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PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL OBSERVATIONS ON TIC[1]

by

S. FERENCZI, Budapest.

I

Psycho-Analysis has done very little so far towards investigating that very common neurotic symptom which, following French nomenclature, goes under the general term of "Tic" or "convulsive Tic".[2] In the notes appended to the account of "Technical Difficulties in the Analysis of Hysteria"[3] in a case I had for treatment, I gave a short digression on this subject, and expressed the opinion that many Tics may turn out to be stereotyped equivalents of Onanism, and that the remarkable connection of Tics with Copralalia when all motor expression is suppressed might be nothing else than the uttered expression of the same erotic emotion usually abreacted in symbolic movements. On the same occasion I drew attention to the close relation between stereotypies and symptomatic acts (in sickness and in health) on the one hand and the Tics, or rather Onanism, on the other. For instance, in the case cited above, these muscular actions and skin irritations carried out apparently without thought and believed to be without meaning were able to seize the whole

[1] Translated by Sybil C. Porter.

[2] See J. Sadger, "Ein Beitrag zum Verständnis des Tic." *Int. Zeitschrift f. Psychoanalyse,* 1914, B. II, S. 354.

[3] Hysterie und Pathoneurosen, Internat. psa. Bibliothek, Nr. 2, S. 48.

of the genital libido; they were at times accompanied by regular orgasm.

When I incidentally discussed the meaning and significance of Tic with Prof. Freud he mentioned that apparently there was an organic factor in the question. In the course of this paper I may be able to show in what sense this view proved to be right.

This is about all the information I was able to gather from psycho-analytical sources about the Tics, nor can I say that since then I have been able to learn anything fresh either from direct observation or from the analysis of "passing" Tics, in spite of the frequency of their appearance in neurotic cases. In the majority of cases one can carry the analysis to a close, and even heal a psychoneurosis, without being obliged to pay much heed to this symptom. On occasions one was led to enquire which psychical situation favoured the appearance of such a tic (e. g. a grimace, a twitch of the shoulders or of the head, etc.). Here and there one can also touch upon the meaning, the sense, of the symptom. One patient of mine continually shook her head vigorously as though saying "No" when carrying out a purely conventional gesture such as taking leave of or greeting anyone. I noticed the movement occurred more frequently and more violently whenever the patient desired to show more feeling, as for instance friendliness, than she really felt and I was obliged to tell her that the shaking of her head was intended to give the lie to the friendly manner or gesture.

I have never so far had a patient who came for analysis for the express purpose of curing a Tic; the minor tics I have had under observation during my analytical practice were so little trouble to the patients that they never complained of them; in each case I had to draw attention to the symptom myself. Naturally under these circumstances all motive was lacking for deeper research and, as stated above, the patients left the treatment with it unaltered.

Now we know this never occurs in the usual analysis of hysteria or obsessional neurosis. The most insignificant symptom can be proved before the end of the analysis to be part of the complicated structure of the neurosis and even to be supported by more than one determining factor. This peculiarity of Tic in itself points to the suggestion that the disturbance in question is in some way differently orientated from other features of a transference neurosis, so that the usual reciprocal action of symptoms

does not apply to it. The circumstance of Tic being peculiar among neurotic phenoma gives strong support to the idea of Freud regarding the heterogeneous (organic) nature of this symptom.

I was helped in the next step forward by a quite different set of data. A patient (an obstinate Onanist) practically never ceased to carry out certain stereotyped actions during analysis. He kept on smoothing his coat to his figure, frequently several times to the minute; in between he assured himself of the smoothness of his skin by stroking his chin or he gazed with satisfaction at his shoes which were always shining and polished. His entire mental attitude, his self-sufficiency, his affected speech couched in balanced phrases to which he was his own most delighted listener, marked him out as a narcissist contentedly in love with himself, who—impotent with women—found his most apposite method of gratification in Onanism. He came for treatment only at the request of a relative and fled from it in haste at the first difficulties.

Although our acquaintanceship was so short it made a decided impression on me. I began to occupy myself with the question of whether the different orientation of the tics mentioned above originated in their being in fact signs of narcissistic disorder that are at the most attached to the symptoms of transference neurosis, but are not capable of fusing with them. I am not taking into account the opinion expressed by many authors that there is a marked distinction between a stereotypy and a tic. In a tic I have seen and continue to see nothing but a stereotypy performed with lightening rapidity, in an abbreviated way, and often only symbolically indicated. The following observations will reveal Tics as the derivatives of stereotypies.

In any case I began to watch *Tiqueurs* that I met in everyday life, in consultation, or in treatment, with regard to their narcissism. I recalled several pronounced cases I had seen medically before I practised Psycho-Analysis and was quite astounded at the amount of confirmatory evidence that literally poured from these sources. One of the first cases I now encountered was a young man who had a repeated twitching of the face and neck muscles. I watched him from a neighbouring table in a restaurant and observed how he behaved. Every few moments he gave a little cough and fidgeted with his cuffs till they were absolutely in order with the links turned outwards. He corrected the sit of his stiff collar with his hand or by means of a movement of the

head or else he made a series of those movements usual with *Tiqueurs* as though he would free his body from the irksomeness of his clothing. In fact he never ceased, although unconsciously, to devote the greater part of his attention *to his own body* or to his clothes, even while he was consciously occupied in quite other directions, such as eating, or reading the paper. I took him for a man possessed of pronounced *hypersensibility and unable to endure a physical stimulus without a defence reaction.* This conjecture was confirmed when I saw to my surprise this young man, who in other respects was well brought up and accustomed to move in good social circles, draw out a small hand-mirror immediately after the meal and in front of those present proceed to clear the remains of food from his teeth with a toothpick and this all the time with the aid of the little glass; he never paused until he had cleaned all his well-kept teeth and he was then visibly satisfied.

Now we all know that remains of food sticking between the teeth can at times be very disturbing, but such a thorough, unpostponable cleansing of all the thirty-two teeth demands a more precise explanation. I recalled to mind a similar view I expressed on a previous occasion[1] on the conditions of genesis of Pathoneuroses, that is to say of "narcissistic disease". The three conditions there put forward under which the *fixation of libido on single organs* can occur are: (1) Danger to life or menace of a trauma; (2) Injury of a part of the body already heavily charged with libido (an erotogenic zone); (3) *Constitutional narcissism when the smallest injury to a part of the body strikes the whole ego.* This latter eventuality fitted in very well with the idea that the over-sensitiveness of tic patients, their incapacity to endure an ordinary stimulus without defence, may also be the motive of their motor expressions, i.e. of the tics and the stereotypies themselves; while the hyperasthesia, which can be either local or general, might be only the expression of narcissism, the strong attachment of the libido to the subject himself, his body or to a part of his body, i.e. "the damming-up of organ libido". In this sense Freud's view of the "organic" nature of tic comes to its own, even if it must be left an open question whether the libido is bound to the organ itself or to its psychical representative.

After attention had been drawn to the narcissistic-organic nature of the tics I recalled several severe cases of tic that, follow-

[1] Hysterie und Pathoneurosen, S. 9.

ing the example of Gilles de la Tourette,[1] one usually designates as "maladie des tics".

These are progressive muscular convulsions affecting practically the entire body which combine later with Echolalia and Coprolalia and can result in dementia. The frequent complication of tics with a typically narcissistic psychosis certainly did not pronounce against the hypothesis that also the motor phenomena of less severe cases of illness of convulsive movement that do not result in dementia owe their origin to narcissistic fixation. The last severe case of tic that I met with was that of a young man who was completely incapacitated in consequence of his psychic oversensitiveness and shot himself as the result of an imagined injury to his honour.

In the majority of textbooks on Psychiatry Tic is scheduled as a "symptom of degeneration", as a sign—often the familiar first sign—of a psychopathic constitution. We are aware that, comparitively speaking, a great number of paranoiacs and schizophrenics suffer from Tic. All this appeared to me to support the suggestion that these psychoses and Tic have the same root. The theory proved to stand on a yet firmer basis when I came to compare the principal symptoms of Tic with the knowledge gained of Catatonia from psychiatry and in particular from psycho-analysis.

The tendency to Echolalia and Echopraxias, to stereotypies, grimacing movements, and mannerisms, is common to both conditions. Psycho-analytical experience with catatonic patients led me some time ago to suspect that the extraordinary behaviour and attitudes were adopted in defence against local (organic) damming-up of libido. A very intelligent catatonic patient who possessed insight to a remarkable degree even told me he was obliged to carry out a certain gymnastic movement continously in order to break down "the erection of the intestine"[2]. In the case of another catatonic patient I could also interpret the occasional rigidity of one or the other extremity, which was connected with a sensation of enormous extension, as a displaced erection i. e. as

[1] Gilles de la Tourette, "Etudes sur une affection nerveuse, caractérisée par l'incoordination motrice, et accompagnée d'écholalie et coprolalie", *Arch. de Neurologie*, 1885.

[2] "Some clinical Observations on Paranoia and Paraphrenia", Contributions to Psycho-Analysis, 1916, by the author.

the expression of abnormal localised organic libido. Federn groups all catatonic symptoms collectively as "organic intoxication".[1] All this fits in with the hypothesis of a common constitutional basis of Tic and Catatonia and explains the broad similarity of their symptoms. At any rate one is tempted to draw an analogy between the principal symptoms of Catatonia — negativism and rigidity — with the immediate defence against all external stimuli by means of convulsive movement in Tic, and to presume that when in the "maladie de Gilles de la Tourette" tics are converted into Catatonia it is merely a question of perpetuating and generalising a partial defence-innervation appearing in Tic only paroxysmally. Tonic rigidity would prove to be a summation of numberless clonic defensive convulsions, in which case Catatonia would be merely the climax of Cataclonia (Tic).

I must not leave the subject without reference in this connection to the well-known fact that tics very often appear as the result of physical illness or traumata *in loco morbi,* i. e. twitching of the lids after a cure for Blepharitis or Conjunctivitis, tic of the nose after Catarrh, particular movements of the extremities after painful inflammation. I must bring this circumstance into connection with the theory that a pathoneurotic increase of libido tends to attach itself to the seat of a pathological somatic alteration (or to its psychic equivalent).[2] The Hyperaesthesia of Tic patients which is frequently only local, could in these cases be traced back to "traumatic" displacement of libido and, as stated above, the motor expression of Tic arises from defence reactions against the stimulation of such parts of the body.

As a further support of the assumption that Tic has something to do with Narcissism I quote the therapeutic successes attained by a certain method of treating Tic. This treatment consists of systematic innervation exercises with enforced quiescence of the twitching part; the success is still more marked if the patient controls himself by looking in a mirror meanwhile. The authors explain that the control by the sense of sight facilitates the graduation of the inhibition innervation necessary to the treatment; it appeared to me, however, that beyond this (or perhaps the greater factor) the distortion of face and body observed in

[1] Quoted from Nunberg's paper, "Über den katatonischen Anfall", *Int. Zeitschrift f. Psychoanalyse,* 1920, Bd. V.

[2] Hysterie und Pathoneurosen, S. 7.

the mirror would have a deterrent effect on Narcissists and function as a powerful encouragement of the healing tendencies.

II

I am well aware of the weak points in the arguments I have advanced. The hypothesis, constructed rather speculatively, for my own use so to speak, on the basis of very meagre observations, would not have been made public but for the fact that its plausibility received essential support from a quite unexpected quarter. For this help I am indebted to the perusal of a book on the Tics, of particularly valuable and conclusive content, in which the whole of the literature on the subject is worked up: "Tic, its Nature and Treatment" by Dr. Henry Meige and Dr. E. Feindel.[1] I should like to connect my further remarks to the contents of this book.

Owing to the particular nature of Psycho-Analysis, physicians who devote themselves to its practice get few opportunities of observing certain forms of nervous disorders such as "organic" neuroses (M. Basedowii) which require physical treatment in the first instance, as well as the psychoses the treatment of which is only possible in asylums, and the many varieties of "common nervousness" which on account of its insignificance is not made the subject of detailed psychotherapy.

For such cases one has to rely on the observations of others and upon literary communications which, although not of the same value as one's own observation, at least has this advantage that one is spared the accusation of biased and prejudiced observation, that one has "suggested" to the patient or been "suggested" to. Meige and Feindel knew hardly anything of the Breuer-Freudian Catharsis; at any rate these names are missing from the index of authors in their book. It is true that "Studies on Hysteria" is referred to in one place, but this appears to be an interpolation of the translator who wished "to draw attention to several German writers whom the French authors had overlooked". Also the translation dates from the early days of psycho-analytical development (1903), so that the far-reaching concurrence of opinions in

[1] German translation by O. Giese.

the work with those of the latest discoveries of Psycho-Analysis is in itself a criterion of an objective argument.

I will quote Trousseau's short but classic description of Tic: "Painless tic consists of momentary twitching of lightning rapidity confined as a rule to a small group of muscles, usually those of the face, though the muscles of the neck, the trunk, the limbs can also be affected ..... With one patient there may occur blinking of the lids, a twitch of the cheeks, the nostrils, or the lips, that makes one think he is pulling faces; with another the head nods or there is a sudden and repeated twist of the neck, with a third a shrug of the shoulders, a spasmodic movement of the stomach muscles or of the diaphragm in short it is an unceasing series of bizarre movements that defy description. In some cases the tic is accompanied by a cry or by a more or less loud vocal sound. The tic may consist entirely of this very characteristic larynx- or diaphragm-chorea. There also occurs a very strange propensity to reiterate a cry or a word, the patient will even utter words in a loud voice which he would rather keep back".[1]

Grasset gives the following account of a patient, a characteristic picture of the manner in which tic can get displaced from one part of the body to another. "A young girl had tics of the mouth and eyes as a child, at fifteen for several months she stuck her right leg out in front, later this leg became lame, then for several months a whistle took the place of the motor disturbances. For a year she would utter a loud cry from time to time: 'Ah'. At eighteen years appeared nodding movements, backward jerks of the head, shrugs of the right shoulder, etc."[2]

These tic displacements often come about in the same manner as compulsive actions which displace the actual and original on to the most distant, only to return in the end to the repressed by a byway. A patient of Meige and Feindel[3] named these secondary tics "Paratics" and recognised clearly that they were in character defence-mechanisms against the primary tics, converted in their turn into tics.

The starting point of a tic may be a hypochondrical self observation. "One day I felt... a crack in the neck" recounted a patient of Meige and Feindel, "at first I thought something had

[1] Quoted from Meige and Feindel, *Op. cit.*, pp. 29 and 30.
[2] *Idem.*, *Op. cit.*, p. 143.
[3] *Idem.*, *Op. cit.*, p. 8.

broken. To make sure I repeated the movement once, twice, three times without noticing the crack. I varied it in a thousand ways and repeated it more and more violently. At last I felt my crack again and this gave me real pleasure ..... however the pleasure was soon disturbed by the fear that I had caused some injury." "Even today ..... I cannot withstand the desire to reproduce the crack and I cannot overcome the feeling of unrest directly I have succeeded".[1] The nature of these sensations, now pleasurable, now anxious, allows us to tabulate them confidently as pathological expressions of the patient's sexuality and of hypochondriacal narcissism in particular. We have here the unusual case of the patient remaining aware of the sensory motive for his stereotyped movement. As we shall see, in the majority of cases the motive becomes an unconscious reminiscence of the real sensation. — Charcot, Brissaud, Meige and Feindel are among the few neurologists who did not disdain to listen if the patient recounted the history of the origin of his trouble. Meige and Feindel say: "only the patient can answer the question of the genesis of his illness (tic) when he harks back to the experiences, often long past, which first gave rise to his motor reactions." With this view in sight, the authors encouraged their patients (although only with the help of the conscious mind) to reproduce those experiences which were to blame for the first appearances of their convulsive actions. We see that the path to the discovery of the unconscious and to its investigation by Psycho-Analysis would have been also possible from this point. They found physical traumata to be often a final explanation: an abscess in the gum was the cause of an inveterate grimace, an operation on the nose a motive for a later wrinkling up of the nose, etc. These authors come near to Charcot's view, according to whom tic is "only a physical illness in appearance and is actually in reality psychical" ... "the direct product of Psychosis ... a form of hereditary Psychosis".[2]

Meige and Feindel have also very much to tell us regarding the character traits of tic patients that we would call "narcissistic". For example, they quote the confession of one patient: "I must admit that I am full of self-love and am particularly sensitive to

[1] *Idem., Op. cit.*

[2] Some disadvantages of this conception lie in the fact that Charcot and his followers often class the tics and obsessions under one heading.

praise or blame. I watch for any words of praise and suffer cruelly from indifference or derision . . . hardest to bear is the thought that I behave in a ridiculous manner and that everyone laughs at me."[1] "When I meet people on the street or in an omnibus I fancy they regard me with a peculiar look of scorn or pity which makes me feel either ashamed or angry." Or "Two persons live in me: one with tic and one without. The first is the son of the second, a worthless child who gives his father much trouble. The father should punish his son but he is generally unable to do so; he therefore remains a slave to the whims of his own creation."

Such confessions show tic patients as of a mentally infantile character, narcissistically fixated, from which the healthily developed part of the personality can with difficulty free itself. The predominance of the pleasure-principle (corresponding to narcissism) can be seen from the following pronouncements: "I only do well what pleases me, that which bores me I either do badly or not at all." "If he has an idea, he must give himself up to it absolutely. He listens to others unwillingly." Further remarks of Meige and Feindel on the infantilism of tic patients run as follows: "The mental condition of tic patients is at a lower age level than it should actually be". "Every tic patient has the mind of a child" (p. 88). "Tic is mental infantilism." "Tic patients are big, badly brought-up children accustomed to give way to their moods never having learned to discipline their wills" (p. 89). "A nineteen year old *Tiqueur* had to be put to bed by 'Mama' and cared for like a baby."[2] He also showed physical signs of infantilism. The incapacity to keep back a thought is purely a psychic pendant to the incapacity to endure a sense stimulus without an immediate defence reaction. Speech is the motor reaction to abreact the preconscious (in thought) psychic tension. In this sense we are in agreement with Charcot's view of the existence of a purely psychic tic. The proofs continue to increase that go to show that it is the narcissistic over-sensitiveness in *Tiqueurs* that results in the in-

[1] *Idem., Op. cit.*, p. 20.

[2] Idiots (who have not emerged from infancy nor therefore from narcissism) very often suffer from tics and stereotypes. Noir compares the balancing and rotating of the head in idiots with "a kind of rocking that quiets the patient and helps him to sleep, and which he much likes"... "it has a similar action to the actual rocking of a little child". *Idem, Op. cit.*, p. 273.

capacity for motor and psychic self-control. This view gives an explanation of the fact that in Tic the apparently heterogeneous symptoms of motor twitching and Coprolalia come to be fused in the same illness. Further character traits of tic patients, easily understood from this standpoint, and described by the authors, are: the ease with which they are excited or tired, Aprosexia, rambling and flight of ideas, the tendency to inordinate desire (Alcoholism), incapacity to endure physical pain or strain. All these traits can be explained in accordance with our views without being arbitrary if in the case of tic patients we think of the tendency to abreact as being heightened and the capacity for psychic retention lowered as the result of enhanced or fixated narcissism, corresponding to Breuer's bi-partition of psychical functioning activities into Abreaction and Retention. Abreaction is a more archaic method of relieving accrued stimulation, it approximates more closely to the physiological reflex than does the still primitive method of control e. g. repression. It is characteristic of animals and children. It is not by chance that the authors state, simply from communications from their patients and from their own conclusions, without any idea of the deeper meaning, that tic patients are often "like children", that they feel themselves young, are unable to govern their emotions, that traits of character seen frequently "in badly brought up children and eradicated in normal persons of adult age by reason and reflection, persist in tic patients in spite of increasing years and that to such a degree that in many characteristics they appear to be nothing but big children."[1]

Their "need of contradiction and opposition" is worthy of special notice, not only on account of the psychical analogy to motor defence reactions in tic patients but because it is also calculated to throw light upon much of the negativism in Schizophrenia. We know through Psycho-Analysis that in Paraphrenia the patient withdraws his libido from the outside world to concentrate it on himself; every outside stimulus, whether it be physiological or psychical, disturbs his new state, he is therefore prepared to withdraw himself from such stimuli by active flight or to ward them off by motor reaction or negativism. But we will subject this question of motor expression to a more penetrating enquiry.

[1] *Idem., Op. cit.*, p. 15.

One can confidently assume that of a series of tics or stereotypies, the secondary if not the chief function is to direct attention and feeling from time to time towards particular parts of the body, as for instance the afore-mentioned stroking of the waist, pulling at or settling the clothing, stretching the neck, extending the breasts (in women), licking and biting the lips and also to some extent grimacing and distorting the face, sucking the teeth, etc. These may be cases in which tic is the outcome of constitutional narcissism, when the inevitable, common outer stimulus calls up the motor symptom. In contradistinction to this there exist cases which one could call pathoneurotic tics, arising from an organ pathologically and traumatically altered by an abnormal libido charge. Our authorities furnish several good examples:

"A girl presses her head on to her shoulder to allay the pain from an abscess in a tooth, an action called forth by a genuine cause, a wholly intentional muscular reaction that has undoubtedly been actuated through the activity of the cerebral cortex. The patient desires to allay the pain by pressing and warming her cheek. The abscess continues, the gesture is repeated with diminishing intention, then more from habit and at last automatically. Still there is reason and purpose in the act, up to the present nothing abnormal has occurred. Now, however, the abscess is healed and the pain ceases but the girl continues to rest her head on her shoulder every few moments. What is now the reason for the movement? What is the purpose? Both have disappeared. What is then this systematic process originally intentional and coordinated and now repeated automatically without reason or purpose? It is Tic."[1] Naturally some part of the authors' explanation remains to be criticised. As they know nothing of the unconscious mind, they hold that tics, in opposition to a conscious act of will, arise without any participation of the mind and as they are unaware of the possibility of a fixation of memory by a trauma and the tendency to reproduction from the unconscious they hold the actions of a *Tiqueur* to be senseless and without purpose.

Obviously, to a psycho-analyst the analogy of the origin of tic and the origin of a hysterical conversion-symptom in the acceptation of Breuer and Freud is at once apparent. Common to both is the possibility of retrogression to a perhaps already forgotten trauma, the affect of which was incompletely abreacted at the

[1] *Idem., Op. cit.*, p. 55. See also the designation of tic: "memory-spasms".

traumatic moment: there are also, however, not unessential differences between the two. In hysteria the physical symptom is only the symbol of a mental shock with the emotion suppressed and the memory of it repressed. In actual Tic the organic injury is the only trauma, which is, it appears, no less qualified to leave behind pathogenic memories than the mental conflict of hysteria. (At any rate the relative independence of tic from actual pathological alteration and its dependence on memories would go to show that the "lasting change" that remains behind after trauma, lies not in the periphery, in the organ itself, but in the psychical representative of the organ.) Hysteria is a transference neurosis in which the libidinous relation to the object (person) is repressed and appears as a conversion-symptom, as it were an auto-erotic symbolisation in the body of the patient himself.[1] In Tic on the contrary, it would seem that no relation to the object is hidden behind the symptom; in this case the memory of the organic trauma itself acts pathogenically.

This differentiation obliges us to introduce a complication into the scheme put forward by Freud on the building up of the "psychical systems". The psychical systems consist of simple reflex arcs in the form of unconscious, preconscious and conscious memory-systems (M-systems) interpolated between the afferent (sensory) and the efferent (motor) apparatus. Now Freud himself already accepts a plurality of such M-systems that are orientated according to the different principles of temporal, formal, or affective association, or association of content. What I should like to introduce here is the acceptance of a particular M-system, that one would have to call the "ego-memory-system", to which fell the task of continually registering the subject's own physical or mental processes. It is self-evident that this system would have a stronger development in a constitutional narcissist than in persons of completely developed object-love, but an unexpectedly powerful trauma can have the result in Tic, as in traumatic neurosis, of an over-strong memory fixation on the attitude of the body at the moment of experiencing the trauma, and that to such a degree as to provoke a perpetual or paroxysmatic reproduction of the attitude. The increased tendency of tic patients to self-observation, to attention to their endosomatic and endopsychical sensations is also remarked

[1] Compare "Hysterische Materialisationsphänomene", in Hysterie und Pathoneurosen, by the author.

on by Meige and Feindel.[1] The "ego-memory system", as well as the system of memory for things, belongs in part to the unconscious and in part extends into the preconscious or into consciousness. To explain the symptom formation in Tic one must suppose a conflict inside the ego (between the ego-nucleus and narcissism), and a process analagous to repression.[2]

We must regard the symptoms of traumatic neurosis as a mixture of narcissistic phenomena and phenomena of conversion-hysteria, and we are in agreement with Freud that they consist in essence of incompletely mastered shock affect, repressed and carried over, abreacted little by little; in addition they show a marked similarity to the "pathoneurotic" tics. I should like, however, also to call particular attention to a remarkable resemblance between the two. Practically all students of the war neuroses agree that neuroses occur almost only after shock *without* severe physical injuries (wounds). Shock complicated by wounds is provided with a corresponding discharge for the shock affect and a favourable path for the distribution of the libido in the organism. This led Freud to form the hypothesis that the addition of severe physical wounds (e. g. a fracture) must expedite the cure of traumatic symptoms. Compare with this the following case-history.[3] "Young M...., who suffered from tic of the face and head, fractured the lower part of the thigh; during the time that his leg was set the tics ceased entirely." The authors consider that this is owing to the attention being diverted; according to our opinion it is due to the diversion of the libido as well. Both views are compatible with the fact that tics can give way before "im-

[1] *Idem., Op. cit.*, pp. 5 and 6. Compare also Psycho-Analysis and the War Neuroses, 1921, (International Psycho-Analytical Library, No. 2) see also "Über zwei Typen der Kriegshysterie" (Hysterie und Pathoneurosen). The mental difference between the manner in which an hysteric and a narcissist register the memory of the same experience reminds us of an anecdote of two sick nurses who were on duty with the same patient on alternate nights. The one reported early in the morning to the doctor, that the patient had slept badly, had been restless, had asked for water so and so many times, etc. The other received the doctor with the words: "Doctor I have had such a bad night!" — The tendency to auto-symbolism is also occasioned by narcissism (Silberer).

[2] We have also met with cases of conflict between ego and libido, inside the ego and inside the libido.

[3] M. and F., *Op. cit.*, p. 111.

portant business" and before "occupation with things of profound interest".[1]

That tics cease entirely during sleep is intelligible from the absolute supremacy of the narcissistic sleep wish and the complete emptying of all other systems of the charge, but it is inessential for the resolution of the question of whether tics are psychogenic or somatogenic. The fact that concurrent illnesses, pregnancy and parturition, increase tics is evidently no argument against their narcissistic genesis.

III

I should now like to subject the chief phenomena of tics — the motor symptom and the dyspraxias (echolalia, coprolalia, imitation mania) — to a somewhat more searching inquiry, relying on the few observations of my own and the wider information of Meige and Feindel.

These authors desire to confine the designation "Tic" to those conditions which show two essential elements: the psychic and the motor (that is the psycho-motor). There is no objection to this restriction of the conception of "Tic", but we consider it would promote the better understanding of the matter if one did not restrict oneself solely to the typical conditions, but also reckoned the purely psychical and even sensory disturbances as of this illness when they correspond essentially to typical cases. We have already mentioned that sensory disturbances are of importance as motives for tic-like twitchings and actions. We must now provide ourselves with a clear understanding of the nature of this operation. I will here refer to an important work by Freud on "Repression" (Samml. kl. Schriften zur Neurosenlehre, Bd. IV., S. 28) where he states as follows: "When an external stimulus becomes internal, for instance, through harassing and destroying an organ, so that there results a fresh source of continuous excitement and increase of tension, ... it acquires .... a far-reaching similarity to an instinct. We know that this condition is experienced in pain."

What is here mentioned of actual pain, must be extended in the case of Tic to the memory of pain. That is to say, in over-sensitive persons (of narcissistic constitution) on the injury of a

[1] *Idem., Op. cit.*, p. 12.

part of the body heavily charged with libido (erotogenic zone) or by other still unknown situations, a dépôt of instinctive stimulus forms in the "ego-memory system" (or in a special organ-memory system) from which unpleasurable excitation will flow to the internal perception even after the disappearance of all results of the external injuries. A particular method of relieving this excitation is by a direct outflow into motility. Which muscles are put into motion, and the particular actions that are carried out, is naturally not a matter of chance. If one takes the very instructive cases of pathoneurotic tic as prototypes of all other kinds, one may assume that the *Tiqueur* will invariably carry out such actions, (or their symbolic rudiments) which were for him the most suitable in warding off or easing the suffering at the time when the external disturbance was an actual fact. We see therefore in this form of tic a new instinct as it were *in statu nascendi* that furnishes us with a complete confirmation of all that which Freud teaches in general on the origin of instincts. According to Freud every instinct is an inherited organised adaptation-reaction to an external stimulus which later without external cause or upon an insignificant external signal is set in motion from within.

There is a variety of methods by which an individual can ward off suffering. The simplest is to withdraw oneself from the stimulus; this corresponds to a series of tics which merit the designation of flight-reflexes. One recognises the general negativism of Catatonia as the climax of this form of reaction. A more complicated tic repeats an active defence against a disturbing exterior stimulus; a third form is directed against the person of the patient. As example of this latter form I mention the widespread scratching tic and the tic when the patient inflicts pain on himself which reaches its climax in the tendency to self-mutilation in Schizophrenia.

A very instructive case is reported in the monograph by Meige and Feindel: "The patient could not keep a pencil or a wooden penholder longer than twenty-four hours without gnawing it from one end to the other. The same thing happened with the handles of sticks and umbrellas; he destroyed an extraordinary amount of; them. To help him out of this predicament he was seized with the idea of having metal penholders and sticks with silver knobs. The result was most disastrous; he bit at them all the more and as he could not destroy the iron and silver he very soon broke

all his teeth. A small abscess then started and the incentive produced by the pain became the source of a fresh mischief. He acquired the habit of loosening his teeth with his fingers, the pen-holders or the stick; he had to have all the incisors taken out one by one, then the eye-teeth and at last the front molars. Then he had a set of teeth made which proved a fresh pretext for tic! With his lips and tongue he continuously shifted the plate about, pushed it back and forth, to the right and left, turned it round in his mouth at the risk of swallowing it."

His own account was: "At times I am seized with the desire to take the plate out... I look for the smallest pretext to be alone for a moment only, then I take the plate out and push it in again at once; my desire is satisfied."

"He had also a tormenting scratching-tic. On every opportunity he felt his face with his hand, or scratched with his fingers at his nose, the corner of his eye, his ear, his cheek, etc. At one moment he would stroke his hair hastily with his hand and at the next he would twist, pull and tear his moustache that at times looked as if it had been cut with scissors."

The following is a case of Dubois': "A girl of twenty years would thrust at her breast with her elbow, the forearm bent back against her upper-arm; she thrust from 15 to 20 times a minute and continued until her elbow had struck the whalebone of her stays sharply. This violent thrust was accompanied by a little cry. The patient seemed only to derive satisfaction from her tic when she had carried out this last thrust."

I will later refer to the connection of similar symptoms with Onanism. Here I will touch on the analogy of the third kind of tic, i. e. the motor discharge ("Turning against one's own person", Freud), with a method of reaction that occurs in certain lower animals, which possess the capacity for "Autotomia". If a part of their body is painfully stimulated they let the part concerned "fall" in the true sense of the word by severing it from the rest of their body by the help of certain specialised muscular actions; others (like certain worms) even fall into several small pieces (they "burst asunder", as it were, from fury). Even the biting off of a painful limb is said to occur. A similar tendency for freeing oneself from a part of the body which causes pain is demonstrated in the normal "scratch-reflex", where the desire to scratch away the stimulated part is clearly indicated, in the tendencies to

self-mutilation in Catatonia and in the like tendencies symbolically represented in the automatic actions of many tic patients, only that in the last mentioned the struggle is not in opposition to an actual disturbing stimulus, but against a detached instinctive stimulus in the "ego-M-system" (organ-M-system). As I have mentioned in my introduction and laid stress on in previous writings,[1] I believe that at least a portion of this enhanced stimulus can be traced back to the local increase of libido accompanying the injury (or connected to the corresponding spheres of sensation). (The psycho-analyst will without hesitation connect the active defence reaction with Sadism and the self-injury with Masochism; in Autotomia we see an archaic prototype of the components of the masochistic instinct.) As is well known, when the intensification of Libido increases beyond the power of the Ego-nucleus to control it, pain is produced; unbearable libido is converted into fear. Meige and Feindel describe as a cardinal symptom of tic-like convulsions that their active or passive suppression calls up reactions of fear and that after the cessation of any prevention or hindering the actions are spasmodically carried out with every sign of pleasure.

The inclination to shake off a stimulus by means of a muscular convulsion or the incapacity to brook any hindering of a motor (or affective) discharge one can, for descriptive purposes, compare with a certain temperament that is known in scientific circles as the "motor type".[2]

The tic patient reacts with over-emphasis for the reason that he is already burdened with an inner instinctive stimulus. It is not impossible that something similar is also the case in one sense or another with the above-mentioned "temperament". At any rate we must reckon the tics as belonging to those cases, whose motility and affectivity are governed, not as is normal by the preconscious, but by undesired and partly unconscious (and as we suggest "organ-erotic") instinctive forces, and that to a degree otherwise only known to occur in psychoses. We have thus one more factor making probable the common (narcissistic) basis of tics and the majority of the psychoses.

[1] Hysterie und Pathoneurosen, S. 7.

[2] The uncontrollable urge to dance at the sound of rhythmical music (Magic Flute!) presents an intuitive picture of the manner in which a sensory, in this case an acoustic, increase of stimulus is relieved by an immediate motor discharge.

The tic malady attacks children as a rule in the sexual latency period, when the tendency for other psycho-motor disturbances (e. g. Chorea) also occurs. It can have various outcomes, apart from remissions, remaining stationary or degenerating into the symptom-complex described by Gilles de la Tourette. To judge by a case that I was able to investigate psycho-analytically, the motor over-sensitiveness can be compensated for in later years by an over-strong inhibition; such as in neurotics who are conspicuous for their excessive caution, exactness and ponderous form of gait and movement.[1]

The authors state that there are also attitude-tics, that is no longer the lightning-like clonic convulsions but tonic rigidity in particular attitudes of the head or a limb. There is no doubt that these cases are transitional between cataclonic and catatonic innervation. Meige and Feindel themselves say explicitly: These phenomena (tonic or attitude tic) approximate nearer to the catatonic attitudes, the pathogenesis of which shows many points of contact with that of attitude-tic! (Meige and Feindel, p. 136.) This is a characteristic example: S. had a "Torticollis" (attitude-tic) towards the left. He set up a considerable muscular resistance to every effort one made to bend his head towards the right. But if one talked to him and occupied his attention during the experiment little by little his head would become quite free and one could turn it in any direction without using any force (Meige and Feindel, p. 136).

Towards the end of the book it appears that one of the authors (H. Meige) even recognised the essential equality of Catatonia and Tic. He mentioned his idea in a paper read before the International Medical Congress at Madrid in 1903. ("L'aptitude catatonique et l'aptitude echopraxique des tiqueurs"). The translator refers to the contents of this paper as follows: "If one examines a number of tic patients the following conclusions are arrived at which are not without interest for the pathogenesis of the trouble ... Many tic patients incline in the most extraordinary manner to retain positions that their limbs adopt or in which they are placed. It is therefore a question of Catatonia. At times this is so strong as to impede an examination of the tendon-reflexes and in several cases to simulate a failure of the knee-jerk. The question has in

[1] On this "action-anxiety" see "On Obscene Words", Contributions to Psycho-Analysis.

reality to do with an exaggerated muscular tension, an enhanced muscle tone. If one asks these patients suddenly to relax a muscle, they often only succeed in doing so after rather a long while. Further one often notices that tic patients have a tendency to repeat passive movements of their limbs in an exaggerated manner. For instance if one moves their arms several times in succession one can observe that the movement will be persisted in for a longer period. Besides the symptom of Catatonia these patients give evidence also of Echopraxia to a decidedly greater degree than normal persons." (Meige and Feindel, p. 386.)

We here have the opportunity to refer to the fourth kind of motor reaction which occurs in a similar way in Tic and Catatonia, namely, Flexibilitas cerea. "Waxen flexibility" consists in the patient passively allowing his limbs to be placed in every sort of position without the smallest muscular resistance and this position is retained for some time. This symptom, as is well-known, also occurs in deep hypnosis.

In another paper[1] in which I dealt with the explanation of psycho-analytical pliability in hypnosis, I traced the weak-willed pliability to the motives of anxiety and love. In "Father-hypnosis" the subject performs all that one asks him to do, as by that means he hopes to escape from the danger threatened by the dreaded hypnotist; in "Mother-hypnosis" he does everything to ensure to himself the love of the hypnotist. If one looks to the animal world for analogies to these methods of adaptation, the pretence of death in certain animals on threatened danger strikes one at once and also that method of adaptation called Mimicry. The "waxen pliability", the catalepsy of catatonia (and the hint of this in tic patients) may be interpreted as bearing a similar meaning. To the man suffering from catatonia everything is of equal value; his interest and libido are concentrated on his own ego; he only desires that the outside world shall leave him in peace. In spite of complete automatic subordination to every opposing will, inwardly he is actually independent of his disturbers; it matters not to him whether his body adopts one position or another, therefore why should he not continue in the physical attitude he has passively accepted? Flight, opposition, and turning against oneself are methods of reaction which nevertheless bear witness of a fairly strong emotional relation to the exterior world. Only in

[1] "Introjection and Transference", Contributions to Psycho-Analysis.

catalepsy does the patient acquire that degree of fakir-like concentration on the inner ego when even his own body appears as something foreign to his ego and is perceived as a part of the environment, whose fate leaves its owner absolutely cold. Catalepsy and Mimicry therefore would be regressions to a much earlier primitive method of adaptation of the organism, an auto-plastic adaptation (adaptation by means of alteration in the organism itself), while flight and defence aim at an alteration in the environment (allo-plastic adaptation).[1]

According to the description in Kraepelin's Textbook on Psychiatry catatonia is often a remarkable mixture of symptoms of imperative automatism and negativism as well as of (tic-like) movements; this would suggest that different methods of motor tension reactions can be present in one and the same case. (Of the stereotyped movements of catatonic patients, which we should describe as tic-like, Kraepelin mentions the following: "Pulling faces, twisting and dislocating the limbs, jumping up and down, turning somersaults, rolling about, clapping the hands, running about, climbing and skipping, uttering senseless sounds and noises." Kraepelin, 'Textbook on Psychiatry', 6th. Edition, Book I.)

In an endeavour to explain Echopraxia and Echolalia in dements and tic patients one must take into consideration the more subtle processes of Ego-psychology to which Freud has drawn our attention.[2] "The development of the ego consists in a separation from primary narcissism and engenders an intensive struggle to regain this. The separation comes about by means of an enforced displacement of libido on to an ego-ideal, and satisfaction comes from fulfilment of the ideal."

Now the fact that the dement and the *Tiqueur* both possess such a strong tendency to imitate everyone in word and action, taking them as it were for an object of identification and ideal, seems to be in opposition to the assertion that they have regressed to the stage of primary narcissism or have never advanced beyond it. This opposition is, however, only apparent. Like other blatant symptoms of Schizophrenia, these exaggerated expressions of the identification-tendency serve the purpose of concealing the lack of real interests; they act, as Freud would express it, in the

[1] See "Hysterische Materialisationsphänomene" in Hysterie und Pathoneurosen, S. 24.

[2] Freud: Samml. kl. Schr., 4e. Folge, S. 109.

struggle for healing, the struggle to regain the lost ego-ideal. But the indifference with which every action, every form of speech, is simply imitated, stamps these identification-displacements as a caricature of the normal search for an ideal; they often operate in an ironical sense.[1]

Meige and Feindel describe cases where even complicated tic ceremonials have been assumed *en bloc*. They emphasise in particular that many *Tiquers* possess the nature of actors and display the inclination to copy every acquaintance. One of their patients assumed as a child the eye-winking of a policeman, who appeared to him as especially imposing. These people are as a matter of fact always on the watch to see how an imposing person "clears his throat and spits". As is generally known, with children tics tend to be contagious.

The antitheses that have been proved in the motor behaviour of patients suffering from Catatonia and Cataclonia are known not to be confined to muscular actions, they have a complete parallel in the speech of these patients. In schizophrenic Catatonia absolute mutism alternates with uncontrollable compulsion to talk and with Echolalia; the first is the pendant to tonic muscular rigidity, the second to an uncontrollable motor tic, and the third to Echokinesis. So-called Coprolalia gives a particularly clear demonstration of the close connection of disturbances of speech and movement. Patients who suffer from it feel compelled to utter aloud without adequate reason words and sentences of erotic, principally anal-erotic, content (curses, obscene words, etc.). This symptom is particularly pronounced when the patient tries to suppress a motor tic.[2] The "detached instinctive energy" mentioned above, finds an outlet to the "ideational motor", the action of speech, when the discharge by mobility is denied it. I should like to connect the fact that it is just speech of an erotic, and above all "organ-erotic" (perverse), nature that finds expression with the so-called "organ-speech" (Freud) of narcissistic psychotics. (In the content of the expressions of schizophrenics references to bodily organs and bodily innervations are often very prominent).

[1] It is well known that imitation is a favourite method of irony; the feeling of annoyance at being copied shows that the action does not fail in its purpose.

[2] On the method of converting repressed actions into thought and speech stimuli see "Technische Schwierigkeiten einer Hysterieanalyse" in Hysterie und Pathoneurosen, S. 49.

IV

Although the observations of the authors are of such value to us, the theoretical conclusions that they deduct from them profit us but little. For the most part their explanations are confined to tracing the symptoms to certain near causes (occasions) or to predisposition or degeneration. Where the patient can offer no explanation for the tic, they regard it as "senseless and without purpose". They forsake the psychological path too soon and lose themselves in physiological speculations. At last they get so far as to accept Brissaud's theory of "hypertrophy of the functioning centre in the brain" (inborn or acquired by constant use), and this they regard as the "central organ of the tic function" in tic patients. Their therapy also is based upon "causing this hypertrophy to recede by a treatment of quiescence". Meige and Feindel speak of "congenital anomaly" of "deficient and faulty development of the cortical association paths and subcortical anastomoses"; of "molecular teratological misconceptions, which our anatomical knowledge unfortunately does not permit of our recognising". Grasset [1] differentiates between the bulbar-spinal "polygonal" and mental tics, in the proper sense of the word. The former Meige and Feindel exclude, with right, from the series of tics and assign it a place among the "cramps"; "mental" tics are those which owe their origin to conscious psychic motor force; Grasset terms "polygonal" tics all those to which we should ascribe unconscious psychic motives. On the basis of a cortical mechanism constructed after the well-known Aphasia scheme, which he calls "Cortex Polygon", he attributes all unconscious and automatic functioning to the functioning of the Polygon. "One dreams with the Polygon", "People in a state of abstraction act with the Polygon", etc. Finally Meige and Feindel come to a decision on the following definition of Tic: "It is not sufficient that a gesture is inappropriate at the moment it occurs, on the contrary it must be certain that at the moment of its being performed it is not in connection with any idea to which it could owe its origin .... If beyond this the action is characterised by too frequent repetition, by constant lack of purpose, by violent urge, difficulty in suppression, and resulting satisfaction, then it is Tic." In one place only they say: "We here find ourselves on the dangerous territory

[1] Anatomie clinique des centres nerveux, Paris 1900.

of the subconscious" and are on their guard against entering this much feared domain.

We cannot, however, reproach them for this, as at that time the doctrine of unconscious mental functions was yet in its infancy. Besides, even to-day after nearly three decades of psycho-analytical work, the scientists of their country lack the courage to tread the path which makes discovery in this "dangerous territory" possible. Meige and Feindel have the merit which is not to be undervalued, of being the first to attempt a psycho-genetic theory of traumatic tic, even if it be incomplete.

As these authors relied upon the conscious expressions and accounts of their patients and had no method at their disposal to arrive at the meaning of what the patients said, sexuality finds no place in their explanations. What a wealth of erotic material — concealed it is true — the histories of the patients contained extracts from the detailed anamnesia of a tic patient of Meige and Feindel will illustrate.

The same tic patient who was mentioned before as having nearly all his teeth removed, also suffered from an "attitude tic": he was obliged to hold his chin high. The idea occurred to him to press his chin on to the head of his walking stick; he then varied it so that he "stuck the stick between his suit and his buttoned-up overcoat, in such a way that the head of the stick appeared in the opening of his collar, and on this his chin found its support. Later, without the stick, his head always needed a support or else it oscillated to and fro without it. At last he was obliged to rest his nose on the back of the chair if he wished to read quietly. His own account will illustrate the further ceremonials he was obliged to carry out.

"To start with I wore a collar of medium height but too tight to get my chin into it. Then I unbuttoned my shirt and let my chin slide into the open collar, strongly bending my head at the same time. For several days the effect of this was satisfying, but the unbuttoned collar did not offer enough resistance. So I bought much higher collars, real cravats into which I forced my chin till I could turn it neither to the right nor to the left. This was perfect, — but only for a short time. However stiff the collars might be they always gave way at last and after a few hours presented a miserable appearance.

"I had to discover something else and the following absurd

idea occurred to me: I fastened a thread to the buttons of my braces, carried it under my waistcoat and finished off the upper end with a small ivory stud which I took between my teeth. The length of the thread was so arranged that I had to bow my head to reach the stud. A splendid trick! — but only for a short time for not only was this position as uncomfortable as it was ridiculous, but also by the continuous pulling my trousers took on a really grotesque and very embarrassing shape. I had to give up this beautiful idea. However I have always preserved a prediliction for this device and even to-day it often happens on the street that I take the collar of my coat or overcoat between my teeth and so walk along. I have bitten up the border of more than one lapel in that way. At home I do differently: I quickly remove the cravat, unbutton the collar of my shirt and bite into that." In consequence of the raised chin he could no longer see his feet when walking. "So I have to be careful when walking, as I cannot see where I step. I know quite well that in order to remove this discomfort I have only to bend down my eyes or my head, but that is just what I cannot do."

The patient still has: "a certain aversion to looking down," and is also inconvenienced by a "shoulder-crack", "analogous to the subluxation of the thumb at will, or the peculiar noises that many people can produce to amuse others". He also produced it as a "small society talent". So long as he was in the society of others, he suppressed his abnormalities, because they made him feel awkward, but "as soon as he was alone he let himself go to his heart's content." "All his tics were let loose, it was an absolute wallow in absurd antics, a motor debauch which eased the patient. He then returned and resumed the interrupted conversation".

His sleeping ceremonials were still more grotesque. "The rubbing of his head on the pillow drove him desperate, he turned himself in every direction to avoid this, ... at last he selected a remarkable attitude which seemed the most efficacious in obviating his tic: he lay on his side quite at the edge of the bed and let his head hang over."

Before we go into the psycho-analytical meaning of the patient's history we must unfortunately express a doubt whether in this case we are dealing with an actual tic or with a severe obsessional neurosis. The distinction between the ceremonial of an obsessional

neurotic, the pedantry and peculiarities of less severe forms of catatonia and the means for defence against a tormenting tic is difficult to determine in many cases and this can often only be done after analysis of several weeks or even longer.[1] Also for a long while "Tic" was used in France as a dumping ground for heterogeneous neurotic conditions, like the "vapeurs" at the beginning of last century or "Psychasthenia" to-day. This doubt prohibits us from making use of the abundant symbolisation of the penis, of onanism, and of castration which appear in the history of this patient, for the purpose of generalising as to the pathogenesis of tics (head, nose, relaxation of the neck muscles, stiff collars, cravat, walking-stick, the stick put between the trousers and the mouth, the knob of the stick in the mouth, the symbolism of irritating teeth, tooth extractions, letting the head hang, etc.). Fortunately in this respect we are not dependent upon a single example. A case that I have closely investigated by analysis[2] showed me quite clearly, that onanistic activities, and genital ones altogether, and erotic excitation of the genitals can be transferred to parts of the body or skin, otherwise not especially erotogenic, in the form of stereotyped movements. The connection with repressed onanism of Onychohyperaesthesia, Onychophagia, sensitiveness of the hair, and the tic-like tugging and tearing of the hair is generally known. Not long ago I was able to break a young man of the worrying habit of biting his nails by a single discussion of his onanistic tendencies.[3] The greater amount of the tics concerns the head and the parts of the face which are particularly favourite spots for symbolical representations of the genital processes.

Meige and Feindel allude to the relationship of the "Occupations cramps" to the tics. These cramps as well as the "occupations delirium" of alcoholism, are in reality substitutes for onanism, as Tausk has pointed out. The peculiar *gêne* that urges *Tiqueurs* to hide or mask their distortions reminds one forcibly of the way in which children are wont to conceal their "Sucking or Pleasure-sucking", described by the pediatrist Lindner of Budapest in 1879.

[1] On this difficulty of differentiating see further note.

[2] Hysterie und Pathoneurosen, "Technische Schwierigkeiten", etc.

[3] A keen-sighted Hungarian surgeon, Prof. Kovács, used to draw the attention of his audiences to the symptom of biting the nails and said these were people who were unable to let prominent parts of the body alone.

"Monasterism" also, the tendency to work off ones feelings in seclusion, may originate in onanism. [1]

In this connection we return to the observations of Gowers and Bernhardt that tics often increase in power at the time of early puberty, pregnancy and childbed, at the time therefore of increased stimulation of the genital regions. Finally if we take into consideration the coprolalia, streaming into anal-erotic obscenities, paraded by many tic patients [2] and their tendency to Enuresis (nocturna and diurna) to which Oppenheim draws attention, we cannot avoid the impression that the significant "displacement from below upwards" so strongly emphasised in neurotics as well as in normal sex development plays no inessential part in the formation of tic.

One can link up this fact with the possibility of tracing back the origin of Tic to an increase of narcissism (which has been a prominent feature of our considerations so far) in the following manner: In the case of "pathoneurotic tic" the injured or stimulated part of the body (or its psychic representative) is charged with excessive interest and libido. The quantity of energy required for this is drawn from the greatest libido reservoir, the genital sexuality, and this must of necessity be accompanied by a decrease of potency in the normal genital sensations. This results in a displacement of not only a certain quantity of energy from below upwards but also a displacement of quality (innervation-character), hence the "genitalisation" of the parts attacked by tic, (excitability, tendency to rhythmical rubbing, in many cases definite orgasm). In cases of tic of "constitutional narcissists" the primacy of the genital zone generally appears to be not quite firmly established, so that even ordinary stimuli or unavoidable disturbances result in a similar displacement. Onanism would thus still be a half

[1] The word "tic" is according to Meige and Feindel an "onomatopoetikon". It is like a short sound. *Zucken, Ticken, Tic* in German; *tic, tiquer, tiqué* in French; *tug, tick* in English; *ticchio* in Italian; *tico* in Spanish, all have the same root and the same onomatopoetical origin (M. and F., *Op. cit.*, p. 29). We must remember in this connection that in consequence of a peculiar and general acoustic synaesthesia the palpitation of the erection of the clitoris is described by the majority of women as "klopfen" (knocking).

[2] There are also otherwise healthy people who are impelled to speak their thoughts at once, e. g. murmur when reading or talk to themselves. According to Stricker every thought is accompanied by a slight innervation of the motor organ of speech.

narcissistic sexual activity from which the transition to normal satisfaction in a foreign object would be just as possible as also the regression to auto-erotism.

I will here touch upon some reflections that I shall refer to later in another connection. To me genital sexuality appears as the sum of auto-erotism displaced upon the genitalia, which in this "displacement downwards" carries with it not only its qualities but the "innervation-characters" in addition ("Amphimyxis of Auto-erotism"). The chief quantity of genitality is furnished by urethral- and anal-erotism. In pathological "displacement upwards" genitality appears to some extent to divide itself up into its component parts, which must lead to the strengthening of certain urethral- or anal-erotic features. The strengthening concerns not only the organ-erotism itself, but also its derivatives, the so-called anal- or urethral-character traits. As urethral characteristics I mention (in Tic and Catatonia) the incapacity to endure strain, the urge to discharge at once every increased stimulus, every affect, by a motor-reaction and uncontrollable speech impulses. The following are probably anal characteristics: the tendency to rigidity, negativism, and muteness, viz. the "phonator" tics.

I also draw attention to what Sadger terms "muscle-erotism" and the constitutional reinforcement of the pleasure of movement (which Abraham has pointed out), which can fundamentally encourage the appearance of motor phenomena in Tic and in Catatonia.

V

It cannot but occur to me that the "genitalisation of auto-erotism", to the consequences of which I attribute the motor expressions of Tic and Catatonia, I have already described in earlier works as the origin of the hysterical "materialisation phenomena" (in conversion hysteria). I cannot shirk this knotty problem any longer, but must endeavour to substantiate the differences that in spite of many similarities divide these conditions from each other. I have already mentioned the essential difference between an hysterical conversion symptom and the localised physical symptom of a narcissistic neurosis (Tic, Catatonia). In hysteria, which is a transference neurosis, the repressed pathogenic material belongs to the

memory-traces in the unconscious for things, that refer to the libido objects (persons). In consequence of the incessant reciprocal associative linking-up of the memory-systems of "the thing" and of "the ego" (body), the pathogenic psychic material of the hysteric can use the associated physical memory material as a means of expression. That is the explanation of the so-called "physical approach" which Breuer and Freud remarked on in reference to the very first analysed cases of hysteria. In the celebrated case of the patient "Anna" the hysterical paralysis of the arm was traced back to the fact that in a most critical moment when contending tendencies came into conflict, her arm was inadvertently left hanging over the back of the chair and had "gone to sleep". In similar manner a tear that obscured her sight was the cause of Macropsia which developed later. The accidental catarrh of a patient of Freud's (Dora) was the finely graduated means of expressing the most complicated love emotions under the mask of a "nervous cough". Thus in conversion-hysteria the object memories repressed by psychic energy are used to reinforce and finally to "materialise" the ego (body) memories associated with them. This is the mechanism of the "leap from the mental to the physical" in the formation of hysterical symptoms.

In Tic on the contrary, traumatic ego (body) memory forces itself spontaneously to the fore on every occasion that offers. One could say that Tic and Catatonia are in reality ego-hysterias. Or expressed in the terminology of the libido theory: the hysterical conversion-symptoms are expressions of (genital) object love, clothed in the form of auto-erotism, while the tics and catatonias are auto-erotism which has to some extent adopted genital qualities.[1]

Finally we must also compare the motor expressions of obsessive actions. We know through Freud, that these actions are psychic protective measures with the object of guarding against

[1] See in this connection the following passage from the important work of Nunberg on the catatonic attack *(Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse,* 1920, Bd. V, S. 49). "In conclusion I should like to refer to the many singularly striking similarities between catatonic and hysteric attacks, as, for instance, the 'dramatisation' and *Angst.* There is, however, this difference between them, namely, that while in Hysteria we are concerned with a Libido-charge of an object, in Catatonia a Libido-charge of an organ takes place."

Also, the perversions of adults are of course "genitalised" auto-erotism (Perversion is indeed the "Positive of Hysteria").

the return of certain painful thoughts; they are actually physical "displacement substitutes" for compulsive thoughts.

Obsessive actions are chiefly differentiated from the tics and stereotypies by their greater complexity; they are real actions that aim at the alteration of the external world (chiefly in an ambivalent sense) and in which narcissism plays no part or else a subordinate one.

A differential diagnosis of these motor symptoms is often only possible after prolonged psycho-analysis.

A SHORT STUDY OF THE LIFE AND CHARACTER OF MOHAMMED

by

OWEN BERKELEY-HILL, Ranchi, India.

The psychology of Freud, which has for its leading *motif* the insistence on a rigid determinism in all psychic processes, has led not only Freud himself,[1] but many others, who have found themselves irresistibly drawn to accept at least this principle of his doctrine, to submit to a psycho-analytical dissection a variety of historical personalities.

To undertake a psycho-analysis of the prophet Mohammed may appear at first sight to be a rather fantastic enterprise, but in view of the fact that Abraham[2] has subjected the Egyptian Pharaoh, Amenhotep IV, who lived nearly 2,000 years before Christ, to a most fruitful analysis, I have been tempted to undertake a review of the character of Mohammed along somewhat similar lines, for there is nothing shadowy or mysterious in the records of the life of the Great Arabian Prophet. We know as much of Mohammed as we do even of Luther and Milton.

As in the case of Amenhotep, there exists in the life-history of Mohammed an abundance of evidence which points unmistakably to the existence of a prodigious "parental complex". Therefore it is by no means unlikely that a psycho-analytic survey of the material at our disposal will enable us to recognise at least some of the psychogenic factors which impelled Mohammed to devote his life to the formulation and propagation of a religious and social system that is still, after thirteen centuries, accepted almost without question by a quarter of the population of the world.

After reading Abraham's fascinating analysis of the character-traits of Amenhotep IV, one cannot fail to be struck by the

[1] See his "Leonardo da Vinci" in "Schriften zur angewandten Seelenkunde", 1910.

[2] See *Imago* 1912, Bd. I.

numerous points of resemblance between the young Pharaoh and the aristocratic Arab.

The character and activities of both men had their roots in an intense "father-complex" involving a strong infantile fixation in regard to the mother. For Amenhotep the roots of his vengefulness[1] lay in the beautiful and gifted Asiatic princess, Teje; while the incestuous love of Mohammed was directed towards the gentle Amina, daughter of Khuweilid, whose very name "Amina", "the Faithful", is daily in the mouth of every Muslim throughout the world.

In the case of Mohammed the "Father-complex" was of a rather peculiar kind since, being born a posthumous child, he never knew his father. The place of the father was taken by his grandfather,

[1] Another most significant feature in the determination of the vengefulness of Amenhotep and Mohammed, was the absence of male offspring to both of them.

Since modern psychology began to throw light on the dark places of the unconscious life of mankind, few more notable discoveries have been made than those dealing with the ebb and flow of the eternal struggle between father and son, the fall and rise of ever-succeeding generations.

It has been shown that the desire for children, but more especially male children, which is a characteristic of all races the world over, is not motivated solely by the instinct of reproduction but also by the desire of the parent, and that generally the male parent, to possess a natural and obvious means to avenge himself of the wrongs done to him by his own father. This intense desire to beget sons has doubtless played a great part in the institution of polygamy, and, conceivably, a still greater one as regards polyandry, especially polyandry of the type practised by the Todas of India, where the brothers of a family unite as husbands of one woman so that among the Todas, in asking a man if he is married, one says, "Is there a son?"

Besides the desire to have a son to enable a man to overcome his father, it seems not improbable there exists along with this desire another, a sort of corrollary to it, namely, to have a son to perform expiatory rites for the peace of his soul, in short, someone who will pray the gods to forgive the father for what the father did to his own father, and so to palliate the guilt-complex in which the generations are co-partners. In the ancestor worship of the Chinese and in the Hindu ceremony of Sraddha we meet with the apotheosis of the expression of this unconscious wish.

When however the individual man is deprived by circumstances of male offspring, we may occasionally observe him to turn elsewhither in search of the means to gratify his vengefulness, and as such seekers both Amenhotep and Mohammed are examples.

When Amenhotep began to express his desire to avenge himself on his father by initiating the religious crusade which was to lead to the *boule-*

hence for Mohammed there was strictly speaking a "grandfather-", rather than a "father-complex".

As with Amenhotep, so with Mohammed; in neither did the aggressive impulses find expression in any active hostility against the objects of their jealous dislike. In both men the impulses underwent immensities of sublimation, so that both sought and found a solution to their respective conflicts in waging a life-long war on the traditions, religious, political and social, of their people.

Doubtless the aggressive impulses (against the father) of Amenhotep underwent a far greater degree of sublimation than those of Mohammed, so that his character became in the end more essentially to resemble that of Jesus of Nazareth than that of the founder

versement of Egypt and to the ruin of his dynasty, he was only twenty-four years of age but already the father of four daughters. Although he could not have known at that age that time would not bring him the sacrifice in the shape of a son, he acted nevertheless as if his future in this respect had been vouchsafed to him. In the case of Mohammed it was slightly otherwise. Khadijah bore him two sons and four daughters. The first-born, a son, was named Câsim, but he only lived two years. Last of all was born the second son and he died in infancy. It must have been at the death of this second son, his last-born child, when the beloved Khadijah was at the advanced age of fifty-seven and the idea of making another marriage had not yet come to him, that Mohammed probably felt that all hope of obtaining his desire was now past, for from this moment forth there began that second period of intense brooding which led to the furious outburst recorded in the ninety-sixth Surah of the Koran which may be taken as marking the starting point of Islam.

That Mohammed married again after the death of Khadijah, and, in addition, permitted himself many more wives than the number he prescribed for his followers, was doubtless due in part to a return of the desire to obtain male offspring, and twenty-five years after the birth of his last child we find him once more the father of a son, the child of the Coptic concubine Mary. That this child can have been named Ibrahim (Abraham) seems to point to the fact that the mind of Mohammed still retained memories of the terrible father who would have sacrificed his son, (Isaac). But the little Ibrahim was doomed, like his brothers, to a short life, and at the age of fifteen months we find him lying in a palm-grove near the house of his nurse — dying. We see too the aged Prophet struggling to prevent his tremendous sorrow from bursting into expression, for had he not himself forbade his followers from wailing aloud? "Ibrahim! O Ibrahim!" he sobbed, "if it were not that this promise is faithful, and the hope of resurrection sure, if it were not that this is the way to be trodden by all, and the last of us shall join the first, I would grieve for thee with a grief deeper even than this!"

of Islam, for the hatred of Amenhotep for his father found its final expression in a consuming love for all created things.

The intensity of the unconscious feeling of both these men can only be measured by the stupendous revolution brought about by them. This tendency to attack the authority of the father in the realm of religion and politics, as exemplified in the lives of Amenhotep and Mohammed, is not confined to individuals who show no other manifestation of mental derangement, but is now recognised to be a notable symptom of certain varieties of psychoneurosis. As Amenhotep cast out Amon, the god of his father, and transferred his reverence to Aton on whom he conferred a might and majesty hitherto unknown to the gods of Egypt, so Mohammed cast out the gods of his father, Al-lat, Al-Uzza and Manah, who were worshipped as angels under female names, and preached the worship of the Jevohah of the Hebrews, modified to fit the demands of his phantasy. Thus:

"They do not call besides Him on any thing but inanimate objects, and they do not call on any thing but a devil devoid of all good," (Koran, Chapter IV, v. 117) and again,

> "Have you then considered the Lat and the Uzza,
> And Manat, the third, the last?
> What! for you the males and for Him the females!
> This indeed is an unjust division!

They are naught but names which you have named, you and your fathers; Allah has not sent for them any authority. They follow naught but conjecture and the low desires which (their) souls incline to; and certainly the guidance has come to them from their Lord.

"Or shall man have what he wishes?" (Koran, Chapter LIII, v. 19–24).

But in spite of the strength of the revolutionary tendencies of Amenhotep and Mohammed, we can observe in both a willingness to compromise on certain points, an attitude of mind that[1] is frequently a feature of the behaviour of psychoneurotics. This willingness to compromise may be taken as an indication that the desire for paternal control is never entirely lost, even when the antagonism to it reaches its highest point of development.

Although Amenhotep broke with the ancient worship of Amon,

[1] As Abraham has pointed out, *op. cit.* S. 342.

the god of his father, and turned to the cult of Aton, he nevertheless resuscitated the worship of the Sun, which had been peculiar to Lower Egypt from time immemorial.

Similarly, Mohammed attempted on two notable occasions compromises with the past. The first compromise concerned itself with the worship of the ancient idols, Al-lat, Al-Uzza, and Manah, to which reference has already been made, for, although Mohammed ended by casting them all out, he was impelled originally to except them from expulsion from the new régime.

The story goes that one day at a gathering of the chief men of Mecca, Mohammed appeared and seating himself by them in a friendly manner began to recite in their hearing Chapter LIII of the Koran. The chapter opens with a description of the first visit of Gabriel to Mohammed and then unfolds a second vision of that angel, at which certain heavenly mysteries were revealed. The passage is as follows:

> " 'He also saw him (Gabriel) at another descent,
> By the Lote-tree at the furthest boundary,
> Near to which is the Paradise of rest.
> When the Lote-tree covered that which it covered,
> His sight turned not aside, neither did it wander.
> And verily he beheld some of the greatest Signs of his Lord
> And see ye not Lat and Ozza,
> And Manat the third besides?'

"When he had reached this verse, the devil suggested to Mahomet an expression of thoughts which had long possessed his soul; and put into his mouth words of reconciliation and compromise such as he had been yearning that God might send unto his people, namely:

> 'These are exalted Females,
> And verily their intercession is to be hoped for.'

"The Coreish were astonished and delighted with this acknowledgment of their deities; and as Mahomet wound up the Sura with these closing words,

> 'Wherefore bow down before God, and serve Him,'

the whole assembly prostrated themselves with one accord on the ground and worshipped. Walid alone, unable from the infir-

mities of age to bow down, took a handful of earth and worshipped, pressing it to his forehead.

"Thus all the people were pleased at that which Mahomet had spoken, and they began to say: 'Now we know that it is the Lord alone that giveth life and taketh it away, that createth and supporteth. And as for these our goddesses, they make intercession with Him for us; wherefore, as thou hast conceded unto them a portion, we are content to follow thee.' But their words disquieted Mahomet, and he retired to his house. In the evening Gabriel visited him; and the Prophet (as was his wont) recited the Sura unto him. And Gabriel said: 'What is this that thou hast done? thou hast repeated before the people words that I never gave unto thee.' So Mahomet grieved sore, and feared the Lord greatly; and he said, I have spoken of God that which He hath not said. But the Lord comforted his Prophet, and restored his confidence, and cancelled the verse and revealed the true reading thereof (as it now stands), namely:

'And see ye not Lat and Ozza,
And Manat the third beside?
What! shall there be male progeny unto you, and female unto Him?
That were indeed an unjust partition!
They are naught but names, which ye and your fathers have invented,' etc.

"Now when the Coreish heard this, they spoke among themselves, saying: 'Mahomet hath repented his favourable mention of the rank of our goddesses with the Lord. He hath changed the same, and brought other words intstead.' So the two Satanic verses were in the mouth of every one of the unbelievers, and they increased their malice, and stirred them up to persecute the faithful with still greater severity.

"Pious Mussulmans of after days, scandalized at the lapse of their Prophet into so flagrant a concession, would reject the whole story. But the authorities are too strong to be impugned. It is hardly possible to conceive how the tale, if not in some shape or other founded in truth, could ever have been invented. The stubborn fact remains, and is by all admitted, that the first refugees did return about this time from Abyssinia; and that they returned in consequence of a rumour that Mecca was converted. To this

fact the narratives of Wackidi and Tabari afford the only intelligible clue. At the same time it is by no means necessary that we should literally adopt the exculpatory version of Mahometan tradition; or seek, in a supernatural interposition, the explanation of actions to be equally accounted for by the natural workings of the Prophet's mind."[1]

The second compromise was a more important one, since it involved the retention of that most ancient and strange edifice the Kaaba — as the ὀμφαλὸς γῆς of Islam. In this case the rationalisations wherewith to justify the sanctity of the Kaaba were more successful than those required to retain as sacred the three "exalted females". Although Jerusalem had been the first "Kebleh", Mohammed, shortly after his flight to Medina, exchanged it for Mecca, thus linking Islam with the ancient pagan cult of his fathers instead of with Judaism.

It was not difficult to justify the retention of a building which was after all a *divine* institution. Was it not a temple built by Adam at the command of God in the likeness of a house he had seen in paradise before the Fall? Had it not been rebuilt after the Flood by the patriarchs Abraham and Ishmael and re-consecrated to the service of the true God from which high state it had fallen in the course of time through ignorance? Did not the appointed compassing of it symbolise the circling course of the heavenly bodies and the obedience of all creation to the Deity? Was not pious devotion nurtured by kissing the sacred corner stone? The slaying of sacrifices in commemoration of Abraham's readiness to offer up his son, signified a like submission.

Thus it came about that this strange cube of masonry, forty feet square, has remained to the present day, so that, in spite of a total lack of beauty or majesty, it continues to inspire many Muslims with such awe that on the day of the Hag many fear to look upwards near the Kaaba, so literally do they interpret the expression "house of God". Later on we shall have occasion to refer to one more striking instance of this "compromise-formation", as Abraham calls it, in the attitude adopted by Mohammed towards the "authority" of rulers and parents.

In spite, therefore, of the intense desire experienced by both Amenhotep and Mohammed to replace the father and grandfather respectively, by himself, it was impossible to dispense with a power

[1] Muir: Life of Mahomet, p. 87.

whose authority would be greater than his own (i. e. as the father's authority had been), with the result that each created for himself, according to his own peculiar phantasy, a religion which had for its central point a Divine Father. Each gave to his Divine creation unlimited power, such power in fact as the child supposes his father to possess. Thus the creation by Amenhotep and Mohammed of a One and Only God, typifies the feeling shared by both alike as regards the "oneness" of the father. As Mohammed may be regarded as having revived the manotheism of Moses, so Amenhotep may be said to have anticipated it! Thus:

"In the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful

1. Say: He, Allah, is one.
2. Allah is He on whom all depend.
3. He begets not, nor is He begotten.
4. And none is like Him" (Koran, Chapter CXII).

Mohammed reasserts that which had been the life of the old Hebrew nation, and the burden of the song of every Hebrew prophet, that God not only lives but that he is a righteous and merciful ruler; and that to his will it is the duty and privilege of all living men to bow.[1] But the God of Islam was to be a more compelling and authoritative God than Jehovah. As the Jew surrendered his birthright if he imparted his faith to other peoples, so the Muslim was to surrender his if he did not spread his faith wherever and however he might. Thus:

"And it does not beseem the believers that they should go forth all together; why should not then a company from every party from among them go forth that they may apply themselves to obtain understanding in religion, and that they may warn their people when they come back to them that they may be cautious?" (Koran, Chapter IX, v. 122.)

But it was not only with the creation of a One and Only God that Mohammed was concerned; he was also deeply involved in the question of the relationship that he himself should bear to this creation. As Abraham points out,[2] the father is for the child the personification of power and greatness, so that, if at any time a child experiences feelings of hostility against his father, the son tends in phantasy to raise the paternal authority to the level of sovereignty so that in the end he himself becomes as it

[1] Bosworth Smith: Mohammed and Mohammedanism.

[2] *op. cit.*

were the son of an imaginary king, and the real father recedes into the position of a sort of foster-father. Thus springs into being that very common phantasy of youth in which the boy fancies, himself to be a prince.

Among the insane we frequently meet with delusions of noble birth which take their origin in ideas of hostility against the father. The same thing is to be found in myths and fairy tales, wherein the hero is brought up by lowly parents, but later comes into those princely rights to which he was from the first entitled by the nobility of his birth. In fairy stories of this sort the age-long conflict between father and son finds expression under all sorts of disguises. Both Amenhotep and Mohammed were so placed by the circumstances of their birth that, for each to rise to a higher degree of sovereignty than his father, it was necessary to appeal to the super-human. Although Mohammed was not, like Amenhotep, the son of a king, there was nothing, humanly speaking, greater for him than his tribe, the Coreish, at the pinnacle of whose aristocratic eminence reigned the venerable patriarch, his grandfather, Abd-ul-Muttalib. What better replacement figure of his grandfather could be found than the god of the Hebrews, of the patriarchs Abraham, Isaac and Moses? Did not the god of the Patriarchs bear the very features of the patriarchs themselves? As a product therefore of the same type of unconscious ideas that gave rise to the adoption of Aton by Amenhotep as the god of Egypt, and of Jehovah by Moses as the god of Israel, there sprang into being that Allah, the Creator of All, the Originator, the Sustainer, the Destroyer, the Lord, the Master, the Just, the Merciful. Among the almost endless list of appellations wherewith Allah may be addressed it is significant to find not only that the name of "Father" finds no place, but it is forbidden to address Allah by this name. We are therefore at liberty to conclude that this omission is yet another expression of the workings of Mohammed's mind under the influence of the "Father-complex".

Furthermore, as in Aton and Jehovah were reflected the personality of Amenhotep and Moses respectively, so Allah became the reflection, magnified perhaps, of the personality of Mohammed, and from these divine prototypes which were the outcome of their creative phantasies, each was able to draw that fiery zeal and wield that tremendous power which made their careers so remarkable in the history of mankind.

Another notable point of similarity between these two great reformers is that both of them suffered from periodical attacks of a paroxysmal kind, thus indicating an indubitable neuropathic temperament.

Strange and graphic accounts of these attacks have been preserved to us by Ayesha, the girl-wife of Mohammed, in which she describes the physical phenomena attending these seizures. Ayesha records of the prophet that, "he heard as it were the ringing of a bell; he fell down as one dead; he sobbed like a camel; he felt as though he were being rent in pieces, and when he came to himself he felt as though words had been written on his heart".

Sprenger, the author of "Das Leben und die Lehre des Mohammed",[1] has described these fits most minutely and with a great deal of curious learning. He thinks that Mohammed, "suffered from hysteria, followed by catalepsy rather than epilepsy".

In regard to their married life both Amenhotep and Mohammed were exceptional. The young Pharaoh, contrary to established custom, clung passionately to a single wife throughout his short reign; while Mohammed lived for twenty-five years a life of punctilious fidelity to the elderly Khadijah, although the customs and traditions of his race permitted the grossest license as regards sexual intercourse.

Now Mohammed was the only and posthumous child of Abd-ullah, the son of Abd-ul-Muttalib. Abd-ullah was one of the most beautiful and refined youths of his time, and his name, Abd-ullah "Servant of God", was not an uncommon one among ante-Mohammedan Arabs. His family belonged to the most ancient and illustrious tribe of the Coreish, whose strength and influence had been established by his ancestor, at the fourth remove, the famous Cossai. Abd-ullah's father, Abd-ul-Muttalib, held the coveted office of entertaining all pilgrims to Mecca, a position which carried with it great power and influence.

When Abd-ullah was twenty-four years of age his father married him to Amina, the niece of Wuheib, who was a descendant of the famous Cossai, founder of the fortunes of the Coreish. At the same time Abd-ullah's father, Abd-ul-Muttalib, in spite of his advanced age, married Halah the cousin of Amina and daughter of Wuheib.

Shortly after his marriage with Amina, Abd-ullah set out on

[1] Quoted by Bosworth Smith, *op. cit.*

a mercantile expedition to Syria, from which he never returned, being overtaken with a fatal illness and dying at Medina.

Mohammed was born shortly after his father's death and this concatenation was probably one of the most important events in the career of the prophet, since it must have influenced the lines along which his Œdipus-complex developed.

Either as the result of the ill-health of his mother, Amina,[1] or because it was customary among the better class Arab families of those times,[2] Mohammed was put out to nurse, and he was first suckled by a slave-woman of his uncle Lahab, his father's brother. This woman had recently suckled Lahab's youngest brother, Hamza, so Mohammed thus became foster-brother to his own uncle — an event which in all probability contributed later to the development of his chief phantasy.

Later Mohammed was given another wet-nurse, Halima, and she took him away with her to her tribe, the Bani Sad, so that for two years, until she weaned him, Mohammed did not see his mother. Halima then brought Mohammed to this mother, and the sight of so sturdy a child delighted Amina so much that she begged Halima to take the child back again with her to the desert, which, accordingly, Halima did, and for another two years the young Mohammed remained among the Bani Sad.

When about four years of age Mohammed suffered, for the first time, from one of those paroxysmal attacks to which allusion has already been made. In spite of a good deal of uneasy apprehension which the onset of these seizures aroused in the mind of Halima, she continued, at the earnest entreaty of Amina, to keep Mohammed with her for yet one more year, after which she restored the child to his mother.

In the sixth year of his life Mohammed was taken by his mother to visit her relatives in Medina and she alighted from her camel at the house where her husband had died and was buried. This visit to Medina was vividly recalled by Mohammed in after years, when, at the age of fifty-three he once more gazed upon the house. "Here", he said, "it was my mother lodged with me; in this place is the tomb of my father."

On the return journey to Mecca, Amina fell ill and died. The little orphan was carried back to Mecca by Omm Ayman, his

[1] Bosworth Smith, *op. cit.*

[2] Muir, *op. cit.*

Ethiopian nurse, and committed to the care of his grandfather Abd-ul-Muttalib.[1]

It is recorded of the old man that he became greatly attached to his grandchild, and permitted him to take liberties that aroused the jealousy of his sons, who would attempt to drive the child away. "Let my little son alone", the old man would say, making room for him on the rug on which he sat. Mohammed soon began to feel and appreciate the bereavement he had suffered in the loss of both his parents and became, it is recorded, a pensive and meditative child. It is obvious that the tenderness shewn to him by his grandfather, as well as the nobility of the patriarch to whom such great deference was always paid, must have greatly impressed the imagination of the child, more particularly when he began to weave what Freud terms his "Family Romance",[2] wherein the replacement of the father by a more agreeable substitute is the most prominent phantasy.

In the case of Mohammed there must have been a departure from the line which this phantasy-formation usually follows, since as we have already observed, Mohammed was the posthumous child of this father and, in addition, he did not live for more than a few months in contact with his mother, during the whole course of his life. Hence that feeling of hostility usually reserved for the father, was in the case of Mohammed reserved for his grandfather, who came to play in every respect the rôle of father. Furthermore, the peculiar circumstances of Mohammed's life must have given rise to the idea that for him his father and mother had never existed, an illusion which must have received considerable support by his constant association with his young step-grandmother, who was of the same generation as his own mother, being her first cousin, as well as with his young uncle Hamza, who was also his foster-brother. At least one result of this con-

[1] In a footnote to his sketch of the life history of Amenhotep, Abraham calls attention to the important rôle the wet-nurse may play in the life of the child and how with the neurotic "genießt sehr häufig die Amme einen besonderen Vorzug". In this respect also both Amenhotep and Mohammed displayed similar tendencies. It is recorded that the wet-nurse of Amenhotep was permitted by him to take up a prominent place at his court, while Mohammed never omitted to pay affectionate compliments to Halima, and for the devoted Omm Ayman he found a husband in no less a person than his own beloved adopted son, Zeid bin Haritha.

[2] See Rank: Der Mythus von der Geburt des Helden.

dition of Mohammed's early life may have been to evoke that desire, which is very common in children, namely to become the parents of their own parents. This curious construction of the imagination is closely connected with incestuous wishes, since it is an exaggerated form of the commoner desire to be one's own father.[1]

In this connection we may note that Mohammed was always very particular in his numerous references to Mary the mother of Jesus, and the doctrine of the immaculate conception was strongly upheld by him. The conception of Mary and the birth of Jesus are described in detail in the Koran and the calumny of the Jews that Mary was guilty of fornication is denounced in Chapter IV, v. 156.

Finally Mary is placed by Mohammed among the four perfect women of the world — the other three being Miriam (Mary) the sister of Moses, Khadijah his wife, and Fatima his eldest daughter by Khadijah.

The guardianship of Abd-ul-Muttalib lasted only two years. At his death the charge of the orphan Mohammed was taken over by his uncle Abu Talib, elder brother of Mohammed's father. Abu Talib was no less zealous in his devotion to the child than his father had been. He made him sleep by his bed, eat by his side and go with him whenever he walked abroad.

About this time Mohammed began to employ himself in tending the flocks of sheep and goats on the neighbouring hills, and it was while thus occupied that his love of brooding in retirement began to develop into a passion. In adopting this attitude towards the world in which he lived, that is to say towards the world of reality, we can discern a further manifestation of Mohammed's neuropathic disposition, as well as the lines along which his phantasy formation was beginning to urge him.

In the words of Rank: "Der Neurotiker lebt dann nicht mehr in der Welt der wirklichen Geschehnisse, sondern in einer anderen, von seiner Phantasie geschaffenen".

Among the many subjects that occupied his attention at this time, there was one above all on which it appears that he dwelt in wrapt contemplation, and that was the life and character of Moses.

With the story of the great Hebrew law-giver the Arabs had

[1] See Ernest Jones: Papers on Psycho-Analysis pp. 653 and 234, and Rank: *op. cit.*

been acquainted long before the utterance of Chapter VII of the Koran, which is entitled the "History of Moses". In his later days Mohammed was wont to remark that "God has never chosen any one to be a prophet who had not, like Moses, like David, or like himself, tended sheep in the wilderness". There is little doubt that as Mohammed grew older he identified himself more and more with Moses, partly because he felt himself to be like him and wanted to be more like him, and partly because he found in the Jehovah of Moses the prototype of the Allah of his own creative phantasy.

That Mohammed was now becoming the subject of intense repression in certain aspects of his mental development, nothing affords a better measure than the phenomenal chastity of the young Arab at this period of his life, who, although he belonged to a race which, according to Wavell,[1] has absorbed nine-tenths of the entire amount of the erotic passion destined for the whole of mankind, the correctness of his deportment and the purity of his life were so exceptional that some of his biographers have been led to ascribe the preservation of his chastity to the special intervention of Providence.

Certainly Mohammed's life had been up to this time free from any sexual experience, a fact to which he bore witness in later life. For example, he relates how one night he had entered the town to divert himself, "even as youths are wont by night to divert themselves," when he was arrested by heavenly strains of music and, sitting down, slept till morning. Thus he escaped temptation. "And after this", said Mohammed, "I no more sought after vice; even until I had attained unto the prophetic office."[2]

If Mecca, in the days of the youthful Mohammed, was anything like the Mecca of the twentieth century as so vividly described by Wavell,[3] who maintains that the inhabitants of the holy cities, (Mecca and Medina), are given to all the vices of the cities of the Plain and a few more besides of modern introduction, we are left with only two possible alternatives to explain the purity of Mohammed's life, viz. either he was endowed with the most exceptional powers of repression or his sexual desire was extremely exiguous.

[1] A Modern Pilgrim in Mecca.
[2] Muir: Life of Mahomet p. 19.
[3] *op. cit.*, p. 137.

A study of the married life of Mohammed certainly reveals a number of data which support this former hypothesis i. e. that the repression of every impulse towards sexual experience was due to the immensity of certain incestuous fixations. We may therefore presume that to this and to no other cause may be attributed the scrupulous chastity of Mohammed for the first twenty-five years of his life and later the selection as his first wife the elderly matron Khadijah, who at the time of her marriage with him was fifteen years older than he, and already twice a widow.

On these two accounts, i. e. her age and her widowhood, Khadijah must have afforded Mohammed a very perfect replacement-figure for his own mother, for it was only as a widow that he had ever known his mother.

The degree of gratification which this marriage afforded his incestuous fixation can be best measured by the punctilious fidelity Mohammed displayed to his wife for the twenty-five years of their married life and by the reverence he paid to her memory until the day of his death, so that "the pride or tenderness of the venerable matron was never insulted by the society of a rival".[1]

Khadijah bore Mohammed two sons and four daughters. Both sons died in infancy but the daughters survived.

Many traditions are recorded of the sympathetic attachment of Mohammed and Khadijah, the one for the other, and all point to the deference Mohammed always paid to her and how he invariably sought her advice and encouragement. At that great crisis of his life when he believed that he had received his first message from God by the mouth of the angel Gabriel, trembling and agitated, he tottered to Khadijah and told her of his vision and agony of mind. "Fear not", exclaimed Khadijah, "for joyful tidings dost thou bring. I will henceforth regard thee as the prophet of our nation. Rejoice, Allah will not suffer thee to fall to shame. Hast thou not been loving to thy kindfolk, kind to the neighbours, charitable to the poor, faithful to thy word, and ever a defender of the truth?"

"So Khadijah believed" (runs the simple tradition), "and attested the truth of that which came to him from God. Thus was the Lord minded to lighten the burden of his prophet, for he heard nothing that grieved him touching his rejection by the people,

[1] Gibbon: Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, Chandos Library, Vol. III, p. 164.

but he had recourse unto her, and she comforted, reassured and supported him."

Thus did the good Khadijah comfort and soothe the distracted prophet not speaking as a wife but as a mother. At last when Khadijah died in her sixty-fifth year no word save to express his deep and mournful reverence for her ever escaped the lips of Mohammed, not even to Ayesha, whose ready wit and arch vivacity came to enthral completely the heart of the prophet. Thus, in answer to Ayesha, who was jealous of the old and dead Khadijah and asked the prophet: "Am I not so good as she?", Mohammed replied: "No, by Allah, you are not so good; for she believed in me when no one else did, she was my first disciple, she honoured and protected me when I was poor and forsaken."

At the death of Khadijah Mohammed was desolated, but the "mother-complex" persisted so that another marriage followed with another replacement-figure in the person of the elderly widow, Sauda.

The incestuous love for the mother now began to give rise to that other complex which is so often observed to go with it, namely, a "daughter-complex", with the result that Mohammed at the age of fifty became betrothed to a child aged six, named Ayesha. Three years afterwards the marriage was consummated. From this time forth to the end of his life, Mohammed constantly displayed in the choice of his wives evidence of the operation of his incestuous impulses in their search for gratification.

For example, in his marriage with Zeinab bint Khozeima and Zeinab bint Jahsh, we see the selection of two women who bore the same name as Mohammed's own daughter by Khadijah ("daughter-complex"), who had both been married already ("mother-complex"). Also the first husband of Zeinab bint Khozeima had borne the same name as Mohammed's father—Abdulla, so it is not impossible to imagine that in his marriage with Zeinab bint Khozeima, Mohammed found gratification for yet another complex, namely, a "sister-complex". Again, Abdulla, the husband of Zeinab bint Khozeima, was the brother of Zeinab bint Jahsh, thus making the two Zeinab's sisters-in-law. Lastly, the husband of Zeinab bint Jahsh was Zeid, the adopted son of Mohammed, and to enable him to marry the wife of his adopted son, Mohammed expressly ordered the woman to be divorced. Thus in the case of Zeinab bint Jahsh, the incestuous "daughter-complex" was doubly repre-

sented, for she not only bore the same name as one of Mohammed's own daughters, but was the wife of his adopted son to whom he was so attached that he regarded him as his own son and had bidden him to call himself, Zeid bin Mohammed, that is, Zeid the son of Mohammed.

It is now well known that unconscious incestuous impulses often seek gratification through marriage with persons bearing the same name as the object of the incestuous affection. Recently, in a monograph published in the first number of this Journal, J. C. Flügel has illustrated this point in reference to the marriages of King Henry VIII of England.

Another notable point is that this same Zeid had been persuaded years before to marry Mohammed's aged nurse, Omm Ayman, who was so many years senior to Zeid that Mohammed promised paradise to his adopted son as a reward for performing so meritorious an act!

It is significant in this connection to bear in mind that the notices in the Koran of the voluptuous Paradise as described with an abundance of detail in Chapter LV, are almost entirely confined to a time when Mohammed was living a chaste and temperate life with a wife three score years of age: "But to him that dreadeth the appearing of his Lord, there shall be two gardens,

Planted with shady trees,
Through each of them shall two fountains flow,
And in each shall there be of every fruit two kinds,
They shall repose on brocaded carpets, the fruits of the two gardens hanging close by,
In them shall be modest damsels, refraining their looks, whom before them no man shall have deflowered, neither any genius,
Like as if they were rubies or pearls."[1]

In the later chapters, uttered in Medina, when he was surrounded by a numerous harem, women are only twice referred to as one of the rewards of Paradise, and on both occasions in these simple words: "and to them" (believers) "there shall be therein pure wives".[2]

It was not the husband of Khadijah but the husband of Ayesha, the delectable enchantress, who spoke of wives in such terms as

[1] Muir: *op. cit.* Ch. IV, p. 81.
[2] *Idem: op. cit.*

we read in Chapter II of the Koran: "Your wives are a tilth for you, so go into them when you like"; again, "Men are the maintainers of women, because Allah made some to excel others and because they spend out of their property; the good women are therefore obedient, guarding the unseen as Allah has guarded, and those on whose part you fear desertion, admonish them and leave them alone in the sleeping places and beat them, then if they obey you do not seek a way against them; surely Allah is High, Great" (Koran, Chapter IV. v. 34); again, "O true believers, verily of your wives and your children ye have an enemy: wherefore beware of them" (Koran, Chapter LXIV, v. 14).

These utterances, we may take it, were determined for Mohammed by the "daughter-complex"; it is the *father* who speaks of "obedience", "admonishing", and "beating".

There is nothing of particular significance in the precepts of the Koran, nor in the "Hadith", as regards consanguinity in its bearing on marriage. In formulating his precepts in this respect Mohammed seems to have followed more or less the code of Moses, with the notable exception that the prohibition against a man marrying his grandmother, such a remarkable feature of the Mosaic ordinance, finds no place in the list of relations with whom marriage is forbidden.

However, when we come to examine the pronouncements of Mohammed in regard to Widows, Divorce, Orphans, and the relations between parents and offspring, we find evidence indicating the operation of strong subjective feeling.

Before the days of Mohammed, the Arabs had entertained the world-wide prejudice against the re-marriage of widows, so that, according to Burckhardt[1], the Arabs regarded every thing connected with the nuptials of a widow as ill-omened, and unworthy of the participation of generous and honourable men.

We may be sure therefore that the very specific and precise legislation formulated by Mohammed in regard to the re-marriage of widows and to the provision that should be made for women on becoming widows, are the outcome of his own personal predeliction for widows due to his fixation on his mother. Indeed, the most notable reform instituted by Mohammed in this connection was the abolition of the Arab custom of permitting the inheritance by the son of his father's wives, a procedure that was so closely akin

[1] Quoted by Westermarck: The History of Human Marriage p. 127.

to incest, that the mere idea of it so stirred the repressed incest-complex in his own mind that this had to be stamped out at all costs.

Thus is the frenzy of reform fed by feelings of the very type which the reformer seeks to destroy! It is the sublimation with reversion of the Sadistic impulse that produces the Humanitarian!

In his rules regarding Divorce, in spite of the provision insisted on for divorced women, Mohammed has always been regarded by most of his Christian biographers as a monster of licence: "Ye may divorce your wives twice; and then either retain them with humanity or dismiss them with kindness." "But if a husband divorce her a third time, she shall not be lawful for him again, until she marry another husband" (Koran, Chapter II). This injunction gave rise to the institution of the "Mostahil" or hired husband, whose functions were to legalise re-marriage with a thrice-divorced wife, an abuse which may not have been contemplated to the full extent by Mohammed when promulgating this canon.

His attitude in general towards Divorce shews how different were his feelings when actuated by the "daughter-complex" from those determined by the "mother-complex". For example, the impulses which directed his decrees on Divorce belonged to the same group as those which led to the divorce "by order" of Zeinab bint Jahsh, the wife of Zeid, the beloved-adopted son. Again, the subjective feeling of Mohammed becomes very clear when we come to study his commands in regard to the treatment and care of orphans, for was he not himself an orphan from the age of six?

He says of himself, "Did he (the Lord) not find thee an orphan, and hath he not taken care of thee?" (Koran, Chapter XCIV). And again, "And let those fear to abuse orphans . . . Surely they who devour the possessions of orphans unjustly, shall swallow down nothing but fire into their bellies, and shall broil in raging flames" (Koran, Chapter IV).

But it is in his pronouncements on the subject of the relations between children and parents that the operations of the unconscious mind of Mohammed became most manifest, and it is here that we may expect to find the key which unlocks the riddle of his life.

One of the most remarkable features of Mohammed's doctrine which established equality of rights, was the inculcation of an

intense reverence for authority. According to a saying of the prophet, even if a negro slave is placed in authority he must be obeyed. Among the varieties of authority enumerated, that vested in parents is given a foremost place. "And your Lord has commanded that you shall not serve (any) but Him and goodness to your parents. If either or both of them reach old age with you, say not to them (so much as) 'Ugh' nor chide them, and speak to them a generous word". "And make yourself submissively gentle to them with compassion, and say: O my Lord! have compassion on them, as they brought me up (when I was) little." (Koran, Chapter XVII, v. 23–24). The injunction to obey parents implicitly is however qualified by the proviso that parents are only entitled to obedience from their children as long as they do not compel their children to serve others than God (Koran, Chapter XXIX, v. 8).

It is in this connection that we meet what appears at first sight to be a strange paradox in the belief and practice of Islam, the explanation of which lies in the full recognition of the enormous subjective feeling for authority entertained by Mohammed. Thus, in spite of the repeated insistence on reverence for all in authority made by him, Mohammed cannot escape from the charge that he taught his followers, directly or implicitly, to believe that they should fight for their faith, that they should assert themselves as the favoured people, and that it is wrong for them to endure if they can help it, a direct and visible assertion of infidel superiority. Hence the adherents of no religious system are so prone as the Mohammedans to sudden outbursts of frenzy against the very authority they are adjured to revere and obey. The explanation lies in the fact that we are dealing once more with a case of ambivalent "compromise" on the part of Mohammed.

We have already cited two instances of this manifestation of the working of the unconscious mind of Mohammed, one in regard to the perpetuation of that ancient temple of idolatry, the Kaaba, which succeeded, and the other relating to the worship of the three "exalted Females", which failed. Again we find this same tendency manifested in the attitude adopted by Mohammed towards authority. While on the one hand the authority of parents and rulers was to be respected according to the objective feeling of Mohammed, on the other hand, in pursuance of his subjective feeling on the subject of parental authority, it must be opposed

and destroyed, so that, in certain circumstances, defiance of authority was not only justifiable but to be encouraged.

In this aspect of Islam doubtless lies the secret of its tremendous power, for although it appears to make its appeal to man's conscious feeling for religion, in reality Islam stirs up the deeply-buried and unconscious complex against the father, which is an attribute that pervades the minds of all men. From hardly any other source could there spring those wild torrents of emotion that enable men, "utterly lost to every call of honour, or patriotism, or family affection, whose only occupation is eating, and whose only recreation is woman, to thrill with excitement at the summons of the faith, and meet death with a contempt the Red Indian could only envy".[1]

It is beyond the scope of this article to consider the social and political consequences that might follow upon a fuller appreciation of this distinctive characteristic of Mohammedan doctrine, but it is evident that were such facts realised there must result the adoption of a more rational and scientific attitude towards all Muslim which would again result in saving those responsible for the maintenance of law and order in countries inhabited by Mohammedans from that condition of petrified embarrassment into which such persons invariably fall whenever they are called upon to face any widespread expression of Mohammedan feeling in regard to some religious or social dogma.

We have now seen how the case of Mohammed illustrates that the most intense desire to transcend the paternal authority cannot escape from the feeling that all authority whatsoever can be dispensed with. On the contrary, the phantasy that desires the abrogation of the father's omnipotence conceives simultaneously the existence of a still more tremendous power, and creates a fresh "father", either human or superhuman, in whom to repose these gigantic attributes. In the case of Mohammed this phantasy created a replacement-figure whose attributes were: "He is Allah, besides whom there is no God; the King, the Holy, the Author of peace, the Granter of Security, Guardian over All, the Mighty, the Supreme, the Possessor of every greatness; Glory be to Allah from what they set up (with Him)".

But the matter does not end with the creation of the replacement-figure. The phantasy is further concerned with the relation

[1] Townsend: 'The Great Arabian' in Asia and Europe, p. 182.

of the creator to his creation. What then may we take to be Mohammed's conception as to his relation to the Allah of his creation? From the very precise nature of his utterances against the divine origin of Jesus Christ, i. e. that he was literally the son of God, it may be presumed that Mohammed never entertained any conscious idea of a possible kinship with Allah. Nevertheless this does not exclude the possibility of his having entertained the idea that he was miraculously born, especially because of the very meagre rôle played by his parents in his life. The most notable feature of Mohammed's character during the Meccan period was the increasing strength of his conviction that he was the Messenger of God, with the result that any strong conviction, even any strong wish, that he entertained, appeared to him to be borne in upon him by a force external to himself. Later on, after the flight to Medina, the character of Mohammed changed still more. According to Muir,[1] "the acquisition of temporal power, aggrandisement, and self-glorification mingled rapidly with the grand object of the Prophet's life; and they were sought after and attained by precisely the same instrumentality. Messages from heaven were frequently and freely brought down to justify political conduct, in precisely the same manner as to inculcate religious precept. Battles were fought, executions inflicted, and territories annexed, under pretext of the Almighty's sanction. Even grosser actions were not only excused but encouraged by the divine approval or command. A special licence was produced, allowing Mohammed a double number of wives; the discreditable affair with Mary the Coptic slave was justified in a separate Sura; and the passion for the wife of his own adopted son and bosom friend was the subject of an inspired message in which the Prophet's scruples were rebuked by God, a divorce permitted, and marriage with the object of his unhallowed desires enjoined." Hence we find little to wonder at when Omar, the Simon Peter of Islam, in an agony of grief at the death of Mohammed, draws his sword and swears to strike off the head of anyone who dares to say that the Prophet is dead. "Is it then Mohammed", cries the venerable Abu Bakr, in his attempt to pacify Omar, "or the God of Mohammed that we have learned to worship?"

"Slay the Unbelievers wheresoever ye find them", was henceforth the watchword of Islam; "Fight in the way of God until

[1] *op. cit.*, p. 533.

opposition be crushed and the religion becometh the Lord's alone!"

Thus did the child cry through the mouth of the man, seeking vengeance upon the father; and because of the intensity of the passion and because of the conditions under which it developed and because of the nature of the buried complexes to which the cry made such a profound appeal, one fourth of the human race, and that the unchangeable one, has not been merely influenced but utterly remoulded. So it comes about that after thirteen centuries we may observe an Asiatic, apathetic to a degree no ordinary European can comprehend, start up a hero, if appealed to in the name of Mohammed, fling away life with a glad laugh of exultation or risk a throne to defend a guest!

That these emotional outbursts are not confined to individuals but may affect whole communities is a phenomenon men of every creed and generation will at least be wise to consider. It is due to its appeal to these hidden sources of feeling that Islam is still, when its stateliest empires have passed away, and its greatest achievements have been forgotten, the only force able to hurl Asia upon the iron civilisation of Europe. Perhaps after all the findings of modern psychology were anticipated by Renan when he charged Mohammed with inventing a new religion to revenge himself upon his brethren!

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A PSYCHO-ANALYTIC STUDY OF THE CHRISTIAN CREED

by

CAVENDISH MOXON, Los Altos, Cal., U. S. A.

The Christian Creeds are rich in symbols of primitive unconscious desires. The Creeds therefore make a direct appeal to the unsatisfied and repressed persons who desire a refuge from the world as it is. They offer a comforting metaphysic for the mind and a strong support for the will, in other words, revelation and salvation. The revelation is not to be denied, but it is a revelation of the men who made the Creeds, not of the God who made the world. Likewise the salvation promised is a psychological fact, at least for a certain type of mind that has been well named "the sick soul". The healthy minded have no need of the creedal medicine. The vigorous man finds a new incitement to thought and action in the very difficulties that overwhelm the weak. The Creeds concern the sinner who feels incapable by his own efforts of making moral and mental progress, and wishes once again to assume the infantile attitude to life. The unsatisfied and hungry soul is called to a "revival", a "re-birth". A child-like acceptance is demanded as a condition of entrance into the kingdom of psychological rest in Mother Church supported by the Father's everlasting arms. Infantile dependence on the parent's mind and will excludes the desire for self-determination and independent speculation, and makes the will to believe in the mysteries and miracles of the Creed. In the paragraphs that follow we propose to show in detail some of the sources of unconscious satisfaction provided by the Nicene Creed.

"I believe in one God the Father"

At the stage of narcissistic love, the "one God" symbolises the beloved ego-ideal with which one desires to have ecstatic communion.

"The Father" exactly meets the need of those whose object-love is fixed in the family circle, and of those who, unable to

find a parent substitute for their libido, have regressed to the infantile level. The paternal symbolism satisfies the desire of both sexes for a supreme father *imago* and at the same time forms a defence against the boyish tendency to rebellious hatred of the earthly father.

When infantile self-love is overlaid by the higher stage of object-love, the child identifies itself with the beloved parent who is loved like a god. By this introjection of the parent into the self, the child can offer a willing obedience. To obey the parent is to obey oneself. This psychical stage in religion is represented by the joy and freedom felt by the child of God in a slavish service of his will. In the boy there soon arise the iconoclastic forces of jealousy in regard to the mother and rebellious hatred of paternal authority. Consequently the father is now felt to be an inadequate ideal and the boy may take as father substitute some real or imaginary hero who for a time can satisfy the emotional needs. With adolescence however comes the increased critical power to see that even heroes have feet of clay. If the Œdipus complex is still dominant, new sublimations are now required, such as patriotic love of the Fatherland or religious love of the Father God.

In the case of Jesus there are traces of an attempt to throw off a strong attachment to his mother; and this may be one cause of his conscious preoccupation with the Father. The story of the child Jesus in the Temple marks the change from entire parental obedience to a self-conscious spirit of revolt. Jesus is no longer satisfied to make Joseph his ideal (a hard task for a boy with a strong Mother-fixation of love) and henceforth calls no man his father but substitutes the heavenly image. We may conjecture that Jesus, in spite of his conscious revolt against his family, never wholly outgrew his identification with his mother. This would account for his strongly marked feminine traits, his desire for self-abasement in order to enjoy parental lifting up, and his deliberate choice of death on the cross as a means to a new life. Jesus' identification with his mother would act as a barrier against his love of any other woman and account for his failure to marry.

In the case of the girl, faith in God is easier, because more in line with the infantile libido trend, than in the case of the boy. The girl who has sufficiently outgrown her Electra complex seeks

at puberty a satisfying father substitute. In many cases she fails to find one, and therefore she is inclined to be religious. If her hold on reality is weak she turns back to her first love in the sublimated form of the Father in heaven.

The impulses to the creation of a father God are not only the conscious feelings of inferiority, incapacity, and the fear caused by hard times and lack of earthly love, but chiefly the unconscious feeling that one's actual father is all too human, the desire for an ideal lover on to whom one may project one's will to power, and the need of a refuge in the transcendental family of God. The ultimate causes of the Father symbol are the repressed parental complexes that are satisfied by this belief. By turning as a child to God, the repressed psyche gains self-esteem, salvation from guilt, and peace in place of restless uncertainty.

"Almighty"

God the Father in the Christian Creed is omnipotent and, as such, gives a substitutionary satisfaction to a universal desire of childhood. From the psycho-analytical point of view the life of man has been well defined by Ferenczi as a struggle to retain some part of his original feeling of omnipotence. Only the infant in the womb is completely omnipotent. The baby at birth struggles hard to regain complete satisfaction of all its desires. Gradually its dawning sense of reality forbids it to maintain the illusion of almightiness. It has to make efforts to fulfil its desires and to adapt itself to external compulsion. Magic gestures and cries (as Ferenczi puts it) are used at first to retain its power. But with the growth of a social sense, the charming illusion of omnipotence must be consciously renounced. This renunciation is not shared by the unconscious, which proceeds to find some symbolic satisfaction for its infantile belief in free and almighty will. When the libido is progressive the self is identified with a powerful social or intellectual movement; when the libido is regressive the ego is identified with a projected image of its unconscious desires, namely, an omnipotent God. The soul that seems impotent in a heartless world of law takes the path of religious regression in order to regain a pleasant sense of power reflected from on high. Like Paul, such a soul feels able to do all things through the divine power within.

"Incarnate by the Holy Ghost of the Virgin Mary"

Belief in the Virgin Mother has its roots in the Œdipus Complex. The Virgin Mary is an especially attractive object of worship because she satisfies an unconscious longing of the infant boy to supplant the father or to think him away. Since to the child's mind absence means death, the way is then open to take the father's place in relation to the beloved mother.

In almost every religion there are traces of man's tendency to transfer to his deities some part of the emotion normally felt towards the mother, the lover, and the wife. The belief in the goddess called Mother Earth is a spontaneous symbolic production of the human mind at one stage of its development. Some of the most striking examples have been gathered together by Prof. A. Dieterich. In his book entitled "Mutter Erde" he explains the grief and horror felt by believers in the earth goddess when the dead were deprived of burial; for this meant their inability to return to the Mother who could give them re-birth. A happy life after death seemed to depend on their entering into the womb of the earth in order that they might be born again. The aim of the mystery religions becomes clear in the light of this belief in a mother-goddess. In order to be sure of immortality, the initiates were symbolically re-born in the sacrament in order that death might have no further power over them. This is well illustrated by the religion best known to ourselves. Christianity had to become a mystery religion in order to satisfy this keen desire for sacramental regeneration, and thereby conquer the Mithraic and other rival cults.

The first Christians inherited from Judaism the prophetic horror of admitting a feminine element into the conception of God. But as soon as Christianity spread among Greeks and Romans, the desire for a Mother Goddess had to be satisfied in creed and rite. The Church itself was regarded as the Bride of Christ and the Mother of the faithful. The Fathers speak of "Domina Mater Ecclesia". Some even said that Earth was the first Adam's mother just as Mary was the second Adam's mother. And the "Blessed Virgin" proved to be the most popular Christian Mother *imago*. Though Mary was already betrothed to Joseph, the Holy Ghost did not hesitate to overshadow her in order to beget Jesus. This divine action shows a disregard for human and legal scruples that

is not unprecedented in the Old Testament stories of Yahweh and indeed is the mark of every product of the infantile unconscious fancy. Nevertheless Joseph is recorded to have felt an excusable impulse to cast off his lover for unfaithfulness when he knows that she is with child. And it is only by means of assurances and promises in dreams, that God is able to induce Joseph to become the foster-father of his Son and to marry Mary the Mother.

It may well be that the Virgin birth stories in the Gospel are in harmony with the phantasy of Jesus himself. From the strong heroic consciousness of divine Sonship it is only a step to the denial of the actual father. In an age when unconscious desires had free play in myths, the evangelist of Jesus the Son of God would almost inevitably express his Master's own phantasy in the form of a miraculous conception by a divine Father. The myth-maker would unconsciously identify himself with Jesus in the heroic revolt against the father implied by a virgin birth.

The legend of the virginal conception of Mary by the power of the Holy Ghost is, however, perhaps not the first attempt to symbolise faith in the divine origin of Jesus, but rather a secondary element due to Greek influence. The earliest Gospel (St. Mark) ignores the story and dates the divinity of Jesus from the day of His baptism. The Holy Ghost which descended into Jesus was regarded by some Jewish Christians as his Mother. For the Spirit in Hebrew is feminine, and the rôle played by the Spirit in the creation myth in Genesis is that of the Earth Mother. The Spirit "brooded" on the waters of chaos or the world egg like a mother bird, in order to call forth the creative activity of the male God Yahweh. Indeed, as Hannay has pointed out, the very words of the story imply a feminine aspect of the divinity. "God created man in his own image, male and female created he them". In the Aramaic gospel used by the Ebionites Jesus even speaks of "My Mother the Holy Ghost". For some the Spirit symbolised Yahweh's wife; for others it was the creative power which impregnated the mother goddess of chaos. The Jewish followers of Jesus could therefore naturally picture the Messiah as born when he issued forth from the waters of baptism and received breath from the Spirit of God. The non-Jewish Christians unconsciously saw in the Holy Spirit at the Baptism the Phallus of the Mysteries. Dieterich reminds us of the early baptismal rite in which the candle is thrice dipped into the water of the font in order to

fecundate this symbol of the womb from which the candidate for baptism was to be reborn like the Christ.

"One Lord Jesus Christ, the only begotten Son of God"

A long step towards the deification of Jesus was taken by the first person who dated the divine Sonship of Jesus from his birth and applied to Jesus the prophecy of Isaiah about a young woman as if it implied conception without a human father. The birth legends inserted in the Gospels of Matthew and Luke contain a further satisfaction of unconscious desires by assimilating the Christ myth to the widespread myth of the hero's birth. There is the double parentage, the humble carpenter foster-father and the almighty God Father. The Messianic hero is cradled as an outcast in a food box (just as Moses was in a basket) and is persecuted by an evil King. Herod represents the Father on to whom the unconscious projects its childish feeling of filial hate. Otto Rank reminds us in his book on "The Myth of the Birth of the Hero" (p. 51) that "the birth history of Christ is said to have the greatest resemblance to the royal Egyptian myth, over five thousand years old, which relates the birth of Amenophis III. Here again recurs the divine prophecy of the birth of a son to the waiting queen; her fertilization by the breath of heavenly fire; the divine cows, which nurse the new born child; the homage of the kings, and so forth."

Jesus was henceforth no mere man adopted to be the Messiah. But the Virgin Birth story does not satisfy the mystical author of the fourth Gospel. He exhalts Jesus still further from time into eternity. He pictures Jesus as God from the beginning and as man at an appropriate moment in history. Both the Virgin Birth and the Baptism stories are therefore omitted from the fourth Gospel. In their place we find a metaphysical theory of the Word who set up a temporary tent of flesh amongst men and then returned to His eternal glory with an added glamour. By this symbolism the mystic tendency to regression from the world of time and space is finally satisfied.

"Very God" and "Was made Man"

Many of the later Christian controversies arise from the attempt to express in one symbol the conflicting emotions towards the

father felt by the child, i. e. dependence, inferiority in age and power as a son and at the same time equality as a rival. If the sonship of the second person of the Trinity was emphasised, his Godhead was lost; when his equality was recognised the divine unity was split by the rival son-God. By the victory of the Logos doctrine over Arianism, God the Son finally won the central place in orthodox Christian faith and practice. The Father sank into the background and the Son — the representative of man's inordinate ambition — became the centre of the cult.

The hero is ever unconsciously identified with his worshipper. Hence Christocentric religion is in harmony with typical unconscious needs. The believer feels at home as a member of the holy family of God. The Holy Trinity is ever in the mental background and God himself is felt to be a society of three perfect lovers. The Father unobtrusively protects and guides his children from heaven; the motherly love of the Holy Spirit is ever within their soul; and the example of the heroic Son is ever before their eyes as an example for imitation. If the believer finds this family symbolism too difficult and abstract, he can worship the more concrete Trinity of Joseph, Jesus, and Mary. Only the infantile type of Christian desires to think chiefly of dependence on the parental will; the more virile type wants to be at one with the heroic Saviour Son. Hence the normal Christian experience has ever been a communion with Christ. And the greatest sense of power and joy has been secured by the mystical feeling of being one with him, copying his deeds, becoming sons of God, sitting on thrones and judging ordinary mortals and being judged of none. This mystic union with Christ is the conscious symbolism of the Eucharist which is regarded as the supreme act of worship. The unconscious satisfaction gained in this rite is primitive and sexual. In this mystery rite Jesus is the Phallic Saviour. The Lord must enter into the soul as his bride in order that the communicant may have the incorruptible seed of immortality within. At times the sexual meaning of the rite even comes to expression in the New Testament. The believer who is born of God, the Epistle of St. John declared, cannot sin because God's seed is in him. The full joy of Holy Communion thus depends on a belief in the real presence of Christ in the Sacrament — and so the Church naturally fought against any who denied the coming of this precious medicine of immortality from the very body of Christ in his Mass.

The grace received in the Holy Communion is a symbolic satisfaction of repressed love energy: and the symbolism of bread and wine serves to hide from consciousness the real nature of the rite.

"He suffered"

As a rule the person who gets pleasure from suffering is able to enjoy it in others as well as in himself. In other words, strong masochism and sadism occur at different levels of the same soul. This co-existence of opposed emotions in the dissociated parts of one self is clearly seen in Jesus. Jesus has a strong tendency to enjoy suffering. Self-sacrifice was for him part of the good news! It was indeed only a means to the desired end — death as a way to life — but for Jesus it is the only way. Martyrdom is therefore to be sought by all who will to follow the Christ. The weary, heavy-laden sufferers ever call forth the sympathetic compassion of Jesus and receive his blessing as an encouragement to continue with patience to the end. The sadism of Jesus appears in his belief about the suffering of sinners. In order to hide the inconsistency from his consciousness Jesus projects upon the Father his unconscious impulse to enjoy the torture of his enemies.

"Was crucified also for us"
"One Baptism for the remission of Sins"

In the ambivalent attitude of the son to his father we gain a new insight into the feeling of guilt and the desire for atonement with an offended God. We are also prepared to find both love and hate for the heavenly Father. If we venture to follow Freud in his fascinating parallel (see Totem and Taboo) between racial and individual development, we may suppose that in primitive society sons, like the modern infant, took little pains to conceal the jealous hate felt towards the tyrannical and repressive father. It is even possible that the young males actually agreed to kill the father when he too rigidly excluded his sons from the women of the clan. But in that case, a feeling of guilt would arise from their love and respect thus set at naught. In more civilised times parricide is impossible and even thoughts of hate must be sternly repressed after infancy. But the desire for atonement is still strong. God is offended by man's sin. Only by a sacrifice can the children of wrath wipe away their guilty stains,

and only by a magical rite such as Baptism can the fancied stains be removed by identification with Christ. For the Christian, atonement no longer implies the killing of the Totem father. It rather requires the death of the sacrificial son. Jesus' masochistic feeling found an easy outlet here. He would be the suffering Son who would gain forgiveness for his brother men by offering himself as a sacrifice to the Father. When Jesus felt this desire clearly he seems to have deliberately provoked his enemies to kill him by his entry into Jerusalem and by his rough handling of the vested interests in the Temple.

The apologists are right in claiming the universal appeal of the cross to the child-like mind. The passion and Crucifixion of Jesus satisfy equally the sadistic and masochistic trends. Those who love to dwell in devotion upon the tortures of Christ can regard them either subjectively as being suffered by Jesus with whom they identify themselves, or objectively as seen to be inflicted on the victim. In either case the meditations of Holy Week must ever appeal to the unconscious which thus indulges its desires because it has failed to find a socially useful sublimation of primitive libido.

"On the third day He rose again"

Jesus himself expected his sacrifice to be a mere means to his exaltation. For him the martyr's death was no tragic end to his being. And his expectation has been in a manner fulfilled. Jesus has risen far above all heavens, even above the Father himself, as the very centre of the new cult. Paul voices the normal Christian feeling when he declares that for him "to live is Christ, and to die is gain" because death means closer fellowship with Christ. Jesus, not the Father, is eaten in the Mass: at the name of Jesus only do the faithful bow and cross themselves. The religion is Christianity and the liberals have tried in vain to substitute for the orthodox faith in Christ as God their own faith in the Father of Christ as the essence of the Creed.

"He shall come again to judge both the quick and the dead."

Jesus was obsessed by the idea of suffering. He welcomes it for himself and his friends as an expression of love, for his enemies as an expression of his hatred for all who oppose him and his good news. God shall not let the Pharisees escape the suffering

which Jesus and his disciples undergo, but in Hell it shall be of no avail. The sinner shall be judged by the help of Jesus and his apostles and shall be condemned to a final exclusion from heaven. No doubt Jesus was quite unconscious of the hate which crept into his teaching and counterbalanced his strong insistence on non-resisting love.

"The Resurrection of the dead and the life of the world to come"

Jesus' conscious will to die was probably strengthened by an unconscious impulse to suicide. Yet even this abnormal form of self-sacrifice is not a wish for final extinction, and is therefore only in apparent opposition to the desire embodied in the above clauses in the Creed. Death is a way of escape from insuperable external obstacles and internal conflicts. Under the rationalisation and moralisation about the need for a ransom and a sacrifice lies the unconscious desire to return to oblivion in the mother in order to be re-born from the maternal womb. A mere regression to childhood or adolescence would not produce the desired state of unimpeded passivity and the immediate satisfaction of all impulses, associated only with the intra-uterine condition.

It was only the conscious reason of Nicodemus that supposed his re-birth an impossibility. The mystical author of the fourth Gospel shared St. Paul's belief that he could die with Christ in order to be born again. The resurrection becomes a mystical regeneration for all who will to reverse their affective and intellectual life in the direction of childhood. The regression implied in the Christian Creed stops short of the desire for the lap of luxury in Nirvana. The Christian feels the same desire to be swallowed in the maternal waters of death, but expects in addition a new and more satisfying bodily life.

Dr. Ernest Jones remarks that the thoughts of birth and death lie inseparably close together in the unconscious. Hence the idea of immortality is an ever recurring palliative offered by religion to sorrowing humanity under the domination of its infantile complexes. "Neither the child's mind nor the adult unconscious can apprehend the idea of personal annihilation" (Papers on Psycho-Analysis, p. 661). The conscious horror of incest has driven the mother goddess from the Christian Creed, but she is implied in the belief in immortality. Since the infantile unconscious by no

means shares the moral dread of incest and death, the desire to think the father away persists in the Œdipus complex. And, with the exception of atheism, as Rank remarks, the belief in death as the (maternal) entrance to life is the most satisfying unconscious denial of the father.

The Christian Creeds, we conclude, are compromise formations. By their appeal to unconscious needs they have long escaped the moral and rational criticism of progressive intelligence. The result of the insight given by psycho-analytic study of the Creeds will hasten what Dr. Ernest Jones terms the "unmasking" of their symbols and the substitution of more adequate embodiments of human ideals.

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COMMUNICATIONS

WOMB AND BIRTH SAVING PHANTASIES IN DREAMS

by

M. J. EISLER, Budapest.

The solving of dreams which have womb or birth saving phantasies as their basis (both phantasies often appear inseparably interwoven) as a rule presents no difficulties to the analyst once he is alive to them. The associations of the dreamer are here of only trifling service. It is only when the dreamer has experienced the sense of the dream as a whole that the material is produced of which the details are composed. The analysis then advances from this point.

The examples I give are remarkable in the finish of their form; and how I obtained them is worth mentioning. My younger brother had prepared a typed copy of a small contribution to dream interpretation which I published under the title "Das Labyrinth",[1] — a saving dream awakened through incestuous phantasies at puberty. Its content made a deep impression on him with which was mingled a little doubt as to the credibility of the matter. At first it seemed to me he had identified himself with the dreamer, a thought which had reinforced the impression. During one of the subsequent nights he dreamed as follows in the form of a waking stimulus dream. (He dreamed the first part of the dream when called by a comrade trying to wake him; he went to sleep again and finished the dream.)

"I found myself in an empty room massively built of cement It had only one exit, the double door of which was missing. The next moment I heard the voices outside of an older and younger man (professor and assistant). I did not want them to see me, so swung myself by two or three swimming movements into the air and remained hovering horizontally in a somewhat darker corner of the room with my head turned upwards. I spoke to them,

[1] *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse,* B. IV, S. 297.

and after a short time was given difficult problems which I easily solved, and finally the calculation and plan of a large steamer. Soon afterwards a beautiful young girl was sent into the room. I flew down and noticed that now there was a sofa in the room. The girl sat down on it of her own accord. I was going to sit down beside her, when I awoke". Second part of the dream. "I opened a door that was mounted with iron, went in, and saw a long passage out of which a number of other passages led. I wandered about in them and then noticed that someone was seeking me in the long passage. I saw an old man, a professor, to whom probably these passages belonged, for he immediately noticed that a stranger had entered. He held an umbrella under his left arm and wore a large pair of spectacles. I was invisible and so stepped up quite near to him. I wished to snatch off his spectacles, but he pressed them so strongly on to the bridge of his nose that it was impossible for me to take them off. The next moment he put his right hand into his pocket and pulled out a revolver which he fired off in the direction he believed me to be in. I lay flat on the ground. I saw the smoke from the revolver, and the bullet flew quickly in the direction where I had just been standing; then I awoke."

Only the details need be interpreted in this transparent dream. The first part contains the representation of intra-uterine life. The striking conduct of the dreamer who imagines himself as an embryo I interpret — following a remark of Ferenczi — as a paradox: "It is surely not possible for an unborn child to have any sensations whatever". Absurdity is concealed in the dream as super-wisdom.[1] By professor and assistant he signifies his father and myself. In the second part of the dream spying on parental intercourse is represented, as in Freud's example[2] and at the same time a strong ambivalent attitude towards his father (reversed threat of castration) is indicated.

The deeper motive from which this dream originates I discovered a few weeks later when he brought me a similar dream of a womb phantasy.

"I felt as though I were dead. I crossed the square to — Street and had the feeling that somebody was following me. In this street I entered the second house on the right and ascended

[1] The dreamer is an official in a shipping company.

[2] Traumdeutung, 5. Aufl., S. 272.

to the second floor. I opened a door and entered a room which had no other exit. All around I saw stands on which were coffins. My brother L. stood in the middle of the room and received me with the words: "You have come at last, we have been expecting you." I had the feeling that in one of the coffins lay my sister, although I did not see her. At that moment a stranger who had been following me appeared. He opened the door wishing to enter, but remained standing in the doorway. I called to him in sharp but calm tones; 'What are you looking for here? This is the resting place of all my brothers and sisters.' He immediately drew back and closed the door. I turned to my brother and awoke."

A serious and lasting sorrow over a youthful friend who had died constituted the background of the dream. The dream begins with a pronounced longing for death. Freud has with great delicacy and psychological insight described the condition in which the sorrowing person finds himself engaged on the "work of sorrow", to whom the command is issued to withdraw from the lost one all his libidinous object charges.[1] In a moment of egoistic joy at being still alive the unconscious touches on the situation of birth and the place of abode before birth. The dream originated from such a narcissistic self-reflection, yet in it the gloomy fundamental frame of mind also comes to expression. I will pass over the interpretation of the details and only mention in a general way the similarities between this and the preceding dream. The proof of the correctness of this idea I obtained when my brother recounted a third dream. This he had dreamt before he knew of my contributon on the "Labyrinth", and was now able to recall.

"I found myself with a friend (not the one sorrowed for, but another who is also dead) on the water in a boat. The boat overturned on account of the stormy weather, and we both fell into the water. My friend was sinking and he called out beckoning me with his hand. But I saved myself and after a severe struggle got to the shore."

The saving out of the water is, as we know, the primary form of representation of the birth dream.

[1] The equating of grave and womb is found in the unconscious thoughts of all peoples.

NUMBERS IN DREAMS

by

C. D. DALY, Peshawur, India.

On the 14th. of the month the analyst was able to make the patient aware of certain feelings towards his wife and child that he had previously been unaware of.

That night the patient had the following interesting dream in which he took ample revenge on the analyst for breaking down his resistance as well as fulfilling a multitude of other wishes.

There was a pigeon-hole arrangement full of letters, in what looked like an office. He wanted something and knew exactly what he wanted and went straight to it. Drawer No. 935. He knew exactly in which hole or drawer he would find it. He felt very pleased with himself that his office was in such good order.

ANALYSIS

The first thing which occurs to the patient is that most of his daily work and correspondence in his office is with three Hospital units Nos. 95, 35 and 15. He had had dealings with all three on the day previous to the dream

With No. 95 is a doctor whom he dislikes intensely and of whom he gives a vivid description.

With No. 35 is a doctor whom he describes as a good chap.

No. 15 has no doctor.

His wife seems to belong to No. 35 and his daughter to No. 15 He carefully avoids associating 95 with anyone. To the number 9 he gives the following associations.

His wife's name is Nona = 9. She was named thus because she was the ninth in the family.

He here recalls that on waking up in the morning and trying to remember the dream the *figure 915 had first come to him; he felt that this number was wrong, and then remembered that 935 was the correct number of the drawer.*

To 3 he associates his family—wife, daughter and self.

To 5: his daughter was five when she went home.

It might have been a roll of paper he was looking for in the dream, greyish bluish sort of paper, like an engineer's plan. Although he seemed to remember the pigeon holes quite clearly as square holes, yet there was a drawer that had to be opened and a roll which had to be taken out. The patient, who has read some psychological works, is here struck with the idea that the roll of paper might be a phallic emblem.

His mind clings to the colour of the roll; the pale bluish colour is very insistent, it reminds him of the pale bluish colour and the blue veins of his penis. He last saw the colour in the proposed plan for the rebuilding of his hospital. It also might have been a roll of legal documents, marriage documents particularly. He felt in the dream that it was his own drawer and that the opening of it was purely his own business.

He feels that perhaps the dream meant that Psycho-Analysis was going to show him what he wanted, and that the well-arranged series of pigeon holes was his own mind. In the dream all he had to do was to find something.

Here he recalls that in the dream he hesitated for a moment, as he was not quite sure if he had the right hole. At this point he went back to the figure five. Five fingers on a hand, five cards in a hand of Nap; the number of his wife's room in France was five — no, he thinks it must have been six. He used to have five days leave when he went to stay with her. No, it was six. Why does he keep saying five when it is six? He had received a wire from his wife on the sixth from Port Said. Port Said is nine days from Bombay; the wire said she would arrive in Bombay on the fifteenth. The total of the second group of figures is fifteen (915 = 15). It is two days journey from Bombay to where he is. The total of the first group of figures is seventeen (935 = 17), the date of his wife's arrival.

95 = Unit which has an objectionable doctor = The analyst who the day before forced the patient to realise his unpleasant sub-conscious attitude towards his daughter.

35 = Unit which has a doctor who is a good fellow = Patient himself. Also represents his wife whose age is 35.

15 = Unit which has no doctor = His daughter, who at the age of 15 will be away at boarding school.

In the after recollection there were two numbers, the second he rejects for reasons which became quite clear in the analysis. Nona his wife is common to both series of figures, his wife's name being the only association he gave to the figure 9. The figure 3 also only brought up the idea that it represented his family; both these associations were given without hesitation. 5 only led him to 6, from which we get the solution of the second group of figures and their connection with the first group; rejected because they only represented the history of his wife's journey, dates, distances, etc., whereas the first group represents the date of his wife's arrival. Also through it he obtains ample revenge on the analyst for the bad time he went through in the battle over his resistances the day before, by associating him with the objectionable doctor (whom both in the dream and the analysis he omitted to state was a native). He also brought his wife and himself together and got rid of his daughter, against whom he has great repressed resentment owing to her having taken up so much of her mother's time. The sexual symbolisms of the roll of paper the drawer, etc. are all obvious from the latent content of the dream. But the roll of paper stands for a good deal more than merely a phallic emblem. The rebuilding of the hospital = The putting straight of his own and his wife's and child's mental attitudes i. e. the family. The legal and marriage documents = Making it all legitimate, etc.

This fragment of the analysis shows the meaning of the figures in the dream; the remainder of the analysis followed the usual lines.

BLINDNESS AND CASTRATION

by

DOUGLAS BRYAN, London.

A patient who knew nothing about the relation between blinding and castration had for many years extreme horror over the idea of vitriol throwing, both as regards himself and other people. He had also difficulty in saying the word vitriol. He had the following dream. He was sitting in a dimly lighted room and his sister was opposite him. She said to him, "You cannot say vitriol". He said, "Yes I can". She said, "Say it then". He then said the word and the dream ended. When he had told me the dream he added, "And my sister then smiled at me in a mincing and *emasculate* manner". His chief fear as regards vitriol throwing was injury to his eyes. The association between castration and vitriol throwing is here evident.

ANXIETY DREAM AND ŒDIPUS PHANTASY

by

J. HERMANN, Budapest.

A boy, aged fifteen, had an anxiety dream during the night. He woke up and ran from his bedroom — where he slept with his grandfather — into the room where his father and mother were sleeping. He kissed his mother in order to calm himself and then lay down in his father's bed. The father gave up his bed to the son, and went to sleep in his son's bed. The next day I asked the boy if he had begged his father to give him his place. He answered that he had not trained his father for nothing. When I mentioned this to the father he gave me the following explanation. He changed beds in order to show the son that he (the father) was not afraid.

COLLECTIVE REVIEWS

THE UNCONSCIOUS

by

THEODOR REIK, Vienna.

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*

The period with which this review deals has to a considerable extent rendered clearer the concept of the unconscious through deepening and more sharply defining it. It is not chance that the rôle and function of the unconscious should be the subject of keen discussion in the psycho-analytical camp, for new problems emerge with the progressive investigation of the neuroses and psychoses, and the central problem here concerns the attributes of the method of functioning and the significance of the unconscious. The subject, further, has been threatened with a confusion in both terminology and content through the recent views advanced by Jung (18), Adler (1), and their followers, and therefore the need for clarity has been increased. In a series of

works, which bring together what has hitherto been known regarding the unconscious and which also add new points of view and knowledge concerning its principles, Freud has given the necessary explanations. He has shown what facts compel us to assume unconscious mental processes, what facts were necessary in order to assign to the unconscious its special characteristics recognised by analysis, and which other facts prohibit the ascribing to it traits and characteristics of a purely speculative nature. Freud in his Lectures (11, 13) and also in his articles (9) constantly and emphatically states that the assumption of the unconscious is necessary and legitimate, and that we possess numerous proofs of its existence. He certainly does not fail to recognise the different ways of regarding the unconscious, which includes acts that are unconscious only for the time being, and processes that are repressed; and he also shows how valuable the topographical point of view is for the distinction of the hierarchy of psychical acts. By means of psychical topography, which now supplements the dynamic conception of mental processes, it is possible to indicate in what systems or between what psychical systems the processes take place. The important question of the existence of unconscious feelings and formations of affect receives its answer, in that the distinction is emphasised between unconscious ideas that are really memory traces and affects which are really discharging processes. Topography and dynamics of repression, which take place in regard to ideas on the boundary between the preconscious and unconscious systems, receive further illumination through Freud's description of this process as a withdrawal of the libido and through the assumption of a "countercharge" (*Gegenbesetzung*) for the protection of the preconscious system against the pressing forward of unconscious ideas. Besides the dynamic and topographical points of view there is also a third, the economic, which deals with the fate of the quantities of exitation. The description of a mental process according to its dynamic, topographical and economic relations Freud terms a metapsychological presentation. The characteristics of the processes belonging to the unconscious system are lack of contradiction, primary process (mobility of the charges), absence of time, and substitution of external by psychical reality. Freud gives a picture of the communication of the two systems which cannot be easily described, and the development of derivatives of the unconscious. Freud's article on repression (10) furnishes important supplements to the

train of thought just described. He distinguishes a primitive repression as a primary phase from the real repression — the secondary stage; he describes the process of repulsion from consciousness and attraction by the primary repressed material; and he characterises repression as individual and mobile. These points are extraordinarily fruitful as regards the knowledge and working of the unconscious. Professor Jelgersma (17) in his clear exposition, to which particular value is to be attached as coming from a distinguished and unbiassed psychiatrist, has called attention to the necessity of assuming unconscious processes and also the importance of the analytic theories. Kaplan (19—21), who in most of his works draws a comparison between the concepts and results of non-analytic psychology and philosophy, deals with the understanding of unconscious processes and their numerous relations to the symptomatology of the neuroses and psychoses, and also with conceptual differentiation. In his articles, which have not been sufficiently estimated, appear such important problems as repression and psychical polarity, reversal, the relations of the unconscious to the outer world, the fact of mental processes being entirely determined, and other points are elucidated from many aspects and advanced in a clear-sighted manner. In Bjerre's article (2) the relation of conscious and unconscious as an absolute contrast is treated schematically; as a result of this it leads to modifications in the theory and practice of psycho-analysis, in the direction of Jung's teaching. Bjerre's article has been subjected to such an excellent and technical criticism by Meyer (28) and Eitingon (6) concerning its reference to the definite character of the unconscious, that it need only be said that the distinction of a personal and super-personal, "absolute or collective" unconscious in Jung's sense is proved in theory to be just as misleading and arbitrary is it proved itself fateful for Jung in its practical results. The apparent justification that Jung's theories concerning the unconscious possess comes only from the fact that psycho-analysis up to the present has not yet sufficiently investigated the relations of individual psychical processes to the processes of the mass psyche. How cautiously Freud expresses himself concerning the content of the unconscious with reference to the collective mental possession is evident from his comparison with a psychical primitive people. "If there are inherited psychical formations in human beings, anything analogous to the instinct of animals, then

this forms the kernel of the unconscious. There has to be added to this that which has been put aside as useless during the development of childhood, and this need not be different in its nature from what is inherited. A sharp and final separation of the content of the two systems is only as a rule established at the period of puberty" (9). When Jung deduces from the phenomenon of transference the hypothesis that definite attributes which are ascribed to the doctor by patients are projections of the content of the super-personal or collective unconscious, denoting particular "primitive" pictures as dominants of this unconscious, and also separates from the rest the devil-dominants, "demons of sorcery", werwolf, etc. as contents of the collective unconscious, he shows a fundamental misunderstanding of the character of the unconscious. In this way it is explicable why psycho-analysis seems to him to be a struggle with the figures of the unconscious as collective-unconscious determinants. In many ways Silberer's anagogic theories, to which Voigtländer (31) refers, seem to be precursors of Jung's train of thought. Voigtländer distinguishes a real, a constructed and an ideally regulating unconscious without proving the justification — not to mention the necessity — for such a distinction. However, its purpose is quite clear when the authoress recognises for ploughing that its "real" motive is interest in food, that its purposiveness is an ideal regulating force, but can find nothing which — in spite of all known facts of folk-lore, religion and folk psychology — would admit of a sexual analogy.

Bleuler (4) defends the existence of the unconscious against Kretschmer (25, 26), and emphatically states that behind it is no empty name, but an indispensable concept, "which is derived with somewhat the same probability as Neptune was from the disturbances of the path of Uranus". The scientific conflict between Bleuler and Kretschmer serves as an indicaton that the concept of the unconscious in the sense of Freud has now been made the subject of special discussions outside psycho-analysis. We are obliged to refrain from referring to numerous publications by neurologists and psychiatrists in which this discussion appears in a few places, and will only remark that it becomes more and more prominent in the spheres of non-analytic psychology and philosophy. Löwenfeld's (27) intelligent and calm estimation of the rôle of the unconscious in mental life forms a bridge between these investigations. Although he is by no means an adherent of

analysis he calls attention to Freud's service in the new science of the unconscious mental life, and he makes an attempt to synthesise analytic and non-analytic psychology. Whereas Jelgersma in his address proved to be scientifically impartial and strictly to the point, a distinguished German Professor, Windelband shrank from the "uncanny idea" (33, S. 7), "that contents, impulses and strivings can belong to our mental life without our being aware of them in the clear course of our conscious activities". The technical and intelligent investigation of Professor Aloys Fischer of Munich (8) comes as a pleasing contrast to a defence that is so rich in affects. Fischer rejects the equating of mental reality and consciousness, and on the basis of theoretical investigations comes near to many views of psycho-analysis, recognising the existence, nature, and legitimacy of the unconscious as a subject of scientific psychology. Bloch (5), whom the reviewer unfortunately cannot always comprehend, goes along speculative paths, and passes from the physiological into the transcendental and absolute, into the realm of metaphysics. The study that Ganz (15) has furnished of Leibnitz's views on the unconscious and their relation to modern theories may be mentioned as a symptom of the increasing interest in the unconscious on the side of philosophy. This author also compares the hypotheses of Hartmann, Hering, Wundt, Sanon, etc. with those of Freud, so that his work forms a supplement to Kaplan's attempt (21) at a history of the science of the unconscious which leads from Mesmer through Charcot to Freud.

In Freud's Vorlesungen (11) the psychopathology of everyday life, with its manifold and many sided relations to the Unconscious, received a presentation of especial value as an introduction; while the two new editions of the "Psychopathologie des Alltagslebens" which were published during the period to which this review refers contain many supplementary examples (12). In the routine of the day one constantly notices fresh instances of little unconsciously determined mistakes. Almost all analysts and many non-analysts have made contributions to this subject which is the one where the phenomena of the Unconscious are most easily to be clearly observed in operation (1a—24a).

THE SCIENCE OF RELIGION

by

THEODOR REIK, Vienna.

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It is our intention in this review to deal with the analytical work that has been done in the province of the science of religion during the past ten years. At the beginning of this century research into the science of religion took two directions as is evident from the writings of the two exponents on either side, William James and Wilhelm Wundt. The divergence is the outcome of the difference in their views on the essential nature of religion. If there is understood thereby the sum-total of certain rites, rules and laws which may command credit and adherence within a community, then it appears to be a social institution. On the other hand religion may be defined as a behaviour or a definite attitude on the part of individuals towards a divine being, and in that connection their devotion, piety and religious experience may be described. If religion is then made the object of psychological study, there

results from the differentiation between these two views the opposition of the two methods, whether that of social or that of individual psychology, of which the representatives were unquestionably recognised to be Wundt and James.

One of the non-medical representatives of psycho-analysis, O. Pfister, took a definitely religious personality, the Count von Zinzendorf, as the subject of an analysis (43, 44, 45) and endeavoured to explain the special features of the piety of this enthusiast on the basis of the peculiar trend of his erotic nature: similar monographs are occupied with the analysis of ecstatic devotees (41, 42). The same author collected instances of religious glossolalia and brought considered opinions to bear on their unriddling, derived from psycho-analytic practice and from the theory of the instincts which is based on it (47). (Osterreich [37] rates highly the importance of Pfister's research into glossolalia, while Heiler in his monograph on prayer [18], which up to now is at once the most comprehensive and the most scientific of any published, only recognises the erotic conditioning of ecstasy in mysticism without paying any attention to the other results of analysis which relate to the stages preceding actual worship and to the development of ritual.) In these and other articles psycho-analysis showed itself capable of making intelligible the religious phenomena of individual personalities and the processes of religion most nearly approaching pathological symptoms by applying the elucidation which it achieved in its original field of enterprise.

At a quite early stage the relations between dream and myth, to which attention was first directed in an arresting manner by Freud, opened up the possibility of obtaining through psycho-analysis a grasp of the creations of the collective mind in respect to its psychic material, mechanism, and forms of manifestation. Rank, Abraham, Riklin, Jones, Silberer and others steadily widened the scope of the psycho-analytic investigation of myth. The religious myth proved to be equally open to interpretation with the myth which had not been previously recognised as having any religious significance: particularly symbolism and wish-fulfilment in short as revealed by dream-analysis proved to be the principal instruments in the technique of interpretation. By comparison and interpretation of the rich sexual symbolism of the material A. J. Storfer succeeded in making a most valuable contribution to the understanding of the Madonna legend (77). One special piece of symbolism in this

religious group has been dealt with by Ernest Jones who has made the story of the Virgin's conception through the ear the subject of analysis, and has been able to show the meaning of this curious tradition in the light of infantile theories and ideas (22). Thus analysis had explored the realm of subjective religion by means of the psycho-pathological investigation of myths long before a theoretical exposition had been put forth as to the subjective and objective factors in the development of religion.

Although the first analytic researches, namely Pfister's (41—45), in the religious emotional life of selected personalities laid special stress on the pathology of the cases and rendered it more intelligible in the light of sexual impulses and the mechanism of the unconscious psychic life, thus obviously showing traces of the effects of the views of James, nevertheless this influence later on fell more and more into the background. Pfister's later psychological work, while still investigating the religious phenomena of an individual life, takes into consideration the religious institutions within the limits of which that individual life works itself out: the tradition on the basis of which or in opposition to which a personality displays its activity[1]. Abraham's analysis of the figure of Amenhotep IV and his endeavours for the establishment of monotheism is a model of the investigation of the blending in religious life of transmitted influences with personal experience (4). Institutional religion must enter largely into the foreground of analytic interest, when the attention is diverted from the religious emotions of single personalities and concentrated on the community in its religious life. Among the actual facts which called for the notice of the analyst in this connection were particularly the details of rites, ceremonies and of religious worship which gave promise of elucidation by use of the analytic method. In place of individual and somewhat elusive phenomena which materialised as written confessions, prayers, lyrical outpourings and the like, of great interest especially to the Swiss analysts, there emerged objective material —dogmas, rites, cults—the psychological motivation and mechanism of which was now the object of enquiry. Already in 1907[2] Freud had made the first advance in this direction by bringing into com-

[1] This is especially so in Pfister's article on Paul which has just appeared in *Imago* VI, thus falling outside the scope of this review.

[2] In his "History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement" (*Jahrb.* VI, s. 233) Freud erroneously gives 1910 as the year in which this article appeared.

parison religious and neurotic ceremonial. The appearance of this article "Obsessive behaviour and religious usages" was of immense importance in opening the way to the analytic understanding of social religious phenomena.

In "Totem and Taboo" (16) Freud took as his starting point the objective facts of the social and religious life of savages and the early ancient peoples and was thereby enabled to present a sketch in main outline of the origin and development of religion as its deepest assumptions and ultimate aims. Freud begins with the savage taboo prohibitions and injunctions, which in analysis reveal themselves as expressions of a psychic tension brought about by ambivalence. From the most ancient and most strictly observed of the taboo-prohibitions of primitive races, viz. that of refraining from taking the life of the totem, Freud pursues totemism as the first stage in religion and communal organisation down to its beginnings. This is not the place to follow out the course of Freud's investigation, in which is compressed an account of many centuries of culture development: all we can say is that it brings out clearly that the origin of development of religion is the reaction against the crime of parricide which bulks so largely in primitive life, that it explains the animal sacrifice as arising from totemism and shows the wakings of conscience, tender feeling and remorse as directed towards the father to be factors in the building up of religion. This was for the first time achieved by the aid of psychoanalysis in the direction of the causes of the great social institutions, and a comprehension of their genesis, the changes and developments they undergo in consequence of the working of psychic forces. The significance of the Freudian conception for the science of religion—let us admit this openly—is not yet fully within our survey: the future only can and will show how deeply it penetrates the subject, and to the achievement of what results it may stimulate the course of research.

In this theory of the origin of development of religion Freud has laid the foundations of a structure which can only be completed by the work of generations of investigators. Among the first who equipped themselves for the task of execution and filling in of detail were Abraham and the writer of this review. Abraham in his remarkable work which mainly sets out to provide the explanation of certain limitations and transformations of the desire to look, finds surprising analogies for the neurotic symptoms of his

patients in prescription and prohibitions, and in the conceptions of antique and primitive religions. Of essential importance is his derivation of the phobia of the sun and of ghosts from infantile totemism, which at the same time tends to the establishment and confirmation of the Freudian totem-theory. The elimination of doubt in the sphere of religion, the prohibition of images of the divine being, the origin of the brooding and questioning of the Talmud and so on are for the first time though possibly not finally explained by this analytic method. The present writer's contributions to the psychology of religion are directed to making intelligible the psychic significance as well as the psychological origin and modification of certain rites and mythical forms. In these Freud's method is closely followed, thus again bringing out the extraordinarily valuable comparison between the present day usages of savage races with the rites known by us to have been practised among ancient peoples. Thus in the couvade and the puberty-rites of savages certain performances are observable, the prototypes of which have risen by a slow process of transformation to the level of outstanding and important social and religious institutions (61), while in their analysis repressed and repressive tendencies which determine the form of these primitive ceremonies become recognisable. The fear of reprisals felt by the father in respect to the newly born son which plays a significant part in the couvade is recognised as an important factor in the doctrine of the transmigration of souls. The puberty rites of the savage tribes represent actions which are intended to aid the generation which has just reached manhood to overcome their unconscious desires for incest and murder. Simultaneously with the initiation into the totemistic religion the younger generation is in these rites introduced into the community and the male cults. The manifold and painful tests of the novices are likened to the sufferings of God in the ancient religions; the Way of the Cross of Christ seen in this light seems to be a kind of sublimated puberty rite. The archaic and conservative character of the Judaic religion reveals the likeness between certain ceremonies and the symptoms of obsessional neuroses on the one hand and with the rites of primitive peoples on the other as heuristically valuable. The present writer believes he has proved in the case of two significant examples taken from the Jewish liturgy, viz. the Kolnidre and the Schofar, that these apparently isolated usages admit of explanation as the effect of unconscious processes and of

being ranged in due order along with other religious ceremonies. Here and in the analysis of the Mosaic law opportunity arises of using the results of analysis to throw sidelights on the psychic developments of Judaism, and an attempt has been made to explain its peculiarities and its aloofness on the ground of the reaction of certain psychic qualities to the peculiar destiny of this community. The analysis both of the usage of the Schofar and of the Sinaitic pericope led to views on the religious and cultural development of early Israel, widely divergent from those of prevailing theory: of these may be specially mentioned the influence of the totemistic period, and that of the tendencies towards revolt against Jehovah and the reaction tending to suppress such tendencies. In some contributions to Bible exegesis (59, 60) the present writer attempts to show the fertility of psycho-analysis when directed on this thorny and jealously guarded subject, pointing out that by making use of analytic methods a solution is approached for problems which have previously resisted every sort of effort. Levy's valuable articles which so felicitously combine familiarity with sex-symbolism and philological knowledge provide the key to sex-symbolism in those descriptions of Paradise known already to the early Church fathers (31). They further trace out the same symbolism in the Bible and the Talmud where it appears in very various and hardly recognisable forms (28, 29, 30, 33). In the analytical exegesis of the Cain legend Levy rightly though on insufficient grounds advises caution (32). Sex-symbolism has a central position also in the analytical explanation given by Ernest Jones in his studies of the nightmare and its relation to mediaeval forms of superstition (21).

Jones's work on the Divine-man complex throws light on the psychic presuppositions and mental determinants of the belief in one's own divinity, finding expression in the many psychic peculiarities of the characters treated (20).

The Fish Symbol as a sex representation is traced by Eisler in the religions and mythologies of all races (6).

The mental experiences of Schreber as studied by Freud seem to point to the conviction of a similar mission, his phantasies and hallucinatory system affording valuable analogies to certain conceptions of loftier and more primitive religions (11, 12). Of less value are the religious poetical testifyings of Miss Miller, which Jung uses as the starting point of his interesting and far-fetched

theories (23). Whenever a religious problem is involved the Jungian treatment approaches the psychological work of certain theological schools: in spite of the "liberal-mindedness" of their author they represent rather a religious and ethical dissertation on analysis than a real analysis of religion and ethics. The expansion of the libido concept and the immense significance ascribed by Jung to this force, which becomes with him mystical and vague, proves unattainable in the psychology of religion and out of proportion to the phenomena. Like Freud, Jung aimed at bringing into relation with each other neurotic, religious, and mythological phantasies, but this undoubtedly interesting and often fruitful attempt to elucidate individual experiences by folk-psychology fails in this instance. Just as in the practical analysis of the individual so in the analytic investigations of religious problems Jung omits to probe the earliest processes of development and thus frequently runs the risk of considering the products of culture as primary psychic elements. In the interpretation of re-birth phantasies which play so large a rôle in the puberty-rites the present writer claims to have shown that Jung who views them as the embodiment of highly sublimated ethical and religious strivings only reveals the conscious surface layers of the psychic dynamics, or, to put it more simply, alters the significance of the deeper-lying and primarily active tendencies into what is thus ideally directed. The same thing holds good of Silberer, who sees "anagogic" symbols in the tribal initiation ceremonies relating to death and resurrection (69). Undoubtedly the revolting and egoistic side of the human sex-impulses becomes sublimated in the course of a long and eventful development, but they nevertheless show their origin and their peculiar nature in the very act of coming to light as the driving force in the highest moral and religious concepts. Psycho-analysis has an interest in proving the inheritance of animal impulse as operative in the cultural structure by which the social end is served: we have thus gradually exposed to our view the psychic forces from which this culture has arisen and the psychic bases on which it ultimately rests. The belief of Jung and his school is that ethics and religion undeniably arise from these deeply buried roots, that there is however an innate tendency in these roots to strive upwards, that therefore—to drop metaphor—these egoistic and sexual complexes, one and all, possess a higher anagogical significance. That the anagogic theory admits of partial confirmation has never been doubted by psycho-analysis; what of it is sound,

is in its main thesis already recognised by and has been described under the theory of the sublimating processes. The resulting retrograde tendency of the works of the Jungian school on the science of religion is evidenced by the central significance and use of the concept "introversion" in their analytical researches (Morel, Jung Riklin and Silberer). A comparison of Freud's theory of sacrifice with that of Jung shows that the conception of the latter, which incidentally overestimates in a curious way the heterosexual impulse in this connection, takes the uppermost psychic layer as the ultimate, and gives value to the primary tendencies only as a symbolic method of expression; the sacrifice would seem to be as though reprisals were exacted from the beast in man—thus too says theology, "although in somewhat other words". The tendency is observable to allow the religious-ethical element to penetrate the analysis instead of the reverse process. To what reactionary and pseudo-scientific results such a theologising outlook may lead may be seen in the explanation given by Riklin of the sin of Adam (62): to him this is "the backwards-striving principle represented in the incest *motif* and its symbolism reversed. And if the punishment of the sin of Adam is work the motive for the sin is thereby clear: it was the horror of the deliberate undertaking of cultural performances". As we see, such an interpretation has no longer anything analytic about it, but represents a modern recrudescence of scholasticism and its symbolic interpretations with the aid of psychology called in. The processes of sublimation and transformation of the sexual and grossly egoistic impulses nowhere shape themselves more clearly than in the world outlook of the mystics and the immense piety of the middle ages. The strong interest which has been taken in the mystics by individual Swiss analysts and those investigators who are influenced by their views may find its explanation very largely in this fact; Morel, Riklin, Silberer, Pfister, Kielholz have for this reason brought personalities and phenomena belonging to the mythical province of religion into the central forces of their analysis (35, 63, 68, 43, 27).

Among the spheres of historical culture to which analysis has been directed one of the most recent is religion. The analytical psychology of religion has thus, it may be noted, from the first effected a junction with the investigation of myths, where already the traces of folk-psychology have been examined by analytic methods. In the writings of Abraham ([1] Prometheussage) and

Rank ([51] Geburtsmythos) the two sciences have shown some interaction, but with Jones and Storfer more extensive "contacts" have made their appearance and in Freud's "Totem and Taboo" myth and religion at last found their proper allocation in the history of human mental development. There are instances enough available which go to elucidate the relation between these two manifestations of the mass-psyche. One might nevertheless say that this problem is still essentially awaiting solution. Meanwhile it is already clear that myth sprang from the soil of animism, and thus ante-dating religion had prematurely undergone a religious elaboration, further that reactions to the great crimes of the primitive herd, so important for the development of religion, are clearly recognisable in it also.

It has been the aim of Freud to determine the place of religion within the history of culture (16): Rank and Sachs (53) as well as Kaplan (24) have put forth a short statement of their views on the significance of religion in the development of man.

Religious art has been investigated analytically only in isolation: up to the present time Freud's analysis of Leonardo da Vinci's Madonnas (14) is the only important work in this direction. The article that appeared anonymously on the Moses of Michelangelo (80) displayed in the method and outlook so many analytical features that it may be reckoned as a paradigm of analytic observation. The conclusions reached in it received additional verification and enhanced value from the analysis made by Reik of the Sinaitic pericope. Reik's article on the Schofar effects a junction with the analytic valuation of the rôle of dance and music in religious worship. In this the importance of totemism was also emphasized for the late stages of the development of religion (61). A romance in which a saintly character, that of St. Anthony, is the central figure is selected by Reik as object of analysis (57).

In separate notes Rank (54) provides a short character-sketch of the founder of religion and of the artist in accordance with their diverse psychic conditions and the accompanying determinations.

Kaplan's notes (on the Spinozan idea of God, on sins etc.) prove, the possibility of making use of the analytic point of view in the province of religion, a possibility which Winterstein has brought still more within range in a promising philosophical article (79).

Due attention has unfortunately not yet been paid to the development of childish beliefs about God, and to the religious ideas of children.

Freud has proved in his treatment of the recrudescence of infantile totemism the significance of childish ideas for comparative religion. Isolated features important for the later development of the individual are found also in Freud's article "Notes from the history of an infantile neurosis" (13). In Pfister's ministerial works there appear scattered memoranda of great informatory value as to the religious life of children. Eitingon and Reik have made smaller contributions to the comprehension of childish beliefs about God (7, 58). The only larger work on this theme, fascinating both in conception and execution, is that by Lou Andreas-Salomé (64) which treats of "early religious observance" with great sublety and a combination of intuitive with analytic psychology. It is to be hoped that further work will before long fill up the gaps that now exist.

Pfister has devoted himself to the application of psycho-analysis to ministerial work and has thereby achieved very considerable results (38, 39, 40, 46, 48, 50). No doubt such an application represents a compromise between ministerial and analytic endeavours in which it remains undecided what part is being played by the priest and what by the analyst. Activity of this kind is undeniably productive and commendable, but in my opinion the religious element so far as it is apart from the analysis tends to mingle with the therapeutic interest of the analysis which refuses now and always to put itself at the service of a definite moral or religious point of view. According to my personal opinion—the only opinion that can here find expression—psycho-analysis is destined at some future date to take the place to a considerable extent of ministerial activity.

Stekel (74) follows out the manifold disguises of the religious sentiment which appear in modern life: this author maintains also that the religious complex usually plays a large part in neuroses: he notices also a special form of the "Christ neurosis". How far this view as well as similar propositions of Adler's can be referred to the effect of reactions of a homosexual feminine fixation on the father (=God) has been explained by Freud (13). Schroeder reports on the sexual factor in the theology of the Mormons (65).

The theoretical exposition of the assumptions, methods, and aims of the analytic psychology of religion has been successfully accomplished by Rank and Sachs in a comprehensive section of their joint work which since its appearance in 1913 has been freely modified and enlarged by the work of the last few years. Freud

discusses briefly among culture-historical interests the point of view of analysis directed on the science of religion (15). Keller's article in an encyclopaedia (26) and another paper of his (25) and one of Nohl (36) bear an informative character not wholly free from prejudice. Reik estimates the significance of ritual for the analytical understanding of religion in the introduction to his book (61).

Current problems, in particular the Jewish question, are dealt with by occasional and not always scientific application of analysis by Sombart (70), Frank (9), Rappaport (56) and Trebitsch (78).

AESTHETICS AND PSYCHOLOGY OF THE ARTIST

by

HANNS SACHS, Berlin.

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Starting from the phantasies of the individual, psycho-analytic research soon began to investigate the way to the phantasies of mankind.

The first steps on this path were made by Rank, far ahead of all others, with his "Künstler". In this book, which recently appeared in a new edition, the turning to the general and historical is not anticipated merely in vague hints, but built up in methodical form a long time before the material of race psychology was used as a new basis. It is still on many points the best formulation of our knowledge.

Lou Andreas-Salomé (1) has produced a delicate and thorough essay on the conditions of artistic production.

To deduce a piece of fundamental psychology of the artist from one single, though distinguished, example, is the problem Freud has solved with his book on Leonardo da Vinci (5). The second edition is enriched by two findings which fully confirm Freud's hypotheses. One of them a "mistake", or indeed a number of them, in Leonardo's attempt to represent the sexual act schematically, has been discovered and described by Dr. Reitler, the other a "cryptographic" presentation of the vulture on the picture of "Saint Anna" is from O. Pfister.

In a short essay on the poet Dauthendey (11) Hitschmann demonstrates his father-fixation not only as being important for his poetical production, but as the origin of a phenomenon regarded by the poet as "telepathic" and of his religious turning-point Hitschmann has dealt more fully with Gottfried Keller (12) and drawn an excellent picture of his unconscious psychical activity by comparing the poet's typical motives with his behaviour towards mother and sister both in social life and in his work. The most important results are as follows: pleasure in looking directed mainly to the female breasts and its repression which allowed the great depicter of human character to paint only landscapes; the motive of "half family", son and mother, daughter and father, living together as a reminiscence of his childhood-days after his father's early death, a period the boy longed to return to when a step-father arrived who lived unhappily with the mother; the inhibited aggression towards women and its inversion into masochistic phantasies; and finally the mother image in the poet's most interesting female figure, Judith.

A valuable and interesting investigation into the poet's motives is given by Reik's book on Schnitzler (29). The main stress is laid upon the delicate psychological understanding of the poet, which arose from his familiarity with his own unconscious, though a familiarity of a quite special kind. Of special interest are the analyses of the dreams which Schnitzler uses in important passages of his works. Interpretation shows that the construction of these dreams is quite on a line with the rules laid down by Freud.

That the connection between unconscious and poetical production is not an achievement of our generation is proved by Dr. Alice Sperber who deals with Dante's unconscious life (36). Of special

interest is the view, based on rich and well selected material, that Vergil and Beatrice represent the return of the parent's *imagines*.

The present writer has pointed out that the childhood memories of Spitteler (32) show a striking agreement with the doctrines of Freud as regards the nature and importance of events in childhood.

The investigation of E. Lorenz into the "Geschichte des Bergmanns von Falun" (19) shows in a very clear way how a simple anecdote, provided it contains the germ, keeps producing ever new phantasies. As the poetical modifications advance, the unconscious complex by which the phantasy was awakened reveals itself more and more distinctly till it appears in clear words (Hofmannsthal's "last modification") just as dreams of one night vary the same unconscious thought with progressive clearness.

In another essay (20) the same author shows that the Œdipus tragedy ends quite in accordance with the fulfilment of the unconscious expectations—union with the mother earth. While the two above-mentioned essays only touched on the complex "the mother's womb", MacCurdy shows a novel by Lytton which is completely built on it, and throws light by analysis of that novel in the most interesting way on the connections between these phantasies and the "omnipotence of thought".

The idea running through all those essays, namely the return to primitive thinking by apparently original imagination, cannot easily be proved by a better example than the one found by Dr. Protze (24) in which a tree exercises all the functions that "savages" are wont to attribute to their totem. Rank's book (26) is based on the same idea, but carried out in a quite different, more complete and systematic way. Starting from a topic, still very attractive to modern literature, that of the "Doppelgänger" (double) the author goes back to the superstitions relating to mirrors and shadows, from there to primitive beliefs in the soul connected with mirror images and shadows, and finds at last the psychological resolution of these phenomena in narcissism and in the repression conflict against its radiation leading to object-love. The book contains much material in literary history and ethnology and should become a model through its technical method, never satisfied with mere aphorisms, but always trying to link up connections.

A number of essays deal with two great tragic figures of Shakespeare's, Hamlet and Macbeth. The Hamlet essays (15, 27) naturally start from the points in Freud's "Interpretation of Dreams",

and what Rank says about the "play" and its position in the drama might be considered as the finishing touch of Freud's conception. More interest still is paid to the figure of Lady Macbeth, previously only touched on in a footnote in the "Interpretation of Dreams"; the publications 4, 14, 23 occupy themselves with her. The most extensive of these essays is the one by Jekels (14); this yields several valuable results, of which only two will be mentioned: the conception of the distribution between two persons of the originally unitary guilt feeling before and after the deed, and the discovery of "Shakespeare's self reproach", who left wife and children and lost his only son, as the quintessence of the character of Macduff. Freud (6) starts from this discovery and shows how the problem of childlessness runs below the surface through the whole tragedy. In this complex the old nature myth personified in the tragedy, namely the victory of spring coming with green branches over the sterile winter, coincides with the actual event, the accession of James I as successor of the sterile Elizabeth who had beheaded his mother. Freud makes it probable also that the night-wandering of Lady Macbeth goes back directly to the last weeks spent in sleepless disquietude of the virgin queen, who once called herself in grief a fruitless stock. Another of Shakespeare's characters is investigated by Freud in the same essay: Richard III whose personality is developed from the first monologue with logical clearness. He belongs to those who believe they have a special claim on the fulfilment of their wishes because they have been ill-treated by nature at their birth. Among the type of those who break down in success Freud classifies a tragic figure, studied already by Rank, namely Rebecca West from Ibsen's "Rosmersholm". He shows that Rebecca's actual position is the result of a typical phantasy in which the housekeeper sets herself in the place of the housewife. The unconscious root of this phantasy is of course to replace the mother in her relation to the father. When Rebecca learns that this tabooed phantasy was reality for her, that is to say, that she was the mistress of her own father, then she becomes unable to enjoy her success and chooses instead of marriage with Rosmer death with him.

The essay of Furtmüller's (9) on Schnitzler's "Das weite Land" places the strife for power in the centre of action, following the author's prepossession for Adler's conception. A more unfortunate choice than one of Schnitzler's plays to prove such theses could not be made. Schnitzler's later works, especially "Casanova's

Heimkehr" have reduced *ad absurdum* the idea of replacing the erotic problem by an egoistic one.

In the reviewer's essays (33, 35) the attempt is made to trace back to the psychical situation of the author the production of two of the standard works in literature. In both cases the problem of inhibition in production is hinted at, a temporary one in Schiller's case and a final one in Shakespeare's. In the novel of Th. Mann (34) the agreement with dream symbolism between the understanding shown for the basis of homosexuality is pointed out.

An essay on the Moses of Michelangelo (40) by an anonymous author takes quite a distinctive position. Neither the starting point nor the result belong to the domain of psycho-analysis, but the method of the investigation guessing the past from the present, important things from slight indications, and the psychical tendencies of the artist answers fully to the psycho-analytic method in its best and purest form.

Among the aesthetic investigations directed to general problems most are based on something or other pointed out by Freud e. g. 17, 38; their merit lies in the clear presentation and the working out of details. The parallel drawn by Kaplan between tragic hero and criminal (16) is well-proved psycho-analytically and shows this author's right feeling for the new tendency in defining our problems. Through Freud's "Totem and Taboo" we know that it is more than an analogy, that it is the recurrence of the same original crime in different shapes.

A quite uncommon investigation, which in many passages comes very near psycho-analysis, is that by Sperber and Spitzer (37) on the connection between motives and words. Spitzer proves how in the writings of the grotesque poet Christian Morgenstern the word comes before the thing, indeed how the word stimulates the imagination to creativeness. "To treat words like things" is according to Freud a typical quality of childhood, and Morgenstern's humour is based to a great extent on this quality. Still nearer psycho-analysis comes Sperber's shrewd and charming essay on Gustav Meyrink He shows how certain complexes occur again in this poet's writings, sometimes as a colloquial turn, sometimes as an original comparison. When Sperber speaks about the influence of certain complexes on style and language, the idea arises of completing his investigation in the opposite direction, i. e. instead of working from the complexes to language, from within to without, to feel our way

from without to within, to the deep unconscious sources of affect. The "complex of bodily inhibitions" found by Sperber in Meyrink, especially paralysis, blindness and suffocation, arouses many thoughts in the analytical expert. The essay by Körner (18) is an appreciation of the two mentioned above.

The two essays on music (2, 39) give us hope that even this difficult subject, lying farthest from psycho-analytic exploration, will perhaps be understood by our methods. The possibility of awakening certain affects by sounds might be explained by their effect on the unconscious. Hitschmann (13) deals, in connection with a dream, with the psychic life of the young Schubert and his family conflict.

The investigation of "uncanniness" by Freud (7) explains in a more detailed way what had been said before in a footnote to the "Drei Abhandlungen". He points out that ***heimlich*** is one of the ambivalent words, which unite two opposite meanings, "homely" and "hidden, dangerous". Of special interest are the explanations of the conditions under which the re-awakening of the "omnipotence of thought" causes a disagreeable feeling, this being the reason why they are characterized as "uncanny". The complete revival of the childish omnipotence, as in fairy-tales, does not give us this impression, but if poetry places itself into reality, then a sudden going back to omnipotence has an uncanny effect, quite the same as in reality itself, when a chance makes us believe for a moment in this possibility. The other root of uncanniness lies in the return of the repressed; especially the castration complex plays here an important part.

MYTHOLOGY

by

THEODOR REIK, Vienna.

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The recent advances in myth and legend investigation owe much to the work of Dr. Rank. In his collected essays on this subject (7), a definite point of view can be traced gaining clearness and prominence as the enquiry deepens and the more important questions emerge. Proof has already been forthcoming of the value of the comparison of literary creations, myth forms and the phenomena of folk-psychology, instituted in the earlier contributions, notably in the *Doppelgänger:* it was this very comparison that made possible a disengaging of a *motif* from personal and individual aspects and by means of juxtaposition and through a study of likenesses and

differences disclosed the universal validity of certain *motifs*, rooted as they are in the psychic tendencies. Thus more clearly than ever is shown the close connection and profound relation of the love and death significance of the *Doppelgänger* figure. Freud saw emerging behind the characters of Shakespeare's plays the primitive shapes of myth ("Das Motiv der Kästchenwahl", *Imago,* 1914, Bd. II), and forthwith penetrated both the latent meaning of the *motif* and the hidden significance of the myth: similarly the mysterious significance of the Narcissus legend and of the *Doppelgänger* figures yields itself up to comparison guided by analysis.

The analysis of the "Brüdermärchens" in the same collection carries analytic myth-investigation to a very high point succeeding as it does in setting out all the distortions, complications, substitute and reaction-formations, condensations and displacements, and in using unconscious processes to explain the varying degrees of clearness with which the *motif* is invested, its correspondences and its deviations from type. The substitution of the elder favoured brother for the father as the person towards whom jealous feeling is directed, as in the Egyptian brother-story or in the Osiris myth, is shown to be a primitive culture effect, and is grouped with other softenings and concealments brought about by generations of repression. Rank sets out the pedigree of the "Brüdermärchens" and in doing so succeeds in recognizing the existing forms in the *motif* as reflections of definite stages of culture and in allotting the various levels of myth and fairy-tale to advances in social organisation. He traces myth-making to its beginnings found in the partial renunciation of the actual accomplishment of sexual and egoistic desires. Both myth and fairy-tale thus appear as the obverse of culture-development, as store houses of the wishes that can be taken no count of in reality and of unattainable satisfactions. Earlier in the analysis stress was chiefly laid on gaining a clear comprehension of myth and fairy-tale by an elucidation of the symbolism employed in them and by application of psychic formulae; at this point however the first steps are taken towards determining the psychological relation of fairy-tale to myth.

On the basis of the results of these investigations, an attempt might be made to reconstruct some kind of history of the development of the fairy-tale. This is actually undertaken by Rank in the article entitled "Mythus und Märchen". It cannot be maintained that complete success has crowned his efforts, but it must be borne

in mind how great are the difficulties to be encountered, how circumscribed and scanty are the means available for the accomplishment of the task. Nothing but the psycho-analytic investigation of primitive relationships, opened up as it has been by Freud in "Totem and Taboo", joined with an understanding of the psychic peculiarities of the fairy-tale could make this bold attempt at all possible. According to Rank while the myth reflects the measures of defence taken by the father against the rebellious sons, the hero-tales represent the progressive stages of the development of the brother clan. This first synthetic attempt rests on the comparison of the *motifs* with the actual basic situations inferred as existing in primitive times. (We will not disguise the fact that the special accentuation of the respective fashioning of the *motif* in each case does not seem to us sufficient to warrant such a method of determination.)

The author thus brings us face to face with the ultimate and peculiar problems of myth-investigation; with nothing less than an exposition of the external, cultural, and the internal psychological situation out of which the forms of the fairy-tale necessarily arise Rank confines himself to carrying out this task in relation to one single though important *motif*, namely, that of the conflict of the older with the younger generation (*motifs* of exposure, the imposition of a task, exile of the sons, etc.) The analysis of a number of myths shows that the myth is in general an attempt to find substitutes for the original objects (of hatred) and to sublimate the relations to them into culturally valuable acts (thus the removal of the father is effected through the slaying of the destructive monster). On the other hand the special and characteristic form of the fairy-tale sets out to deny the tendencies which (in spite of substitutions) can still be recognised in the myth: in fact in the fairy-tale the tendencies are often completely reversed. Many of the decisive differences between the two creations of phantasy are explained if we regard the myth as the outcome of the patriarchal time and the fairy-tale as having arisen out of the soil of the clan. In the myth the hero encounters external obstacles, in the fairy-tale the inhibitions are from within. Myth is polygamous, fairy-tale monogamous; myth is patriarchal, fairy-tale social, it is ethical while myth is non-moral, Rank considers of special importance the stress laid in the fairy-tale on material considerations and their driving force, particularly on the material difficulties of family life; from these the hero myth is completely aloof. This feature is both an indication of the external

circumstances in which the fairy-tale took its rise and also an explanation of many of its characteristics: its naïve wish-fulfilment, its exaggerations of size, riches and so on. Particularly interesting is Rank's derivation of the fairy-tales of a later time from an original primitive tale which brought the solace of phantasy to the endurance of a first great famine. Disappointment and disillusionment came about from various causes such as the reappearance of the same difficulties in the clan as in primitive life. A feeling of shame and a fear of reprisals are both at work in the fairy-tale when it refuses to admit the existence of just that fragment of crude reality which appears and is justified in the myth. Undoubtedly one of the motives for fairy-tale making is self-consolation but the main reason lies in the warning thereby given to the younger generation. While the myth is the story of the son, the fairy-tale is the story of the son of the second generation who has become a father and is possessed with the fear of reprisals. The son's revolt is depicted in the myth, but in the fairy-tale the parents have the upper hand again and are concerned to put a stop to the threatened resistance of the younger generation. The belief in the myth and the (proverbial) disbelief in the fairy-tale arise from the fact that the one creates a substitute for reality while the other sets out to deter those who seek to realise the primitive wish.

While in Rank's work the analytic investigation of myth is carried to the limits of its special sphere and from there attempts to form correspondences with related sciences, the adherents of Jung pursue the reverse course. There is doubtless nothing to be said if occasionally the points of view of the frog and the bird are interchanged, but it scarcely seems possible to adopt both at one and the same time. Silberer (8, 9) and Lorenz (5) have aspired to do this, and in part, with interesting results. So long as they remain on psycho-analytic ground their contributions are noteworthy and their results display insight; their deductions as to the loftier activities of the soul may also possess much value (analysis is not called upon to judge of that): but their attempt to interpret the primitive impulse-tendencies of the myths "by analogy" as the original morality, and as a matter of course directed towards high ideals, is an unfortunate one. Thus it comes about that Silberer in his analysis of the homunculus-idea (8) only devotes about half his space to analytical matter—certainly of high value—so that apart from the interesting questions he raises it is fresh material only

that he is able to contribute to the "dismemberment" myth-*motif* (9) analysed by Rank and none of the new views and results which had been confidently expected of him. Confining ourselves to what he does give us in his article, it amounts to this, that it cannot be asserted that psychological stratification, as shown in the disguised or weakened forms of the myths, always corresponds to historical alterations of the myths or proves an earlier or later origin. But the time-determination of myth-formation and of its psychological levels would seem a secondary affair and in no way to be solved by analysis. Further, analysis by no means leaves out of sight, though Silberer seems to think it may, that myth-contents may undergo coarsening as well as softening as time goes on: in fact full account is taken of this in the analytic attempt to explain the mechanism of the reappearance of repressed material. Silberer's admonition to caution would be more in place if not only were one obliged to banish the idea when reading his works but if also such discretion were counted by himself the better part of valour. Meanwhile the mystical bent of his views is unmistakable. Less marked is the influence of Jung on Lorenz whose striking contribution on Œdipus in Colonus (5) calls special attention to the blessings which at the end of his troubles the grey-haired hero brings to the land that harbours him and to his mythical union with the earth. MacCurdy (6) investigates the Hephaestos myth and endeavours to prove the inner connection between the imagined "Omnipotence of thought" and the idea which he discovers in the myth, of life in an abode under the earth i. e. the body of the mother.

DREAM INTERPRETATION

by

OTTO RANK, Vienna.

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Since the last collective review (*Jahrb. der Psa.*, VI, S. 272) two new editions of the "Traumdeutung" (4. Aufl. 1914 and 5. Aufl. 1919[1]) have appeared as well as Freud's "Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse", of which the second part is devoted to the exposition of the dream. Since these works contain important extensions of the theory of dream interpretation, and also all the recognised advances in the literature of the subject, it seems appropriate to use the clue supplied by Freud's expositions for following out the further development of the theory of dreams.

We will preface our remarks by a pronouncement of Freud's, taken from the last edition of the "Traumdeutung" (23, S. 409) a pronouncement which states nothing essentially new, but nevertheless throws a characteristic light on the deepening understanding of the dream through psycho-analysis, as well as on the significance of this for the history of man and civilisation. "Dreaming is generally

[1] With two appendices by the present reviewer: 1. Traum und Dichtung. 2. Traum und Mythus.

speaking a fragmentary regression to the earliest relationships of the dreamer, a revival of his childhood, of the impulses then dominant, and of the means of expression then available. Behind the childhood of the individual there is vouchsafed to us a glimpse into the phylogenetic childhood, into the development of the human species, of which that of the individual is an abbreviated repetition influenced by the chance circumstances of this life. We realise the force of Friedrich Nietzsche's remark that in the dream is operative a very ancient fragment of human life to which there is no longer a direct approach', and we are prepared to expect to arrive by dream analysis at the knowledge of the archaic inheritance of the race, and to recognise the soul which is innate in it. It would seem that dream and neurosis has preserved for us more of the actual detail of early life than we could have supposed possible, and thus psycho-analysis may claim a high place among the sciences that concern themselves with reconstructing the most primitive and most obscure phases of human origins."

The question that thereupon presses for attention, viz.: "whether it will be eventually possible to distinguish which part of the latent psychic processes arises out of the early history of the individual and which out of that of the race" (21, S. 222) is one that Freud does not care to answer finally in the negative. Moreover he considers that the formation of symbols outside the experience of the individual justifies the conclusion that these symbols are to be regarded as a race inheritance.

This brings us to that part of dream interpretation most engaging our attention at the present time, viz. symbolism, the significance of which goes far beyond the scope of dream interpretation, and with which are closely connected numerous still unsolved problems. Those not infrequent cases where the common element in the symbol and the thing symbolised is not obviously recognisable go to prove that the symbolic relation is of a genetic nature. "What is to-day symbolically connected was probably in primaeval times united in conceptional and linguistic identity" (23, S. 240). It is noticeable that where the same language is in use the same symbols occur. Severals examples of dream symbols verified by further analytic work are adduced by Freud (23, S. 241–5) with additional matter on S. 249–50, 253–60) not without a caution against indiscriminate confounding of symbolic representation with the other kinds of indirect representation,

of which he gives a series of highly entertaining examples (23, S. 278–80).

In regard to the use of symbolic interpretations in dream analysis Freud warns us against overvaluing their practical significance and neglecting on that account the method of "free association" to which the priority belongs both in theory and practice, while the translation" of symbols only enters as an auxiliary. Thus a combined technique is forced on us, "on the one hand relying on the associations made by the dreamer, and on the other, supplementing from the analyst's knowledge of symbolism what is wanting" (23, S. 240).

Closely related to symbolism is the theme of typical dreams with the interpretation of which the dreamer's ideas are generally directly at variance. Among these Freud now sharply distinguishes two classes (23, S. 262): those that actually have the same meaning each time, and those which in spite of an identical or similar content nevertheless will be subject to very various interpretations, because the same (typical) thoughts and imaginings, represent in dream-making greatly differing unconscious wishes.

Insufficient attention to this important distinction between the latent dream thoughts and the unconscious dream-images seems to represent the second and existing phase of the understanding of the dream on the part of the scientific world, now that the first phase of confusion of the manifest and latent dream-content may be considered as partially disposed of.

"After so long identifying the dream with its manifest content, the danger to be avoided now is that of confusing the dream with the latent dream thoughts" (23, S. 430 Note).

"'Dream' is the name to be reserved for the result of the dream-making, that is to say then the *form* in which the latent thoughts are transmitted in the process of dream-making" (21, S. 201).

Like most misunderstandings of psycho-analytic views this confusion of the latent thought with the dream has been adopted as an unconscious resistance by superficial analysts. After Adler's (1) pronouncement on the premonitory function of the dream, Maeder (55) set up a "fonction ludique" of the dream without noticing that all these "prospective tendencies" are functions of the preconscious waking thought[1]

[1] As is set out in a particularly instructive article of Dr. Varendonck of Ghent, shortly to be published.

the result of which may become plain to us by analysis of dreams or other phenomena (23, S. 430 Note).

This assertion is thus "not a novel one, as to the characteristics of the unconscious activity to which the latent dream thoughts belong, nor yet an exhaustive statement, for the unconscious activity concerns itself with much else besides preparedness for the future" (21, S. 267).

The distortion of Freud's wish-theory lately put forward by Silberer (74) seems to rest on the consideration of this comprehensive content of the latent dream thought. He states that he is unable to identify himself with a theory that is exclusively a wish-theory (S. 50). It may indeed be "that the phantasy-existence of men enters into all emotions (and emotion is the unconditional prerequisite of the dream). But the question is whether the persistent concentration of the observer on this aspect permits the emergence of the most characteristic, the most important, the leading *motif*. While fully agreeing with the theory of the concealed wishes and their appearance in unrecognisable forms, I nevertheless feel that I must subscribe to a more general formula — and say: the stimulus giving rise to the dream is an *emotional factor of high coefficient*[1] which with its pleasure and painful colouring stirs our interest to wakefulness, and takes us through joyful expectation, admiring self-complacency, anxious fears, uneasy reflections, bitter accusations, or into some other inward state animated by the emotional affect. Usually *several factors*[1] at once take part in the dream" (S. 63).

We find here the same entire misconception of the dream-theory that Silberer—in spite of many valuable contributions to the science of dreams—shares with most readers of the "Traumdeutung". The dream may be a warning, a scheme, a preparation and so on, in so far as attention is paid only to the ideas appearing in it: "it is also always the fulfilment of an unconscious wish, and it is that and that alone, considered as the result of the dream-making elaboration. A dream is thus never simply a plan, a warning, but always a plan or the like translated with the help of an unconscious wish into the archaic method of expression and transformed in the direction of the fulfilment of these wishes. The one character, that of wish-fulfilment, is the constant: the other is capable of variation, it may be on its own part a wish, so that the dream represents a

[1] The italics are the author's.

latent wish of the preceding day as fulfilled by the help of an unconscious wish" (21, S. 251).

The failure, frequent even in analytic circles, to recognise this state of affairs lies in this, that it may very generally be neglected in practice. Not only in the interpretation of the dreams of the healthy, but in any analytic activity we are liable to be interested as a general rule only in the preconscious ideas, which are capable equally of making use of the dream-form as at other times of expressing themselves in the free flow of thought or in some slip of behaviour. "Effort is usually only directed towards breaking up the dream form, and replacing it by the latent thoughts, out o which the dream has come, in their proper connections" (21, S. 250).

In view of the prevalent ignorance of the essence of the Freudian wish theory, it would be a matter of congratulation that Freud has lately again (22) undertaken a more penetrating exploration of this region, if it were not for the feeling that these new elucidations will not materially assist those who where not capable of accepting the earlier ones. This "Metapsychologische Ergänzung zur Traumlehre" aims at shaping out and intensifying the lines of discussion laid down in Section VII of the "Traumdeutung" on the structure and function of the mental apparatus. Freud takes as a starting point the concept of regression fundamental for any understanding of dream-formation, and distinguishes three kinds of it: (a) a *topical* regression in the sense of the developed scheme of the Ψ system, (b) a *temporal* regression, in so far as it is concerned with a harking back to older psychic forms, and (c) a *formal* regression, if primitive methods of expression and representation replace the usual methods. All three kinds of regression are however at base one, and in most cases coincide, for the temporally older is equally the more primitive formally, and a more immediate object of perception in the psychic topical system" (23, S. 409). Of the temporal regressions there are again two to be distinguished: "that of the ego-development and that of the libido-development. The latter achieves during sleep the restoration of the *primitive narcissism*[1], the former the stage of halluncinatory wish-gratification" (22).

The popular "wish-fulfilment" is properly speaking to be understood psychologically as this hallucinatory wish-gratification. The primitive narcissism is disturbed by certain system charges which arrest its vitality also during sleep. It endeavours to defend itself

[1] Italics are the author's.

against these charges through a diversion of the day-remnants into regressive paths and so to obtain gratification. This is achieved by means of a dream-wish that represents an unconscious instinctive impulse. Consequently the dreams would be *"agents for removal of sleep-disturbing (psychic) stimuli by the method of hallucinatory satisfaction"* (21, S. 145).

This formula while it in no way contributes anything new, but merely supplies the logical working out of the wish-theory already developed in the "Traumdeutung", allows in its general scope for psychic stimuli of widely differing kind (originating from the ego as well a from the sexual impulses) without tying itself to a determinant remaining invariably sexual, as superficial and antagonistic opinion has represented it. If in dream-interpretations, especially of neurotics, but also of normal adults, *sexual material* preponderates, such material has nothing directly to do with the real dream-forming unconscious wish of the theory, but is merely a method of expression and serves as a proof to us that the sexual takes a very large place in the psychical, and naturally particularly in the repressed states of the human being. But the statement that all dreams demand a sexual interpretation, a statement which is the object of unceasing polemic, is entirely foreign to Freud's "Traumdeutung". It is not to be found in the five editions of this book, and stands in palpable contradiction to its other contents (23, S. 270). The present reviewer might feel himself to blame for the obstinate repetition of the statement as due to his own extension and modification of the Freudian basic formula, but the reproach was already levelled quite unjustifiably at Freud and his theory of the neurosis before the reviewer's contribution was included in the "Traumdeutung" (3. Aufl., 1919, S. 117 Anmkg.). How unscrupulously writers who are closely associated with psycho-analysis proceed in this respect is shown by the fact that Silberer (74, S. 63) after an inaccurate reproduction of the Freudian formula quotes that of the present reviewer without giving any name and in such a way that the impression is inevitably gained that it is a more exact formulation of Freud's own. The whole extremely characteristic passage runs as follows "one may certainly take up a standpoint from which the dream excitant is always seen as the 'wish'" (Freud). The formula most exactly expressing this point of view, the full comprehension of which can only be achieved of course by a much more exhaustive study of the Freudian system, runs as follows:

"on the basis and with the help of repressed infantile-sexual material, the dream regularly represents the fulfilment of current and usually also erotic wishes which are veiled and clothed in symbolic form".

This formula which in the first place is concerned only with the material of the dream, and leaves out the theory altogether, in the second place permits one freely to subsume under it the so-called comfort-dreams (dreams of hunger, thirst, and desire to urinate), and while it designates the current wishes as "usually" also erotic, it admits the possibility of exceptions. As a matter of fact the most so-called *comfort-dreams* of adults prove not to be exceptions from the rule, displaying as they do a very considerable erotic "lining" if the dreamer submits them to analysis, instead of simply acknowledging their apparent comfort-character by a "comfort-interpretation". The erotic stimulus is for example often represented in the dream under the infantile guise of a desire to urinate, indeed the urination dream which subserves the comfort tendency is frequently caused by a sexual stimulus. On the other hand the pollution dreams betray in their result with more or less experimental clearness the sexual meaning of the seemingly harmless dream images. Sadger (71) has recently emphasised the relation of the pollution dreams to urethral erotism as well as to ejaculatio praecox and psychic impotence. In all these problems the stratification of meanings of a dream must never be lost sight of; to attach proper value to this may preserve one from premature commitments on the nature of the dream.

As regards Silberer's positive contribution to the interpretation of dreams appraised in the last collective review (*Jahrbuch d. Psa.*, Jahrg. VI, S. 277) viz. the so-called "functional" phenomenon (erroneously described by some as functional "symbolism"), Freud recognises this as a second factor in dream formation originating from the side of waking thought, less constant but next in importance to the far more significant "secondary elaboration". The theory of the functional phenomenon is, however, open to abuse in that it leads back to the tendency to abstract symbolic interpretation of dreams. In particular the "threshold" symbolism perpetually emphasised by Silberer is one that Freud is far from being able to discover as often as might be expected from Silberer's examples (23, S. 344). These describe the behaviour of a psychic moment merely registrative in function which establishes

the fact that in certain circumstances a kind of self-observation takes place with the censorship, supplying a quota to the dream-content, without contributing anything further to the comprehension of the dream as a psychic product.

One assertion of Silberer's cannot be too energetically contradicted, since though it is up to now entirely without proof yet it is eagerly repeated by all who would like to disguise the fundamental relations existing in dream-making and to draw away attention from its roots in instinct. It is a question of a proof for which we are still waiting and which is vainly sought in Silberer's last work, that besides the psycho-analytic interpretation the dream demands further the so-called "anagogic" one for its full comprehension, an interpretation which aims at the exposition of the loftier activities of the soul. Silberer does not bring forward in proof of this assertion any series of dreams analysed along both lines. According to our own analytic experience such a state of things has no existence: most dreams do not even require a further interpretation, much less are they capable of an anagogic one. In cases where such a meaning can be given, it is usually independently supplied by the dreamer, while the correct "interpretation" of the material submitted has to be sought by aid of the well-known technique (23, S. 391). If it be thought desirable to publish as "anagogic" interpretations the trainso f thought of the patients under analysis as to the meaning of the dreams, relating as they do to sublimation (as well as to transference and resistance), the warning must be repeated as to the danger of confusing the dream with the dream-material: a warning which Freud has lodged against those who would make use of the "dirigibility" of the dreams by the analyst as an argument against the objectivity of dream research. "In testing these influences on his patient the analyst only plays the part of the experimenter who arranges the limbs of his subject in certain positions. It is frequently possible to influence the dreamer as to what he shall dream *about*, but never to influence him in addition as to *what* he will dream. The mechanism of dream elaboration and the unconscious dream-wish are withdrawn from any foreign influence" (21, S. 269).

We have seen that there is an obstinately recurring tendency to confuse the dream with the latent thoughts, which are then employed as objections to the wish-fulfilment theory. In the course of our refutation of this line of thought, we are repeatedly brought

face to face with a problem lately again raised by Freud[1]. Since the preconscious thoughts can supply the dreamer with material which throughout is opposed to a wish-fulfilment, such as well-founded cares, painful considerations, difficult decisions, it would seem not unjustifiable to ask how the dream behaves in such a case. Now this question has been answered by Freud himself, and that in the first edition of the "Traumdeutung" (1900), where he showed how the painful and anxiety dreams were also just as much wish-fulfilments in the sense of the theory of dreams—even if the wishes were repressed, not acceptable to the ego, or of another psychic system—as the straightforward gratification dreams, in which the unconscious wish coincides with the conscious. The mechanism of the dream-making is, of course, more obvious, if we substitute the opposition between the "ego" and the "repressed" for that between conscious and unconscious (23, S. 415). On the basis of this differentiation a special group of "punishment dreams" can be recognised, fulfilling simultaneously an unconscious wish and a wish for punishment of the dreamer on account of a repressed impermissible impulse. We must, however, attribute the active unconscious wish of the punishment dreams to the "ego", not to the repressed element. The punishment dreams thus point to the ego taking a still further share in the dream-formation. The simplest supposition as to their origin is that the thoughts of the previous day are of a satisfying kind—not as one might think painful—but give expression to unpermitted gratifications: of these thoughts then nothing wins its way through into the manifest dream but their direct opposite. Thus we find in Freud the somewhat more complete formula "Wish-fulfilment, anxiety fulfilment, punishment fulfilment" *(Wunscherfüllung, Angsterfüllung, Straferfüllung)*, where it must be remembered that anxiety is the direct—in the unconscious, the coincident—antithesis of the wish, while the punishment also represents a wish-fulfilment—that of the other censoring personality (21, S. 246).

Finally, still another group of dreams present difficult problems for dream interpretation, namely, the *dreams of the beloved dead*. In these dreams there commonly appears a shifting from death to life and back again which according to Freud (23, S. 291 A) re-

[1] See his address at the Hague Congress (Sept. 1920) of which a short abstract is given in this Journal, Vol. I, p. 354, also his treatise: Jenseits des Lustprinzips (1920).

presents the ambivalence of feeling on the part of the dreamer, and should go some way towards showing that such ambivalence is not mere indifference. Other dreams in which it is only remembered that the dream figure is already long ago dead, have to do with thoughts of one's own death and the dismissal of such thoughts from the mind; but the meaning of these dreams has not been fully worked out yet in analysis. An attempt has recently been made by Galant (25), to explain this homogeneous group of dreams, in opposition to these views, as sexual wish-fulfilments of algolagnic perversion.

Pötzl's article (61) is an important contribution, substituting as is does a highly subtilized experimental method for the rough technique of introducing disturbing stimuli into the dream-state. Pötzl got a number of subjects to draw what they had consciously grasped of a picture exposed by a flashlight. He then got them to make drawings in the same way of suitable portions of their dreams of the following night. It was thus proved unmistakably that the details of the picture not grasped by the subjects had been elaborated in the well-known autocratic way in the service of the dream-building tendency, while the consciously observed parts reproduced in the first drawing did not re-appear in the manifest dream-content. This may be looked on as a valuable experimental proof of the rôle of recent impressions in dream-formation.

Rudolf Weber (Geneva) has thrown out the question "Why do we think in words in waking life, but in dream in images?" Koehler (47) attempts on the basis of the Freudian theory to answer "that our psychic life receives the greater number of pleasing impressions through the eye".

Out of the remaining literature of dreams, remarkable rather for its quantity than its quality, we will single out three characteristic types: first the *a priori* opponents who still refuse to declare themselves, next those who feel they can no longer ignore the Freudian theory, and tack it on to their own previous views on the dream (19, 81, etc.) and finally, those who accept it, but immediately think they must develop it further in their own way. As example of the first group of absolute opponents we may mention Henning (28), because he deserves to be rescued from oblivion as the gauge of scientific disputation. Against the wish-fulfilment theory Henning fulminates with the whole weight of the statistical statement that 75 per cent of all dreams are unpleasant. In the next place he does not approve of

symbolism and to show his superiority on this point he identifies Silberer's opinion with the standpoint of the Freudian school, and makes this would-be witty remark: "If the principal condition of symbol-formation lies in an inadequacy of the power of comprehension, the Freudian school does not exactly pay itself a compliment and their opponents will rejoice that they themselves encounter no symbols in their dreams". How uninformed the author is in the theory of symbolism is revealed unambiguously behind this ambiguous conception of symbol-formation. He is peculiarly drastic of course in his treatment of sex-symbolism; in rejecting this he knows no limits—not even those of experience. "We shall see in the case of examination dreams *as in pollution dreams*[1] that the matter in hand is actually quite different[2], that moreover no discussion of a *sexual component need arise*"[1] (p. 11).

That Henning deliberately—deliberately is the only word possible—selects the pollution dreams for the refutation of sex-symbolism is proof of an undaunted distrust of the deception of the senses that one would have credited to no one but a Copernicus. The conviction however is soon forced on one that even he was more inclined to concessions than this pig-headed person. "The result is that this (pollution-dream) is directly concerned with the sexual act, and clearly without any symbolising whatever: of course the details are not of an aesthetic character. *Therefore, I should prefer not to print the actual words*[1] but, without concealing anything essential, to omit the all too drastic illustrations" (S. 43).

In this way Henning at least is spared the reproach which he levels at Freud, because the latter "does not examine the dream and its component at all, but only the dream-reproduction formulated in words" (S. 8). It is amazing to see the subtlety with which Henning knows how to avoid this error. When it is impossible for him to evade altogether the necessity of committing the manifest dream content to words, he glides over it at least with supreme contempt thus: "Three men have a tale to tell of their sister (in a pollution dream), although none of them have the least disposition towards incest, but on the contrary have a strong physical repugnance for her. One of them was commended by the sister on the day of the dream for

[1] Italics are the reviewer's.

[2] As Stekel declares.

his (missing) affair, whereupon he replied in vexation 'Look to your own dirty ways and I will look to mine'" (S.45). With this reaction the dreamer seems to have prophetically anticipated the only correct reply to Henning's dabbling in the problem of dreams.

Even more annoying than such a dull ignoramus is the case of those who having discoverd psycho-analysis, which they would like to brand for the common good, feel themselves bound to elaborate the theory. Such a one is Lomer, who with disgraceful coolness puts the fundamental conceptions of the Freudian theory on one side as self-evident, and then bases on them his old wives' fable of a dream-book (53) which in lack of critical insight yields nothing to his prototype Stekel ("the cautious Stekel" he calls him, S. 31). He is merely transcribing Freud (word for word, e. g. S. 36) when he introduces the interpretation of the dreams of flight with the words "There is a general consensus of opinion that the material of this dream is a harking back to a memory of the well-known childish 'flying' on the arms of grown-up people." On the other hand (S. 37) he wrongfully suspects Freud of assigning to all dreams a sexual (!) wish meaning, and two decades after the appearance of the "Traumdeutung" has the audacity to inform Freud that there are also egoistic dreams.

The author's true originality, apart from his lotto-interpretations, lies in his complete absence of critical feeling. He waxes very vehement over the recognition of the telepathic possibilities of dreams, and here at least acknowledges his debt to a number of other authors who have preceded him on this subject by quoting them. But this is all the evidence that he has to bring forward; for the rest he gives—as he usually does—instances chosen obviously only in reference to their manifest content, and suddenly we find that in view of the mere possibility of a sign of telepathy his whole grasp of dream and symbol has completely forsaken him. This case illustrates very clearly how certain sympathies and tendencies, in short affective attitudes of mind, disturb the judgement and bring about an adherence to the manifest dream content that develops into an insuperable obstacle to the understanding of any dream problem. Apart from the fact that the coincidence in time of a manifest dream image with an occurrence has no bearing on its intelligibility, it does not prove the existence of telepathic influences. If the dreams were analysed, purely psychic sources for the dream image would at once appear, and perhaps in many cases the whole

assumption of telepathy would thus fall through[1]. On the other hand one might well come to closer grips with the problem of why many telepathic and prophetic dreams concern themselves with death.[2] The adherence to the view that dreams have a prophetic character shows how deeply anchored are superstition and folk-belief in the unconscious, and how strong the tendencies are to regard the consciously intelligible dream content as the only one bringing happiness or wish-fulfilment.

[1] In one example erroneously described as a "veridical dream" (59) there was clearly present an *unconscious knowledge.*

[2] See the case of clairvoyance analysed by Hitschmann, "Zur Kritik des Hellsehens", *Wr. klin. Rundschau,* 1910, Nr. 6.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE LOGIC OF THE UNCONSCIOUS MIND. By M. K. Bradby. (Oxford Medical Publications. Henry Frowde, Hodder and Stoughton, 1920. XIV+316. Price 16s.)

Is has now for some considerable time been apparent that psycho-analytic research has rendered necessary a psychological amplification of logical theory in at least two respects: first, the manner in which the (intellectual) apprehension of reality is liable to be influenced by conation and affection; secondly, the manner in which the characteristics of unconscious thought (lack of contact with reality, absence of sense of contradiction, disregard of time, liability to condensation, displacement, etc.) contrast and interact with the processes of conscious thought, with which alone the science of logic has been concerned in the past. The problems belonging to this second class have been to some slight extent touched upon by Freud in his fourth series of collected papers, while the more general psychological problems of the first class have been occasionally treated by writers on social psychology and (from the philosophical point of view) by the pragmatists. But anything in the nature of a systematic or comprehensive treatment of the bearing of modern psychology (including Psycho-Analysis) on logic is still lacking; so that the reader will turn with all the greater interest to a book on the Logic of the Unconscious Mind by an author who has already in previous volumes devoted herself to a general exposition of the scope and significance of Psycho-Analysis.

Miss Bradby is herself apparently well aware of the importance and magnitude of the task she has undertaken. "The student of logic to-day", she says in her Introduction, "is called upon to give the subject a fresh start, and this he is enabled to do by the discoveries of Psycho-Analysts concerning the Unconscious Mind. Equipped with a new understanding of human motives, he has to look at people's reasoning, his own and others', and see what connecting principles may be observed, what general laws are actually in operation". She is also fully cognizant, apparently, of the vast significance of the unconscious mental forces in shaping human life and human destiny, as when she says, "to a large extent the conscious aims of mankind would seem to be defeated rather than fulfilled, and we may surmise that his reasoning is at fault. At no time was the contrast between the purpose and achievement of human

society more striking than at the present . . . It is strikingly plain that reason has not yet had its day, and that mankind . . . far from having outgrown logic, has not yet arrived at the stage of general explicit reasoning, but still acts largely as did its primitive forefathers, on pur-blind intuition or stone-blind instinct."

As we progress further into the book, however, we learn to our disappointment that in spite of her apparent realisation of the importance of unconscious factors in moulding thought and conduct, Miss Bradby has contented herself with a study of human motives at a relatively superficial level: she has appeared unable or unwilling to apply the results of her psycho-analytic studies to her present problem, with the result that she has written a book which might have been produced by almost any student of social psychology with but little more than a smattering of psycho-analytic knowledge.

She confines herself almost entirely to the first of the two above mentioned ways in which Psycho-Analysis appears to demand an extension of existing logical doctrine. This is much to be regretted, both because of the immense theoretical importance of the second class of problems and because it would have been of great interest to see how Miss Bradby would have applied in detail her principle that "the rules lof logic are not, as so often said, contradicted in the unconscious or turned topsy-turvy, but merely applied to less developed material. The unconscious mind . . . has no peculiar logic of its own. All logic is one, that of rational mind continually developing" (p. 47). The workings of the Unconscious appear at first sight to depart so widely from the rules of logical thought that the tracing of a process of continuous development from the one to the other presents a far from easy task, any contribution to which would have been extremely welcome.

Even within the narrower field of the influence of conation and affection on cognition we find, however, scarcely anywhere a reference to psycho-analytic discoveries in the places where they would be appropriate. Thus in dealing with the fear of the dead there is no mention of the mechanism of projected hatred which is so largely responsible for this fear; in treating the motives which impel men to seek wealth there is no mention of the coprophilic origin of many of these motives; the psychological aspects of Totemism find no place in discussions relating to vegetarianism, man's attitude toward animals and the Lord's Supper; while no consideration is given to the parent-regarding or narcissistic tendencies in the treatment of the ideas concerning God and Devil. In thus omitting all reference to the psycho-analytic aspects of so much of her subject, Miss Bradby has doubtless made her book easier to read, but has at the same time lost a useful opportunity of making a valuable contribution to knowledge—a loss which scientific students of psychology, logic and social problems, in so

far as they are aware of the nature of the omission, will most assuredly regret.

To psycho-analysts it will probably be a matter of interest to endeavour to trace the causes which have led Miss Bradby to throw away her psycho-analytic knowledge in the time of need and to revert so largely to pre-analytic modes of thought; for intellectual backsliding of this sort is unfortunately no uncommon occurrence in the history of Psycho-Analysis, and it is evident that even earnest students must constantly be on their guard against the operation in themselves of the tendencies which lead to this backsliding. Apart from the more obvious shirking of the unpleasant and apparently grotesque issues necessarily involved in a full consideration of unconscious motive forces (a shirking which appears to manifest itself—negatively—in a somewhat impassioned optimism and confidence in human progress), there are perhaps two intellectual confusions which are largely responsible for the result in the present case: (1) the failure to grasp the nature and significance of Freud's distinction between the Preconscious and the Unconscious proper (in the systematic sense), Miss Bradby's treatment of the "Unconscious" being concerned largely with the former and only to a comparatively small extent with the latter, (2) a strong tendency to overemphasise the importance of "functional" symbolism and to neglect the usually more significant "material" aspect of symbols. Following certain of the more extreme exponents of Jung's school, Miss Bradby seems inclined to believe that all symbols express mental states or processes and have but little direct relation to *objects* of interest or desire in the outer world. This tendency frequently causes her to overlook the ultimate nature of the (unconscious) objects of human endeavour, and sometimes even leads her to almost ludicrously inadequate accounts of motivation; as when she attributes a mal-observation (reported by Darwin in 1876) on the part of farmers and gardeners to the effect that the field beans of that year were all growing on the wrong side of the pod, to the farmer's "uneasy dread of having his ideas upset"—the particular form of the mal-observation being, it is suggested, due to the fact that "Darwin's own discoveries were threatening the supposed symmetry of unconscious thought" (p. 102).

Although we have been compelled to emphasise the very serious incompleteness of the book from the psycho-analytic point of view, we do not wish in any way to convey the impression that the volume is devoid of merit. Failing a more penetrating and exhaustive treatise on the subject, it will doubtless be of considerable value both to the student of logic and to the student of psychology, and is more especially likely to be of interest to the economist, the moralist or the politician who is beginning the study of psychology. Psychologists have as yet produced little that is calculated to appeal to workers in these fields, and Miss

Bradby's exposition of the illogicalities of human behaviour and her insistence upon the operation of unconscious or semi-conscious motives as important determinants of this behaviour should provide a valuable lesson to all who have to deal with social phenomena.

The book is divided into a short introductory section—devoted to an exposition of formal logic—and three "Parts", the first dealing with "the unconscious background of conscious reasoning", the second with "unconscious motives the source of fallacy", the third with "logic applied to life". In the first of these three parts are chapters on instinct, intuition, dreams, language etc.; in the second there is attempted an analysis and classification of fallacies, while the third deals with education, "the logic of compromise" (concerned with the interaction of groups of opposed motives), social problems, religion, spiritualism, etc. To the present writer it would seem that the middle portion of the book is the most helpful, interesting and original, as it suggests many valuable lines of thought which—especially when deepened by psycho-analytic insight —should be of service to the sociologist and social psychologist.

We may perhaps be permitted to reproduce here, with a few illustrations and comments, Miss Bradby's—admittedly provisional—classification of fallacies.

1. The Fallacy of Authority—"A tendency to accept 'authority' instead of forming independent judgments", as illustrated, for instance, in the savage's proneness to rely on tribal custom or upon the word of medicine-man, priest or king or by the tendency among civilised men to base arguments upon the authority of religious creeds or the dogmas of scientific textbooks; this fallacy (like all the subsequent ones) appearing in its most insidious form when the real basis of the argument is unrecognised, e. g. when a man thinks he is arguing from purely scientific premises but is all the time being unconsciously influenced by a religious bias. It is obvious that a more penetrating analysis of the psychological mechanism of this form of fallacy would deal with the nature of our attitude towards authority itself and with its foundations in our early attitude towards parents and parent-substitutes.

2. The Fallacy of Self-Centredness—"a tendency to primitive egotism or imaginative self-centredness"; as illustrated by Lord Salisbury's argument that an increased number of public houses does not imply increased drunkenness (any more than a great number of chairs would lead his housemaids to sit down the oftener). The fallacy here arises from Lord Salisbury regarding drunkards as being "people like himself who have no craving for alcohol that cannot be kept in check". The same fallacy is responsible, according to our author, for mistakes which arise from reading our own nature into animals (anthropomorphism) or into persons of different race or class. In its more subtle forms it is undoubtedly a form of fallacy of which it behoves psychologists more especially to be

on their guard. In one of its varieties—called by Miss Bradby the fallacy of Subjective Symbolism—in virtue of which events or things are regarded as expressing human tendencies or feelings, it constitutes a source of error from which the Zurich school of psychologists in particular have, in the opinion of the present writer, not been altogether free. A full treatment of the roots of this fallacy would probably have to take into consideration the whole mechanism of Projection and the psychological tendencies underlying Animism.

3. The Fallacy of Will—"a tendency to think that one can gain one's object by the mere imposition of one's will"; as illustrated by Gordon's unsuccessful attempt to save Khartoum, the Children's Crusade in 1212 and the Society of Friendly Workers inaugurated in 1894 with the idea that it would "speedily solve the problem of the poor in London in detail and as a whole", but which in three years time had ceased altogether to exist. In this fallacy psycho-analysts will have no hesitation in seeing the continued operation of the primitive "omnipotence of thought".

4. The Fallacy of the Wish and the Fear—"a tendency to believe in the existence of that which one desires, to which may be added the complementary tendency to believe in the existence of that which one fears or dreads"; as illustrated by the investment of savings in highly speculative companies, in the Russian Troops Myth of 1914, or the seeing of hostile aeroplanes when none were present. The psychological roots of this fallacy are obviously much the same as in the preceding case, the fallacies themselves differing little except as regards the intimacy of their relationship to action, which is greater in the case of (3) than in the case of (4).

5. The Fallacy of the Simple and Striking—"a tendency to accept a thing as true because it is simple and striking"; as exemplified in unreal simplifications in theology, history or science (In one of her examples the author erroneously states that Psycho-Analysis "tries to make its sexual theory do all duties by regarding every impulse as sexual, much as certain Indians regarded men and horses as kinds of pig"—though it is interesting to note that a reference to one of Jung's works is given in this connection.). A full explanation of the psychological roots of this fallacy would doubtless involve a thorough investigation into the nature of what might be called the Principle of Least Effort (in this case intellectual effort)—a principle which is emerging into a position of great importance in connection with Freud's later work. The mechanisms of symbolism (particularly those to which Ernest Jones has drawn attention in his recent work on the subject) and the general tendency to use concrete images rather than abstract thought are also obviously of great importance here.

6. The Fallacy of Limited Experience—"a tendency to draw con-

clusions from too limited an experience"; as illustrated by the North American Indians' belief that the early French missionaries were bent on doing them harm by the exercise of magic, since in their ignorance of Christian ways and traditions they could conceive of no other motive that could satisfactorily account for the behaviour of the Europeans.

7. The Scientific Fallacy—"the tendency to overlook certain factors in the scientific pursuit of other factors"; as illustrated by the behaviour of "the surgeon who performs an operation without considering the condition of the patient's spirits or digestion". It is admitted that mistakes of this class have "a family likeness" to those of Limited Experience. The Scientific Fallacy is, we are told, "especially the pitfall of educated youth, of experts and of specialists and it makes a little knowledge such a dangerous thing when combined with only a little imagination, that we are apt to forget the still greater danger arising from complete ignorance". It is obvious that this and the preceding class of fallacies differ from the other classes in that they are to some extent necessarily involved in the finite nature off all human knowledge; even here, however, the danger of ill-adjusted thought and action very frequently arises from the co-operation of conative and affective factors, as is recognised by Miss Bradby when she says for instance that "the expert in hot pursuit of some factors, overlooks others which would delay him, or bent on applying a theory, neglects data which do not tally with it."

8. The Fallacy of the Marvellous—"a tendency to believe in a thing because it is marvellous"; as illustrated by our readiness "to make a nine days' wonder out of anything which offers possibilities (such as the case of Helen Keller) or our alacrity in spreading or believing reports of supernatural phenomena. A full treatment of the psychological causes of this fallacy would have to deal with, among other things, (1) the intellectual basis of the fallacy in limitation or dissociation of experience (an aspect already treated by McDougall and other psychologists), (2) the belief in magic and the supernatural generally as arising from a projection of the primitive "omnipotence of thought", (3) the narcissistic roots of the motives leading to exaggeration as a means of increasing the power and interest attaching to the individual (a matter upon which psycho-analytic research has still probably much enlightenment to give us).

9. The Fallacy of Suggestibility, individual or gregarious—an aspect of the subject to which considerable attention has of course already been paid by medical and social psychologists, on which Psycho-Analysis has been able to throw some further light by exhibiting the infantile roots of suggestibility in their various displacements, and as regards which the forthcoming pronouncements of Professor Freud on Collective Psychology will be eagerly awaited by psycho-analysts.

10. The Fallacy of Magic Influence —"a tendency to believe that

things influence each other by secret sympathy"; a fallacy which (chiefly through the works of Freud and Frazer) is now, in its general bearings, too well understood by psycho-analysts to need comment or illustration.

It is to be regretted that in introducing the above classification of fallacies, due to other than strictly intellectual causes, Miss Bradby has made practically no reference to the work of her few predecessors in the same field. In a book of this kind we should at least expect some mention, for instance, of the name of Francis Bacon.

Enough has been indicated here to show the vast importance and interest of the theme handled by Miss Bradby—a theme which we hope will be accorded fuller treatment in the not too distant future. We need only add in conclusion that the book is written in an easy and pleasant style and affords throughout striking evidence of the author's wide reading and extensive interests.

J. C. FLÜGEL.

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THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NERVOUS AILMENTS. By Joseph Ralph. (Ralph, Chelston, Torquay, 1920. Pp. 62.)

Since writing the brochure which was reviewed in the last number of the JOURNAL (p. 487), Mr. Ralph has returned from America to England and has just published a second brochure. Like the former one, it is a clear, though brief and elementary, presentation of the aims of the psycho-analytic method, especially in regard to psychotherapy. As in the former case, we note an historical error regarding Dr. Breuer. This time, it is true, he becomes connected with Vienna and not Zurich, but it is said of him that in 1880, when "an old Viennese neurologist", he made certain discoveries, but was unable to appreciate their importance on account of his advanced age (pp. 13, 15). Dr. Breuer is a practising physician, and his speciality is physiology, not neurology; as he is, we believe, still in practice, he was presumably in the thirties in 1880, so that the reasons why he did not pursue his investigations are more likely to be connected with youth than with age.

Two others slips may be commented on. Freud never found that the neurasthenias were "merely symptoms of underlying mental causes" (p. 16), but has always regarded them as of purely physical origin. Nor can we agree that "it is advisable that the patient relinquish the usual routine of life and place himself at the disposal of the analyst for daily treatment of about two hours' duration" (p. 61). It is, on the contrary, important that the patient's mode of life during the analysis should approximate as nearly as possible to his normal one, and every effort should be made to ensure this, since it is a far more favourable condition for the analysis; while the cases it is advisable to treat for two hours daily are exceptions rather than the rule.

In his preface Mr. Ralph breaks a lance for the lay analyst, in which he has our full sympathy, but "methinks he doth protest too much" when he maintains that those who have succeeded in psycho-analytic work have done so not because of their medical training, *but in spite of it* (author's italics). There may, especially from the psychological point of view, be deficiencies in a medical education, but in the treatment of patients the advantages of it are greater than the disadvantages. E. J.

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RELIGION AND THE NEW PSYCHOLOGY. A Psycho-Analytic Study of Religion. By W. S. Swisher, B.D. (Geo. Routledge and Sons, London, 1920. Pp. 261. Price 10s. 6d.).

From the publishers' announcement we learn that this is "the first attempt in book form to apply Psycho-Analytic or Freudian Psychology to the entire problem of Religion and the conduct of Human Life", but the reader will be disappointed if he expects from this to find a psycho-analysis of individual religious phenomena. There is in the book neither this nor any fundamental investigation of religious problems, so that the book would have to be pronounced unsuccessful if we were to accept the author's statement (p. x) that it "aims to be a comprehensive treatment of the religious problem in its various phases, the varied phenomena of religion, and various normal and abnormal religious types together with certain suggestions for a new and different kind of education, from the viewpoint of the new psychology".

We suspect, however, that the author's real aim was quite other than this, and that actually he has succeeded much better than might be thought if judged from the less modest standards indicated above. The desire evidently permeating the book is the altruistic wish to help other people who may find it hard to reconcile their religious tendencies with either the new psychology or the facts of life, and the spirit of goodwill and benevolence that breathes through the whole book quite disarms criticism. The author appears to be an American clergyman, presumably from Boston, who has come to realise that the old insistence of religious teachers on dogmatic beliefs and moral precepts as the sole guide to life urgently needs to be supplemented, if not indeed actually replaced, by a more comprehending attitude towards human nature and its possibilities. This he has found in psycho-analysis, which is of course the new psychology referred to in the title, and he follows his homiletic impulse to place before others the more satisfactory point of view he has himself attained.

The book is a kindly talk on such matters as the problem of evil, religious conversion, human motives, etc., as illuminated by psycho-

analysis. Interspersed throughout the book is a very readable and on the whole trustworthy account of the main psycho-analytic discoveries. He repeatedly insists on the wide-spread importance of sexuality in life in general, and religion in particular, and seems prepared to accept the exclusively phallic origin of the latter. He points out the enormous importance of the Œdipus complex, especially as a source of the sense of sin and guilt. Many illustrations are given of unconscious motivation, and there are two appendices on dreams and birth dreams respectively. The relation of mythology to religion is not overlooked, though if the author were acquainted with the literature in German he would have been able to extend this part in a valuable degree.

Perhaps the most interesting and valuable part of the book is the indication it affords of the way in which religion as previously known will gradually become replaced by other forms of human activity, and, as the author points out, has in the past twenty years already been so replaced on an extensive scale in America. As with all great changes in human thought, this comes about not, as one might logically expect, through the detailed refutation of preceding beliefs, but through a gradual loss of interest in them; one thinks of the various scholastic problems of the middle ages, the witchcraft epidemic, and so on. To the author, as to many other religious people, it is rapidly becoming a matter of indifference what actual beliefs are held on the great religious topics of salvation, of the next life, of the nature of God or Christ, and the like. Bibliolatry, for instance, he positively inveighs against. Such things belong to the past, not to the future. Care about individual security, salvation and consolation is being replaced by interest in the relation of an individual to his group, essentially to his fellow man; the supernatural aspects are falling more and more into the background. On this phase of the evolution of religion there can be no doubt that psycho-analysis must have a far-reaching effect. This the author sees clearly enough, and he is in the vanguard of progress in laying before his fellows such considerations in this very stimulating, challenging, and at the same time helpful work.

In the next edition, which we trust will be called for, we suggest to the author that he reconsider the following points. As a criticism of Freud's view that the sense of blood-guilt emanated originally from the crime of parricide (for which, by the way, the term of patricide has been coined in the American translation) he says (p. 13): "Again, it must be borne in mind that the primitive evinces no sense of blood-guilt. To kill an enemy is merely to rid oneself of his hated presence". He here seems to us to have for a moment forgotten, what he never forgets elsewhere in writing the book, that blood-guilt has nothing to do with enemies, but with one's near relations. The important discovery of a connection between relief of a symptom and the tracing of its for-

gotten cause was not "made in 1881 by Freud and his associate Breuer", but by the latter alone (p. 25). Nor is it true that "Janet and Charcot made the same discovery through hypnotic methods". A bibliography of psycho-analytic works is given at the end, all of course in English. Of technical works those by Adler, Coriat, and Pfister are included, but not Brill, Ferenczi, Hitschmann, or the reviewer; of non-technical Lay, Mordell, and Prescott, but not Barbara Low, Putnam, or White.

E. J.

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PSYCHONEUROSES OF WAR AND PEACE. By Millais Culpin, M.D., F.R.C.S. (Cambridge University Press, 1920. Pp. 128. Price 10s.)

This was a thesis successfully presented at London University for the degree of M.D.

As Dr. Culpin has had the advantage of studying the war neuroses in his double capacity of operating surgeon and physician, the result is a valuable contribution to the literature on this subject. He is non-committal in his attitude towards the Freudian conception of the origin of the Psychoneuroses but appears to have an open mind on the subject, and is open to conviction. For instance he appears to be rather inclined to favour Janet's theory of Dissociation and classifies some of his cases under the term of "Psychasthenia". Under this heading he includes Phobias and Obsessions and in this respect separates them from Hysteria. He states, however, that the only theory of causation is the theory of the unconscious and here he seems to discard Janet's dissociation theory in favour of the more reasonable Freudian conception.

With regard to predisposition, the author will not admit that every patient must necessarily have had a predisposition to a nervous breakdown, though he adds that as his experience increased the percentage of cases showing no predisposing factors decreased. It is in this respect that he appears rather to neglect the ontogenetic factors: that the current conflict of modern warfare might in every case have something to do with hereditary influences and the repressions occurring in the first five years of life seems to have been overloked. Thus he only quotes one case in which it was considered necessary to analyse the early sexual repressions. That the current conflict bears a relationship to older ones in reviving buried memories is not seen.

In his chapters on treatment, Dr. Culpin deals skilfully and at some length with the revival of war experiences by the method of abreaction. He lays stress on the necessity of the emotion being felt as a new experience in association with the original cause. A hypnoidal state is aimed at in this abreaction and in this respect the author endeavours to steer a halfway course between the methods of free association and hypnosis.

Much of the book is devoted to the description of cases; these appear to be well chosen and admirably adapted to illustrate the author's views.

A description of the important mechanism of transference is omitted; it is however possible to read between the lines and see that Dr. Culpin recognises that his successful treatment depended on this mechanism. Dr. Culpin, while not accepting the Freudian conception of origins, admits the therapeutic value of this technique.

R. M. RIGGALL.

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PSYCHOLOGY AND PSYCHOTHERAPY. By William Brown, M.A., M.D., D.Sc. With a Foreword by William Aldren Turner, C.B., M.D. (Arnold, London, 1921. Pp. 196. Price 8s. 6d.)

Dr. Brown has given us a very readable little volume, and what he has to say is attractively and clearly presented. It would be good if more of the books written on cognate topics were written with the same conciseness, neatness and clarity.

The contents of the book, however, are of more unequal value, though the author has, with one important exception, successfully achieved his main purpose of expounding the psychological principles underlying the practice of psychotherapy. Of the five sections the first, "Introductory", gives a general account of mental dissociation, hypnotism, and of hysteria and other neuroses, with a thumb-nail sketch of Freud's and Jung's views of sex. The description of neurasthenia (p. 34) makes it plain that the author really has the condition of hypochondria in mind. He says that Freud's three objections to the method of hypnotism are: (1) Failure of the method in certain cases. (2) Its tendency to produce other symptoms in place of those of which the patient is cured. (3) Fear of the transference of sexual feeling to the person of the physician (p. 16). The last of these is, of course, a grotesque invention. In the second he ascribes to Freud the belief that hypnotism produces the other symptoms, whereas Freud naturally is speaking of the neurosis. Freud's real objection is not included in the list, though it is hinted at elsewhere in the book in a misleading statement. One notes, by the way, that, whenever the subject of transference and its relation to suggestion is touched on, signs of confusion of thought appear. Thus the author proclaims with the air of discovery, and insists in the face of imaginary opposition, that transference occurs during psycho-analysis! "I am not claiming that analysis involves suggestion... But I am contending that the method of psycho-analysis, even when carried out according to the strictest rules of the Freudian school, does involve suggestion in the form of transference,

and, further, that unless positive transference occurs the method is powerless to effect a cure" (p. 110). And yet this passage immediately follows one quoted from Freud enunciating the same thing as a truism of psycho-analysis.

Part II, "Theoretical", comprises three chapters. The first is on Freud's theory of dreams. A concrete account is given and the author's only personal comment is to express the opinion that the interpretation of fear dreams as wish-fulfilment dreams leaves him unconvinced. In fact, he stigmatises it as "this persistent and almost impertinent faithfulness to one idea". The second chapter, "Freud's Theory of the Unconscious", is a condensation of the final chapter of the *Traumdeutung,* the last page or two being devoted to McDougall's views on the psycho-physics of inhibition. The third chapter, "Theories of the Emotions", discusses McDougall's, Shand's and Ribot's views on this subject, besides which the author finds Freud's dichotomy into egoistic and sexual instincts "rather vague and incomplete".

Part III is on Psychotherapy proper. There are said to be four fundamental factors at work: Psycho-Synthesis, Psycho-Catharsis, Autognosis, and the personal influence of the physician (suggestion). The first of these refers to the recovery of lost memories, chiefly in hypnosis. The second is, of course, Breuer's abreaction, to which the author attaches great value. The third term is coined to replace the more humble expression of self-knowledge. The method by which this is attained does not seem to differ from a combination of Dubois' persuasion and Déjerine's conversational talks. "In *a certain class of cases* it may give findings that correspond with the theories of psycho-analysis. In such cases it should, of course, be called psycho-analysis" (p. 104). Presumably in these cases the subject of sex has been mentioned by the patient, but we cannot see what change this makes to the method. The reader may indeed ask why in this section there is no account given of the psycho-analytic method, for it would be very appropriate here, and nearly a half of the whole book is taken up with the subject of psycho-analysis. Further, the author tells us that he has performed numerous psycho-analyses in the past eight years with a view to testing the theory of it (p. vii). The answer is a simple one. In spite of his wide reading, the author seems to be under the curious impression that the psycho-analytic method comprises nothing beyond letting the patient talk. He says, for instance, "Psycho-Analysis is simply the method of free association" (p. 14), and it is implicit in his whole attitude towards the subject, notably in the account he gives of a "Freudian case" (p. 106, 107). Having no sort of familiarity with the psycho-analytic technique, it is comprehensible that his knowledge of the unconscious is purely second-hand and his views on it, therefore, of no particular interest.

A quarter of the book is taken up by Part IV, curiously entitled "Lessons of the War". We say "curiously", for, without intending to, the author makes it quite plain that there were no lessons learned from the war. Neither he nor any of the other numerous writers on the subject has yet produced a single idea or any method of treatment that was not well-known before the war. This is not to say that the account he gives of his experiences in the field (in an advanced neurological station) do not make interesting reading, but that is quite another matter. We note that the author accepts Freud's view of repression as the cause of dissociation, also in the war cases, though not of course his view that the conflict in the psycho-neuroses (even of peace) is fundamentally a sexual one. As for treatment: "In my view it (the process called by Breuer and Freud "abreaction") is the most helpful therapeutic process in dealing with the majority of war psycho-neuroses" (p. 125).

The last Part, a rather superfluous one, is a conventional account of the various hypotheses concerning the relation of mind to brain.

A list of books of reference is appended, no works by any psycho-analytical writers except Freud being mentioned.

We trust that in a future edition Dr. Brown will replace the word "push" by "advance" or "attack" (p. 134, 135), for it is not in harmony with the rest of his style. E. J.

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ANXIETY HYSTERIA. By C. H. L. Rixon, M.D., M.R.C.S., and D. Matthew, M.C., M.B., Ch.B. (H. K. Lewis and Co., London. Pp. 124. Price 4s. 6d.)

This little book, says Col. Sir A. Lisle Webb in his foreword, aims at supplying a real need for a brief and straightforward account of the modern views of functional nervous disorders. This aim is only partly fulfilled, for no account is given of the knowledge of these disorders accruing from the psycho-analytic investigation of them. Further, one fails to find that anything other than what has been brought forward during the last two or three years in the more general literature on the subject, apart from the Freudian, has been discovered by the investigations of the two authors.

If the intention of the authors was to expound the modern views, surely those of Professor Freud and his followers should have been included, even if the writers themselves were unable to accept them.

This book in one direction is an advance on so many others of a like nature, in that the authors have eschewed the term "Psycho-Analysis" and use the term "Mental Exploration" for their investigations in the psychical sphere.

The choice of the title, "Anxiety Hysteria", is unfortunate and misleading. Freud coined this term for a given purpose to describe a particular syndrome. The authors apply this term of Freud's to cover conditions for which it was never intended, and they also quote other terms which they state are used for the same condition. It would amount to the same thing if someone wrote a book entitled, "Paralysis Agitans", and stated that in using this term he included all forms of tremor, and such terms as psycho-neurosis, anxiety state, etc. were sometimes used for the same condition. Such methods do not tend to clarify the already chaotic state of thought with regard to the functional neuroses, but only lead further into the morass.

It is to be noticed that the authors still adhere to the old term subconscious, and they state that there is no hard and fast line between it and the conscious. This is certainly opposed to the modern trend of thought among psychologists, who, since Freud built up his theory of mental functioning, are tending more and more to adopt his nomenclature of conscious and unconscious and the precise meanings he attaches to them.

On page 13, the authors mention the "golfer's golf complex"; the term complex according to its present usage in psychology refers to a group of ideas dissociated from the personality and which are emotionally toned, so it cannot apply in this case to the above "complex"; constellation would have been the correct term.

The authors state on page 43, that the repression of the instinct of self-preservation is the commonest cause of all psycho-neuroses, both war and civil. There is no evidence at present that the instinct of self-preservation is ever in a state of repression, and until this is forthcoming the authors' statement is rendered useless. If it is to be supposed that what they really mean is self-love and not self-preservation, two very different things, then their statement would have a certain degree of truth in it.

The authors' line of treatment of their so-called anxiety hysteria appears to be a resuscitation of forgotten memories, followed by explanations that these are the manifestations of the instinct of self-preservation. The authors claim satisfactory results from this method, but the permanence of cures of this nature is still an open question, for in this respect there is a great divergence of opinion.

Exception must certainly be taken to the authors' remarks on dreams, page 103. Firstly, Freud has never maintained, as is here falsely stated, that all dreams rest on a sexual basis. Secondly, Freud and his followers have always maintained that the interpretation of dreams is only to be arrived at through the free associations of the dreamer. It is somewhat of a presumption on the part of the authors to take Freud's method of interpretation as though they had come to it

by conviction, and assign to Freud and his followers the putting upon the dream the interpretation of the interpreter's mind, which latter method, it may be added, is frequently adopted by the unfortunately increasing number of pseudo-psycho-analysts.

The authors' purposive omission from their bibliography of books directly dealing with their subject, such as Ernest Jones's Papers on Psycho-Analysis, etc., must certainly have some other motivation than the one given, namely, that they have not been mentioned because they are likely to arouse controversial points. Do the authors seriously consider that the books quoted by them contain nothing of controversial nature? If so the outlook for advance in an understanding of psychological problems is decidedly unfavourable.

DOUGLAS BRYAN.

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LES MÉDICATIONS PSYCHOLOGIQUES. Par Pierre Janet. (3 vol., 1144 p. Paris, Alcan, 1919.)

Dans cet ouvrage, Janet a rassemblé une série de conférences et d'articles qu'il a faits entre les années 1906 et 1914. Il analyse les différentes psychothérapies qui ont été employées au cours de ces dernières décades. Janet était particulièrement bien placé pour faire ce travail. A côté de sa connaissance très approfondie des littératures anglaises et allemandes, il est un des rares psychiâtres français, qui ait attribué à la psychologie, une importance de première ligne dans l'étude des maladies mentales. Ce qui donne un charme tout particulier à cet ouvrage, c'est que l'auteur intercale toujours dans son exposé, des exemples concrets.

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Tome premier: «L'action morale et l'utilisation de l'automatisme». (343 p.)

Janet étudie d'abord les guérisons miraculeuses. Il reconnaît qu'elles existent parfois, mais il considère que cette thérapeutique religieuse est la moins scientifique de toutes nos médications psychologiques. Elle est, en effet, appliquée de la même façon pour tous les malades, et, de plus, elle ne fait pas appel à une force psychique humaine, à une énergie individuelle. Tout se passe entre Dieu et la maladie. Le grand progrès que nous apportent les médications philosophiques et morales que Janet étudie ensuite est qu'elles font appel à la volonté humaine. Ces psychothérapies ont cependant encore un gros inconvénient, celui de ne pas tenir compte des circonstances spéciales dans lesquelles s'est développée la maladie. Janet passe alors à l'étude de la suggestion

et de l'hypnose. Après un exposé historique de la question, il conclut que «la suggestion n'est possible que chez des esprits qui présentent momentanément une dépression de profondeur moyenne atteignant le niveau des tendances réalistes et rendant la réflexion lente, difficile et courte», Pour Janet, la suggestion est la provocation d'une impulsion, à la place d'une volonté réfléchie; l'hypnotisme, la provocation d'un somnambulisme à la place d'un état de veille. Avec la suggestion, nous sortons des moralisations indéterminées pour entrer dans une conception plus précise des lois psychologiques. Le fait même qu'elle n'est indiquée que dans des cas restreints, montre déjà que nous sommes en face d'une thérapeutique plus précise et plus scientifique.

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Tome deux: «Les économies psychologiques». (307 p.)

Après avoir parlé de ses travaux sur l'analyse psychologique, et de travaux de Morton Prince, Janet aborde le problème de la psychoanalyse. Au premier abord, il paraît assez sévère à son sujet. Il prétend qu'elle ne nous apporte rien d'original. Il lui reproche encore de faire des généralisations là où il ne s'agit probablement que de cas individuels. Tout en reconnaissant la grande part qu'il faut attribuer aux troubles sexuels dans l'étiologie des névroses, il ne peut admettre le pansexualisme de Freud. Voici ce qu'il dit:

«Si la méthode de la psychoanalyse consiste à trouver à tout prix, même en se permettant les interprétations les plus invraisemblables et les plus saugrenues des idées fixes sexuelles, il est évident que je n'ai pas fait de psychoanalyse. Mais ai-je eu tort de n'en pas faire? Cette méthode d'interprétation sexuelle à outrance est justement ce qui est en discussion; Avant d'exiger son application perpétuelle, à tort ou à travers, il faudrait commencer par démontrer sa légitimité, par montrer sans interprétations la généralité des traumatismes d'ordre sexuel dans les névroses.»

Janet critique aussi la notion de libido qu'il trouve trop vague. Il voudrait aussi un critère plus précis dans les interprétations des symptômes pathologiques:

«L'analogie vague des symptômes avec des phénomènes sexuels n'est pas une raison suffisante pour donner la prépondérance à ces phénomènes dans l'interprétation de la maladie.»

Si le ton général de cet article est assez sévère, il faut reconnaître que sur bien des points Janet rend hommage aux découvertes de Freud. Voici quelques citations qui en font foi. (p. 219.)

«La psychoanalyse a surtout observé les rêves des malades. Mais il faut reconnaître que cet examen des rêves a été fait d'une manière très originale. Au lieu de se borner à recueillir les attitudes et les paroles du sujet pendant les rêves ou immédiatement après le réveil, et de ne tenir compte que de ses paroles elles-mêmes, la psychoanalyse a tiré de ces documents un parti infiniment plus avantageux, grâce à la méthode de l'interprétation.»

(p. 224.) «La conception du refoulement est certainement l'une des plus intéressantes de la psychologie de Freud. Ce phénomène doit être, à mon avis, entendu d'une autre manière, mais il n'en a pas moins une grande importance.»

Parlant de l'opinion générale des psychiâtres français sur la psychoanalyse, Janet dit: «qu'elle est injuste et regrettable, car au-dessous des exagérations et des illusions qui déparent la psychoanalyse et que j'ai été obligé de signaler, se trouvent un grand nombre d'études précieuses sur les névroses, sur l'évolution de la pensée dans l'enfance, sur les diverses formes des sentiments sexuels. Ces études ont attiré l'attention sur des faits peu connus, et que, par suite d'une réserve traditionelle, on était trop disposé à négliger. Plus tard on oubliera les généralisations outrées et les symbolismes aventureux qui aujourd'hui semblent caractériser ces études et les séparer des autres travaux scientifiques et on ne se souviendra que d'une seule chose, c'est que la psychoanalyse a rendu de grands services à l'analyse psychologique.»

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Tome trois: «Les acquisitions psychologiques.» (494 p.)

Dans ce troisième volume Janet s'attache à décrire les médications qui font acquérir au malade des tendances nouvelles, qui cherchent à augmenter ses forces ou à lui faire récupérer celles qu'il a perdues. Janet aborde d'abord le problème de l'éducation et de la rééducation. Il ne s'arrête pas seulement à la rééducation physique (gymnastique pour les contractures hystériques, rhythmique pour les choréiques, exercices de prononciation contre le bégayement, etc.) mais il étudie encore la rééducation de la perception, de la mémoire, de l'attention et des autres facultés psychiques. A cause de la grande difficulté qu'ont les névrosés à faire des acquisitions nouvelles, l'éducation, comme moyen thérapeutique, n'a que des indications limitées. Elle est efficace surtout contre les troubles qui portent sur des fonctions psychologiques élémentaires et sur des troubles qui sont localisés sur une fonction particulière et non sur l'ensemble du psychisme. Janet insiste sur la nécessité de préciser les symptômes et les malades auxquels l'éducation

est applicable avec efficacité. La psychothérapie selon lui, n'est pas encore arrivée à ce résultat.

L'auteur étudie ensuite les aesthésiogénies et il comprend sous ce titre les médications qui cherchent à provoquer une excitation par la sensibilité. A ce propos, il rappelle la métallothérapie et le magnétisme. Il pense que ces méthodes pourraient avoir une grande importance si l'on étudiait mieux les phénomènes si singuliers et encore peu explicables qu'elles ont mis en lumière. A leur endroit, on ne peut évidemment pas encore parler de règles thérapeutiques mais il y a cependant des germes à développer. Janet étudie ensuite les autres traitements par l'excitation. Ceux-ci sont caractérisés par leur tendance à provoquer un effort personnel plutôt que l'automatisme, une activité plutôt que le repos, une vie sociale plutôt que l'isolement. Il fait remarquer justement que certains actes qui, à première vue, paraissent déprimants sont souvent au contraire des excitants; mais là plus qu'ailleurs il nous faut tenir compte du facteur personnel. Il faut procéder par tâtonnements, car ce qui est excitation pour les uns est dépression pour les autres: Ainsi sont les mariages, les voyages, les dangers, les douleurs, les émotions, les travaux professionnels ou les travaux intellectuels. Lorsque ces excitants psychologiques sont insuffisants pour rendre au malade sa vie normale, Janet les appelle impulsions pathologiques. Mais là encore il recommande de ne pas les négliger mais au contraire d'utiliser ce qu'elles ont de favorable. Pour appliquer ces traitements par l'excitation avantageusement, il faut avant tout être au clair sur le degré de dépression du malade. Janet conclut ainsi son long chapitre sur les excitations:

«Il faut indiquer aux malades des actions qu'ils soient capables d'accomplir et qui leur laissent des bénéfices. Il faut leur apprendre à les accomplir correctement et complètement de la manière qui peut teur être excitante. L'homme ne s'enrichit pas seulement en faisant des économies sur ses dépenses, il peut aussi s'enrichir, peur-être même plus rapidement, en apprenant à faire des recettes.»

L'auteur étudie ensuite les médications psycho-physiologiques. A ce propos, il analyse les travaux de Lewellys Barker, de Seguin, de Deschamps, de Chaslin, de Huchard, etc. Il insiste sur l'importance des recherches faites au cours de ces dernières années sur les vaso-moteurs et les glandes à sécrétions internes. Il fait bien remarquer l'importance de la physiologie dans l'étude des maladies mentales et il ne saurait accepter l'attitude de certains psycho-thérapeutes qui voudraient se passer des connaissances physiologiques et médicales. Janet étudie ensuite «la direction morale» qu'il différencie des médications morales dont il a parlé dans son premier volume, en ce qu'il s'agit ici, non plus d'une morale vague appliquée à tous les malades de la même façon,

mais d'une action morale précise, tenant compte des circonstances spéciales du malade et de l'influence personelle du médecin. Etudiant ensuite cette influence, il rend hommage en passant à la théorie de Freud sur le transfert. Cette méthode de la direction morale demande un tact très avisé. On ne saurait aborder un aboulique en faisant appel tout de suite et à touts propos à sa volonté. Comme les autres, cette médication ne peut s'appliquer à tous les cas. Elle n'est du reste pas sans produire certains troubles: résistance ou attachement exagéré du malade au médecin. A ce propos encore, Janet discute les théories des psychoanalystes.

En conclusion, l'auteur nous propose la définition suivante de la psychothérapie:

«La psychothérapie est un ensemble de procédés thérapeutiques de toutes espèces, aussi bien physiques que moraux, applicables à des maladies aussi bien physiques que morales, procédés déterminés par la considération de faits psychologiques observés antérieurement et surtout par la considération des lois qui règlent le développement de ces faits psychologiques et leur association soit entre eux, soit avec des phénomènes physiologiques. En un mot, la psychothèrapie est une application de la science psychologique au traitement des maladies.»

Janet estime que nous ne possédons pas encore une psychothérapie telle qu'il vient de la définir. En effet, en thérapeutique nous pouvons, suivant les maladies, ordonner avec précision un purgatif ou un astringent, un calmant ou un narcotique, tandisqu'en psychothérapie il ne nous est pas encore permis de dire avec la même précision: Ici il faut faire de l'hypnose, là de la suggestion, ou encore, chez tel autre malade, une psychoanalyse. Certes nous tendons à arriver à ce résultat, c'est pourquoi Janet, s'il est très pessimiste aujourd'hui reste plein d'espoir pour demain. Nous avons terminé l'analyse de son grand ouvrage, nous avons craint d'être trop bref sur bien des points et surtout, au cours de notre exposé, nous n'avons pas eu la place de faire bien des remarques critiques qui nous sont venues à l'esprit, à la lecture de cet ouvrage si documenté et si attrayant. Nous renvoyons donc notre lecteur à ce livre qui résume d'une façon magistrale non seulement l'expérience très riche de l'auteur, mais aussi toutes les experiences qui ont été faites au cours du siècle dernier, dans le domaine si passionnant de la psychothérapie.

RAYMOND DE SAUSSURE.

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PAGAN AND CHRISTIAN CREEDS: THEIR ORIGIN AND MEANING. By Edward Carpenter (George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London. Pp. 318. Price 10s. 6d.).

This is a book that would be useful to every psycho-analyst. It contains in a handy and readable form material that is not readily accessible otherwise. It has the superiority over the usual text-books of mythology in embracing a wider scope, taking into account the work done during the past century by anthropologists as well. The subjects dealt with include a comparative study of the solar myths, Christmas festivals, totem-sacraments, rites of expiation, initiation, and redemption, saviour-gods and virgin-mothers, the sex-taboo, magicians, kings and gods, food and vegetation magic — in short, the whole evolution of religion and allied phenomena. Two chapters deal with the genesis and exodus of Christianity respectively.

Scholars might find a good deal to criticise in the details of the work, especially as the material is all gathered at second or third hand; and the author is not over-discriminating in his choice of authorities, appearing to rely equally on men like Reinach and less trustworthy writers such as J. M. Robertson and Andrew Lang. But the broad outlines of what he has to present are sound enough, and, after all, he is avowedly acting as a transmitter between the expert and the uninformed. Not that he confines himself to playing this part. Much of what he has to say has been transmuted by his own general outlook on life, which is at once poetic and rationalistic. Of the three main naturalistic theories of myths and religions his view is that the phallic cults came first, the cult of magic and the propitiation of earth-divinities and spirits (including vegetation magic) came second, and only last came the belief in definite God-figures residing in heaven (including the solar, lunar and stellar myths). He attempts further a rough correlation between the developmental stages of the various phenomena and three stages of mental development, to which he gives the names of simple consciousness, self-consciousness, and universal consciousness respectively. They are not altogether unlike Freud's stages of animism, religion, and science.

As is well-known, psycho-analysis has been extensively applied to many of the topics here dealt with, by Freud, Abraham, Rank, Reik, Roheim, and others. All this work is quite ignored by Carpenter, and it is very striking to note how his own suffers in consequence. Time and again he flounders over a particular problem — typical examples being the necessity for a virgin-mother and the meaning of totem meals, where a knowledge of psycho-analysis would at once have provided him with the key to the solution. The whole work will have to be re-written again some day in the light of these later investigations. Psycho-analytical work is of course accessible to analysts in our own literature, and no analyst can afford to ignore the problems in question, which have immediate bearings on our daily studies of unconscious mental life. But it is very useful to have, so to speak, the raw material gathered

together for us in such a convenient shape, providing at least a review of the problems which can then serve as a starting-point for more intensive and special studies.

E. J.

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Die Pubertätsdrüse und ihre Wirkungen (The Puberty Glands and their Effects.) By Alexander Lipschütz, Lecturer on Physiology at the University of Bern. (Bircher, Bern 1919. Pp. 456.)

"Whoever feels the need to fill up this large gap in our knowledge (i. e. with reference to the essential factors of sexuality) with a tentative assumption may formulate the following conception based on the active substances found in the thyroid gland: A material which is distributed throughout the organism becomes disintegrated through the appropriate excitation of erotogenic zones, as well as through other conditions under which sexual excitement originates. The products of this disintegration supply a specific stimulus to the organs of reproduction or to the centres in the spinal cord connected with them. We are already familiar with such a disintegration of a toxic stimulus into a specific stimulus of an organ from other poisonous substances that are introduced into the body from without . . . I certainly do not attach any value to this particular assumption and should be quite ready to give it up in favour of another provided its fundamental character, the emphasis laid on sexual chemism, is preserved. For this apparently arbitrary statement is supported by a fact which, though little heeded, is particularly worth considering. The neuroses, which can be traced to disturbances of the sexual life, show the greatest clinical resemblance to the phenomena of intoxication and abstinence which result through the habitual introduction of pleasure-producing poisonous substances (alkaloids)."

This passage, which the writer quotes from Freud's "Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie" gives the views that have obtained in psycho-analysis from its commencement on the physiological basis of the libido. Freud in his first publications on the pathogenesis of the anxiety neurosis and neurasthenia presented the view that these "actual neuroses" are not accessible to psychological analysis, but only to a physiological one, and he emphasised the far-reaching similarity that exists between anxiety and neurasthenic symptoms and the phenomena of chronic poisoning and abstinence. The reviewer has also alluded to the analogy between the symptoms of alcoholism and certain purely endogenous neuroses. He stated, "that the neurotic who takes a glass of brandy really only wishes to stimulate his failing capacity to induce endogenous pleasure through the taking of alcohol, which suggests a certain analogy between the hypothetical endogenous substance of the libido and alcohol. The symptomatology of alcoholic intoxication with the subsequent

crapulence shows a great similarity to the cyclical psychosis" (*Jahrb. der Psychoanalyse,* Bd. III., S. 855). Freud also considers that the symptoms of hypochondria, the "third actual neurosis", which cannot be resolved any further psychically, are an accumulation of "products of fermentation" of the organ libido, therefore also a sort of internal secretion.

These and similar passages in the works of the Freudian school are so numerous and so familiar to those conversant with the literature that it may seem unnecessary to make further allusion to them. Still from time to time it is necessary to do this, because our opponents generally suppress these passages—either intentionally or from ignorance of the facts—in order to bring the unjust reproach against psycho-analysis that it wishes to explain everything from a psychical point of view and denies the biological basis of the neuroses and sexuality.

The few passages that have been quoted, which could easily be multiplied tenfold, prove the opposite. A biochemical and biomechanical conception of the processes of life in general, and the sexual ones in particular, lies at the basis of psycho-analysis; but the working out of these problems psycho-analysis leaves for the most part to biologists, and physiologists, because it has no direct access to them itself. On the other hand, psycho-analysis asserts that it possesses a method of investigation and treatment which enables it to analyse into their elements the psychical phenomena accompanying the normal and neurotic sexual processes, to investigate their conflicts with other mental forces, to reconstruct the developmental history of the mental part of sexuality (the fate of the libido), and to influence psychotherapeutically this fate. Psycho-analysis can proffer the most valuable conclusions where biological methods have for a long time failed. These conclusions, however, have to bear the fate of all psycho-analytical explanations; they are exceedingly antipathetic to conscious thought, and for this reason there is a tendency—mostly unconscious—to their distortion and misinterpretation; hence also the relief that is felt at every new physiological discovery, whether it is the Abderhalden specific reaction to organic extracts, or the opening of a new chapter in the theory of the internal secretions. Every time it is hoped that the troublesome thing "psychical" and its deep investigation—psycho-analysis—will finally be buried.

It is to be expected that the publication of the most recent biological investigations on the function of the "puberty glands", which Lipschütz has collected together and systematically presented in this extremely well and clearly written text-book, will leave a similar effect It now appears proved that certain sexual processes can be inhibited, or, on the other hand, re-enforced, by physiological and especially by biochemical means. We certainly shall not fail to find people who with this somewhat too big physiological gun will assert that the whole ingenious

edifice of psycho-analysis will be blown down, and that from now all neuroses will be treated only by chemical or operative means. We shall await these attacks with equanimity and not follow the bad examples of our opponents. On the contrary, we are quite willing to admit the great biological significance of the new discoveries; but we shall not give up the hope that the meritorious investigators of the new physiological territories will acquire so much psycho-analytical knowledge that they will recognise in time the real limits of their competence and not overstep them.

We should like to state at the beginning, however, that this reproach of one-sidedness and tendenciousness cannot be brought against the author of this work. He expressly and repeatedly declares, "that the psychosexual conduct of man cannot be explained alone from the effects of the internal secretion of the sexual glands". But he takes into consideration only the effectiveness of factors other than those of internal secretion in as far as "external factors produce changes in the central nervous system on which the sexual glands act through their internal secretion". Lipschütz does not seem to know that psychical factors can oppose the biochemical sexual activities as an independent force, that they can re-enforce, inhibit or even completely suppress them, and that the final and manifest sexuality of man proves to be the result of libidinous and other (especially egoistic) impulses, as psycho-analysis has taught for the last twenty years. And yet it was his master, Professor Steinach of Vienna, the discoverer of the puberty glands, who, stimulated by psycho-analysis, was able to produce proof from experiments on animals that purely psychical effects could inhibit or re-enforce the development of the puberty glands (in an anatomical and functional sense). The finer processes of these psychical inhibitions and re-enforcements of sexuality will not for a long time be the object of physiological experiments; the psycho-analytic path is still the only one to their recognition.

This limitation, which corresponds with the facts, of the importance of the new discoveries certainly does not deny their great significance. On the contrary, we do not hesitate to assert that Steinach's discoveries may be regarded as the most important event in the sphere of human and animal physiology since the discovery of the functions of the thyroid gland, suprarenals and pituitary gland. The importance of the subject for psycho-analysts induces the writer to give the readers of the JOURNAL a more detailed account of the content of this book.

The most important result of the more recent investigations, which were carried out under Steinach's guidance in the biological experimental institute of the Academy of Science in Vienna, is the establishment of the fact that no internal secretory effect can be ascribed to the spermatogenic part of the testicle and its small canals, and that it is the so-

called "interstitial cells" of the testicle, i. e. the cells in the tissue between the small canals of the testicle, which represent that internal secretory organ "whose task it is to bring to maturity the physical and psychical sexual characteristics and to preserve them in a state of maturity". The totality of these cells forms an organ in itself, an internal secretory gland, to which Steinach gave the name of the male puberty gland.

The female puberty gland of mammals consists of connective tissue epitheloid cells in the Thela interna of the shrinking follicle and epithelial cells of the Granulosa, with in addition periodically after a definite age the corpora lutea of menstruation or pregnancy. (On the whole the histological and functional findings in the male sex are much clearer and more convincing. Reviewer.)

An important fact that the author of this work, Dr. Lipschütz, has established compels us to refer again to a result of the Freudian theory. We know that Freud on the basis of his analyses of the neuroses was impelled to assume two great thrusts of development of the libido, corresponding to the two efflorescences of infantile (perverse) and juvenile sexuality; between these a period of relative sexual quiescence is interpolated, the so-called latency period, in which the entire instinctive force of the human being is placed in the service of asexual tendencies (in the psyche, of "sublimations"). It is sufficiently well known what indignation the Freudian assumption of an infantile sexuality provoked in our psychologists. All possible kinds of unscientific polemics were mobilised against it, including scorn and derision, calumny, personal attacks, theological, moral, even psychological and biological pseudo-arguments, only so as to protect the amnesia prevailing in childhood regarding infantile sexual processes, to hang round it more closely a scientific veil and to save the ideal of a childhood "unsullied" by sexuality. But what does the unbiassed experimental biologist show us? Nothing less than the "exact" confirmation of the Freudian assumptions.

"The much discussed sexuality of the child" — it runs on page 127 in reference to psycho-analysis — "and the sexual perversions of adults can be considered as infantile fragments of sexuality, to which normally new components are added during further development under the influence of the sex glands". This confirmation is carried further even into details. It could be established that in the male foetus the puberty gland is markedly hypertrophied, so that it occupies the greater part of the testicle; a second significant increase of the interstitial cells takes place at puberty, so that really there are two acmes in the development of the puberty glands. Lipschütz saw he was compelled to assume that changes take place in the organism in the early embryonic period, which qualitatively are similar to those that occur in the period of puberty. He then distinguishes two "great phases" of puberty or sexual

maturity. "What has hitherto been generally denoted as the period of puberty is probably only a "second great phase of puberty, which sets in about the middle of the second decade". "The age of childhood, reckoned from birth to the beginning of the second great phase, can be denoted as the 'intermediate phase of puberty' " (p. 170). Apart from differences in nomenclature and certain relations in time, these passages contain the biological corroboration of the developmental history of sexual maturity (infantile sexuality, latency period, puberty) postulated by Freud.

Sooner than one ventured to hope, the view expressed by the reviewer concerning Freud's "Theory of Sex" and its scientific and historical significance begins to be verified. He maintained that Freud's sexual biological discoveries have an originality of a peculiar order. While hitherto psychologists had to start from the experiential facts of physiology, here for the first time it happens that conclusions were arrived at concerning unknown biological facts from pure psychological investigations, and these conclusions awaited the corroboration of biology. A second confirmation of this nature is that proclaimed by Steinach of the influence of sexual biological processes through the purely psychic influencing of animals.

In any case these gratifying agreements point to a future, though certainly distant, in which biologists and psycho-analysts will be associated in a common work.

The new knowledge of the functions of the puberty glands we owe to a great number of experiments on animals carried out by biologists with much patience and care, for instance, observations on castrated and cryptorchidic animals and human beings, transplantation experiments of female and male sex glands, experiments of over-feeding and injection of gland substance, elective Röntgenisation of the germ glands while sparing the interstitial cells, artificial atrophy of the germ cells and hypertrophy of the interstitial cells by ligaturing the vas deferens, etc. From the mass of facts presented we will only call attention to a few that are of particular interest to us. Lipschütz states (p. 23) that "the connections recognised by Tandler compel us to assume that during the ontogenetic development the soma passes at first through an asexual stage, that an asexual embryonic form exists, sexual differentiation being only brought about later through the formative action of the sex glands". He then says (p. 127) that some infantile components of sexuality represent asexual impulses, which only later become attributes of the sexual whole. This assumption is built up chiefly on the experience that castration results in the approximation to a form of youth common to both sexes (the "asexual" form). Reference must first of all be made here to the double meaning of the word "sexual": a form of youth which is asexual in the sense of the sexual dimorphism can very well

be sexual in the erotic sense. Secondly it is to be noted — and this Lipschütz admits in other places — that the puberty glands and the secondary sexual characteristics in part dependent on them may not be the sole sources and expressions of sexuality. Our psycho-analytical experiences compel us to assume that there are sexual components peculiar to the individual organs of the body themselves, even apart from their having been previously "erotised" by the secretion of the puberty glands; these components attain the fuller incorporation, so to speak the fuller initiation, through the cooperation of the genital and secondary sexual characteristics (which of course are largely dependent on the puberty glands). We have not the least doubt that further biological experience will also corroborate this observation so conclusive to psycho-analysts.

With a certain air of intent the author seems to evade the question of the general bisexuality (with the ultimate prevalence of the one sex) postulated by psycho-analysis. We expect that he does this because he has gained his psychological knowledge chiefly from the literature of the advocates of homosexuality (particularly Magnus Hirschfeld) who do not wish to recognise that homosexuals are rudimentary and incomplete sexual types who have remained fixed in a preliminary stage of development but would like to assign to them the rôle of a particular (perhaps especially privileged) intermediate stage. And yet the brilliant "masculinations" achieved by operation, by means of which Steinach has transformed male homosexuals of the feminine type in such a way that there developed in them normal male characteristics and a corresponding attitude of libido, change nothing in the conception we are led to by psycho-analysis. It would be a gross error to confound femininity of the man with homosexuality altogether. Psycho-analysis shows us many cases in which the homo-erotic tendency develops as a neurotic symptom without there being any femininity in the predisposition; in such cases the "masculination" would only increase the psychical conflicts and aggravate the neurosis, perhaps also the homosexuality. Therefore great caution is necessary in recommending these operations.

The reviewer had the opportunity of recommending to Professor Steinach a few themes which present themselves in this biological province; for instance, the biochemical influencing of the paranoiac homosexuals, biochemical-macrobiotic and therapeutic experiments (by means of transplantation of puberty glands or ligaturing the vas deferens). Fortunately he came too late with his proposals, since these works had already been started by Steinach and partly carried through already. We await with great interest the communication of these results.

S. Ferenczi.

NOTES

THE INTERNATIONAL PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL PRESS

In June appeared the first two volumes of The International Psycho-Analytical Library, namely, 'Addresses on Psycho-Analysis' by the late J. J. Putnam, and 'Psycho-Analysis and the War Neuroses'. The former is a collection of Dr. Putnam's papers on Psycho-Analysis, together with a bibliography of his psychological writings and an Obituary by Dr. Ernest Jones, a Preface by Professor Sigm. Freud, and a portrait of the author. The latter book contains three papers which were read at the Congress of 1918 by Drs. Ferenczi, Abraham and Simmel, a paper by Dr. Ernest Jones read before the Section of Psychiatry of the Royal Society of Medicine, and an Introduction by Professor Freud.

The third volume of the Library, 'The Psycho-Analytic Study of the Family' by J. C. Flügel, will be ready by the time these lines are printed.

A translation of Freud's 'Jenseits des Lustprinzips' (Beyond the Pleasure-Principle) is in the press and one of 'Massenpsychologie und Ich-Analyse' is in active preparation and will appear during the Autumn.

The translation rights of the 'Sammlung kleiner Schriften zur Neurosenlehre' have been acquired by the Press, and these papers will be rearranged and published in six volumes.

'Essays in Applied Psycho-Analysis' by Dr. Ernest Jones is now in preparation. This will contain, amongst other essays, 'A Psycho-Analytic Study of Hamlet', 'The Symbolic Significance of Salt in Folk-Lore and Superstition', 'The Virgin Mary's Conception through the Ear: A Contribution to the Relations between Aesthetics and Religion'.

Other books in preparation include 'Australian Totemism' by Róheim, 'Studies in Dreams and Allied Topics' by Rank, a collection of papers on Psycho-Analysis by Ferenczi, and one by Abraham.

INTERNATIONALER PSYCHOANALYTISCHER VERLAG

The Internationale psychoanalytische Bibliothek has reached its eleventh volume with a translation of Dr. Ernest Jones' 'Treatment of the Neuroses' under the title of 'Therapie der Neurosen'. Previous volumes in this series published during the last twelve months are: 'Zum Kampf um die Psychoanalyse' by Oskar Pfister; 'Psychoanalyse und Soziologie' by Aurel Kolnai, and 'Klinische Beiträge zur Psychoanalyse' by Karl Abraham.

A second edition of 'Jenseits des Lustprinzips' (which is, by the way, the second *Beiheft* to the *Zeitschrift*) was issued in June with certain revisions, and in July Freud's new work 'Massenpsychologie und Ich-Analyse' was published.

One of the most important publications of the year is the 'Bericht über die Fortschritte der Psychoanalyse in den Jahren 1914 bis 1919', the third *Beiheft*. The bulk of the material contained in this book is being published in English in the JOURNAL under the heading of Collective Reviews, but those who wish for full bibliographies are again reminded that they should consult the original *Bericht*.

The fourth *Beiheft,* which appeared within the last month, is August Stärcke's 'Psychoanalyse und Psychiatrie', a paper read before the Congress at the Hague.

Beyond that already mentioned, new editions of the following books have been called for: 'Zur Psychopathologie des Alltagslebens' (7th. enlarged edition), 'Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse' (3rd. edition), 'Totem und Tabu' (2nd. edition), and 'Tagebuch eines halbwüchsigen Mädchens' (2nd. edition).

REPORTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL ASSOCIATION

NEW YORK PSYCHOANALYTIC SOCIETY

Meeting on October 22, 1920. Dr. Rudolph Katz of Amsterdam, Synthetic Analysis, being an exposition of the theories of Dr. C. G. Jung of Zurich.

Meeting on November 30, 1920. Spirit Mediums and Their Manifestations. By Dr. H. W. Frink.

Meeting on January 25, 1921. Some experiences at the Sixth International Psycho-Analytical Congress. New points of view in Psycho-Analysis as gleaned from the work with Prof. Freud, and contact with the other European analysts.

The main points dwelt upon were the great interest shown in the work of the Congress by all those present; the large number of members of good standing present at the Congress; the well marked progress of Psycho-Analysis that the members of the various countries could report; the activities of the Vienna group of analysts and the very pleasant time spent at their meetings in Vienna.

As far as the technical points in analysis are concerned, the advantages of the reclining position to those of the sitting position heretofore used in America. Also the advantages of daily visits (excepting Sundays and holidays) instead of three times weekly, as formerly practised. Mention was made of the so-called "active therapy", which had been spoken of at the Congress. The aim of the speaker was in the main to emphasize the great advantages, and the great sense of satisfaction of going to the fountain source for information.

It is worth mentioning that since the return of Dr. Stern from Vienna, two other analysts, Drs. Frink and Meyer, have gone to Vienna, and at the present writing are with Prof. Freud. In the Fall three other analysts are going to work with Prof. Freud.

Several new members have been elected in the past six months.

At this meeting a new President was elected, in the person of T. H. Ames, Dr. A. Stern was elected Vice President, and Dr. A. A.

Brill, Secretary and Treasurer. Recommendations were made to Professor Freud concerning the appointment of associate editors to the JOURNAL.

Meeting on February 16, 1920, Dr. Stern read an abstract of Freud's "Jenseits des Lustprinzips".

After recapitulating the development of the theory of the pleasure-pain principle, Freud goes on to expound his conception of the mechanism of the traumatic and the war neuroses, and the dreams of patients suffering from them. Such dreams are to be explained, according to Freud, on some theory other than that of the wish-fulfilment. The absence of a mechanism for the discharge of affect is responsible for such dreams, and the repeated occurrence of such dreams is an attempt of the patient to effect a discharge or release of affect. Patients are predisposed to traumatic or war neuroses when fright is not negatived by a pre-existing anxiety or fear; fright is an emotion resulting from an unexpected danger. A *Wiederholungszwang* (an impulse to repeat) Freud believes in certain instances to precede a wish, as a determinant for an act, as illustrated in the play of children, and in the phenomena of the transference during a psychoanalytic treatment; the *Wiederholungszwang* dominates the wish-fulfilment principle in such instances. Freud expounds this theory by means of further speculation concerning the function and development of consciousness, drawing an analogy from the functions of the outer layer of the protozoa. One function of the outer surface is to exclude the entrance of destructive stimuli; when destructive stimuli break through, as in shock, the pleasure-principle is abrogated, and the necessity arises for the disposal of the inrushing stimuli by means of the occupation energy *(Besetzungsenergie)*, which converts the inrushing energy into static energy (a process that may be likened to chemotaxis). A traumatic neurosis is due to a rupture or break in the defensive mechanism, with inability of the system to convert the inrushing energy into static *(ruhende)* energy. Preservation of the ego is now the object to be attained, and that is primary to the wish-fulfilment principle. The dreams would then be an attempt on the part of the ego to convert the free floating *(freibewegende)* energy into static *(ruhende)* energy, by having the necessary dread or anxiety in the dream. The *Wiederholungszwang* attempts to bind the free floating energy, which threatens the existence of the ego.

Freud sees in all living organisms an impulse to return to former states or conditions, given up because of disturbing external circumstances; this impulse is an expression of inertia of all living matter, and is apparently opposite to our wonted conception of an impulse as a striving towards change and development. Such organisms as have resisted these external influences are still on a low level of animal or plant life. The germ cells of the higher organisms reproduce life, and are in opposition to death of living substance. The destiny of these cells, after they have severed themselves from the primary organism, is guarded by the instincts. This contrast results in death (ego) impulses and life (sex) impulses. Freud compares this conception with Schopenhauer's philosophy of death as a final result or aim in life, and on the other hand, the sex impulse as "the will to live".

The development of the libido theory showed us the broad meaning of the word love or sex; also the transferring of love of object to the ego (introversion), thus making part of the ego instincts libidinous (narcissism). Love as expressed in sadism is destruction of the love object, and in the form of masochism, destruction of the ego; it is sadism in which the ego becomes the object. The sadistic component may be the primary death impulse. The proof of the existence of the death impulse may be found in the fact that the dominating tendency in the psyche and in the whole nervous system, is the striving towards decreasing, stabilizing or annihilating inner tensions as expressed in the libido theory.

Freud emphasizes the speculative nature of his theories, and states that he himself does not know to what an extent he is ready to accept them as definite.

In the discussion that followed, the prominence and importance of the ego instincts in the causation of the neuroses (war and traumatic) were dwelt upon. Emphasis was laid on the introduction of a new element in dream production. It was also pointed out that this divergence from the wish-fulfilment principle in dreams in no manner detracted from the value of the latter; but that according to Freud the wish-fulfilment did not sufficiently explain the phenomena of the dreams of the war and traumatic neurotics.

Meeting on April 26, 1921. Visual Imagery in relation to Libido. By Mary K. Isham.

Dr. Isham said that she had chosen Visual Imagery as a title for her paper merely as a topic upon which to focus attention for

some ideas more or less closely related to it. She was not attempting to form any scientific conclusions. Visual images, or patterns of spatial outline and color, are woven into every function of human life. In considering any function of the mind, we come into relationship with every other process and product, and one sometimes seems to wander from the announced subject.

Taking visual images, first presentative and then representative in the order of their relationship to external reality in varying degrees down into the depths of unconscious life, we have direct visual perception of an external object, after-images, conscious memory images, revery, fantasy, hypnagogic images, dream pictures, hallucinations, imagery of the clairvoyant trance.

In order to gain a clear idea of the relation of visual imagery to libido, the writer called attention to zonal components and various other topographical areas of interest. By means of the zonal components and organs of special sensation, as well as of those muscular, articular, and visceral, the partial instincts work out their urges. The partial instinct with which we are concerned in the formation of imagery is that of looking in its extreme receptive and passive functioning. If this sort of functioning becomes blocked by a heaping up of libido toward the sensory end, the sensory stimulus is not transmitted into motor activity, but is projected from within into an artificial objectification. But a temporary blocking is not unwholesome, provided it continues only long enough to act as a signal for further and more effective activity. It can not be considered abnormal, unless it persists long enough to cause annoyance and inconvenience.

Some of the causes for the heaping-up of libido in vision were discussed. In regard to wrong methods of training, the case of a child who developed habits of repression, from being under the supervision of two austere, silent and repressed parents, was described. Such a child is denied most of its motor outlets, and has little chance to express itself even in words of which it hears very few in the solemn, vacuous, and sordid atmosphere of the home. It is on the way to become idealistic beyond its capacity for sublimation, introverted, and hyperaesthesic. Under these conditions, it resorts to the most accessible, but chiefly passive occupation of looking at things, although its interest in everything is very active. But the passive attitude of receiving impressions gets an active motor outlet, when the child hunts through books,

or whatever else it can find for pictures. Impressions mostly take visual form.

Then the writer discussed the relation of visual imagery, thinking, and word-forming. This led to an account of the mechanism of imagery in the thinker of pronounced visual type.

The two extreme types of intellectuals who are continually expressing their antagonism for the other's way of thinking easily fall into a sensory image-forming and concrete motor type. The intuitive thinker was selected as the former and the scientist as the latter. Both, the one working in pure intimations of immediate experience, the other in material which can be measured, meet in every person in varying proportions.

When a forgotten visual memory laden with repressed impulse is hindered from transformation into intellectualization, or into motor activity, it is forced to artificial projection. Examples of this result were given: also examples of the unprojected and more passive forms which do not attain the representative situation, but are a direct and fixed looking at some object; and examples of the projection of visual imagery into different forms of art.

Art, sex and religion were three subjects that were assigned their share in the projection of visual imagery. Their common bond and distinctions were discussed upon the definition of religion as essentially a longing for an intimate bond between a superior personality and one's self.

Art, although originating in a partial impulse and a direct urge is also in its process of production a form of sublimation, a deviation from the sex instinct, because it is love energy directed toward a non-human, instead of a human object love.

Similarly visual imagery, not only as a component of artistic production, but of any achievement, condenses many meanings in relation to libido. It is a sign that the libido is blocked somewhere and hence is a signal for transformation of energy. It is also an agent of sublimation, for it effects a diversion of libido from tabooed outlets.

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